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This doctoral dissertation makes a twofold contribution to the understanding of 
psychological processes behind food choice. First, it explores whether cognitive 
shortcuts, known as heuristics, based on seemingly irrational beliefs can lead to rational 
behaviours when applied in the right context. One such heuristic, the organic = 
healthful heuristic, is explored. It is the belief that organic products are more healthful 
than conventional products. There is no conclusive evidence supporting this belief, also 
known as the halo effect, where positive attitudes towards organic products transfer to 
beliefs about specific properties such as healthfulness. Here I propose statistical 
learning as an alternative explanation to the halo effect, and test this in three studies. 
Study 1 shows that food products from healthful food categories are more likely to be 
organic. Study 2 shows that consumer perceptions of the healthfulness and the number 
of organic products across food categories are accurate. Study 3 shows that consumers 
perceive organic products as more healthful when the statistical structure justifies this 
inference. These findings show that consumers correctly use organic products as a cue 
for healthfulness because they are, on average, 30% more healthful than conventional 
products. Second, this doctoral dissertation develops a new information search measure 
which complements existing measures to better describe consumer search processes. 
One area, which is currently not covered by existing measures, is when information 
search consists of equal amounts of attribute- and alternative-wise search sequences. I 
propose a new measure, the Systematicity of Search Index (SSI), which explores 
information search in terms of systematicity or the proportion of non-random search. 
Study 4 demonstrates the usefulness of the measure and shows that the SSI can shed 
light on processes not captured by the existing measures for analysing information 
search. 
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1.1 Importance of understanding food choice 
The motivation for this doctoral dissertation has been to understand how 
consumers make food choices so that we can help them to make better decisions. To do 
this, we first need to have a theoretical understanding of what consumers do when 
making food choices. The importance of understanding how consumers make food 
choices is underlined by a range of different social issues. Three issues were central to 
this thesis: growing obesity rates, growing food waste rates, and issues regarding food 
safety. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss each of these three issues in more 
detail, and the reasons why they were central to the thesis.  
First, understanding why obesity rates continue to rise is one of the main reasons 
for studying food choice. Studies predict that one fifth of adults worldwide will be 
obese by 2025, with the citizens of the United Kingdom (UK) expected to be the most 
obese population in Europe by the same date (National Health Service, 2016a). It is 
well known that obesity increases the risks of developing Type 2 diabetes, coronary 
heart disease, stroke and specific types of cancer such as breast and bowel cancer 
(National Health Service, 2016b). By understanding how consumers make food choices, 
we can help them make more healthful choices with regards to the causes of obesity.  
Second, growing food waste rates also contribute to the need for better 
understanding of food choice. Statistics show that approximately one third of the food 
produced globally, (i.e. 1.3 billion tonnes), on a yearly basis gets wasted which amounts 
to approximately US$ 680 billion in industrialized and US$ 310 billion in developing 
countries (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2017). In the UK, 
the estimated amount of household food waste for 2015 was 7.3 million tonnes, which 
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is an increase of 4.3% on 7.0 million tonnes of food waste produced in 2012. Of these 
7.3 million tonnes, the amount of the food waste that could have been avoided, i.e. the 
food that was edible at some point before it was thrown away, was 4.4 million tonnes, 
compared to 4.2 million tonnes in 2012, which is an increase of 4.8%. The retail value 
of the avoidable food waste was around £13 billion, and this was associated with 19 
million tonnes of CO2, which is the same as the emissions produced by one in four cars 
on UK roads (Waste Resources Action Programme, 2017). It is therefore important to 
understand how consumers make food choices, to reduce the amount of avoidable food 
waste and hence reduce these negative effects on the environment.  
Third, it is also becoming more important to understand consumer decisions 
when it comes to food safety. In the last few decades, food safety received more 
attention due to the emergence of various ‘food scares’ such as bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE) in beef, the Belgian dioxin scandal, salmonella outbreaks and the 
horsemeat scandal, to name just a few. Consequently, every year in the world, almost 
one in 10 consumers gets ill from eating contaminated food, which results in 420,000 
deaths. Furthermore, almost 125,000 children under the age of five,  die every year 
from foodborne diseases which makes this group particularly vulnerable, and amounts 
to 30% of all deaths (World Health Organization, 2015). In the UK, there are more than 
500,000 cases of food poisoning every year, which result in approximately 500 deaths 
(Food Standards Agency, 2014). These figures are very high, and might be reduced by a 
better understanding of how consumers make decisions related to food safety, so as to 
improve education to help people to make better decisions. 
 In sum, the previously presented issues are mutually intertwined. For instance, 
inappropriate communication regarding food safety warnings can cause unnecessary 
anxiety and therefore increase food waste and/or undermine healthful food choices 
(Bown, Kaptan, & Preston, 2015). On the other hand, changing consumers’ negative 
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perceptions about frozen food, such as frozen vegetables, could have a positive effect 
on decreasing obesity rates and food waste, as well as improving food safety (Kaptan, 
Bown, Piper, & Bruine de Bruin, 2016). It is evident that the advancement of 
understanding of food choice has multiple positive implications for both consumers and 
the environment. Relevant findings could be implemented through more effective 
public policies, adaptations in the environments in which we make food choices, such 
as supermarkets and restaurants, so that we are encouraged to make more healthful and 
safer choices with minimal food waste. To conclude, enhancing the understanding of 
food choice should be of special interest for researchers in various domains. However, 
as I show in the following section, this is not an easy task, because food choice is a very 
complex matter.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss first the factors that contribute to the 
complexity of food choice. Then, I discuss the idea that consumers deal with this 
complexity using simple cognitive shortcuts. I continue by focusing more closely on 
consumer decision processes, with a specific focus on consumer information search. 
Finally, I give an outline of the doctoral dissertation chapters. 
1.2 The complexity of food choice 
Food choice is an essential, yet very complex, task. It includes five main types 
of determinant: namely psychological determinants such as beliefs, habits, values, mood 
and past experiences with food; social determinants such as family, peers and wider 
society; economic determinants such as cost and income; biological determinants such 
as hunger, appetite and taste, and finally, cultural determinants such as the culture in 
which we are brought up (Bisogni, Connors, Devine, & Sobal, 2002; Rozin, 2006). 
There are also various decision processes behind each food choice, which could be 
classified as either general or specific. Broadly speaking, general processes include 
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processes such as what to eat, where, when, why and with whom (Köster, 2009). More 
specific processes include processes such as whether eating will be done in parallel to 
another activity such as eating and reading a magazine; goals we want to achieve such 
as eating more vegetables; current physical condition such as being hungry or tired, and 
recurrent or habitual events such as morning coffee (Bisogni et al., 2007).  
In addition to the matters described above, the abundance of food related 
information we are faced with today (Schwartz, 2004), contributes to the complexity of 
an already complex task. Statistics show that between 1975 and 2008 the number of 
products in the average supermarket increased from approximately 8,950 to almost 
47,000. What is more, the number of product varieties has been increasing within each 
product category and so consumers are nowadays faced with a challenge to choose 
between a great amount of very similar products (Consumer Reports, 2014). For 
instance, the UK’s largest grocery retailer Tesco (Department for Environment, Food & 
Rural Affairs, 2015) stocks up to 90,000 products with, for instance, 283 types of 
coffee, 98 type of rice or 28 types of tomato ketchup (theguardian, 2015). At the same 
time, there has been an increase in the amount of information legally required on labels 
as well as an increase in the amount of information voluntarily provided by 
manufacturers (Food Standards Agency, 2008). This wealth of information and 
alternatives to choose from has been termed as the tyranny of choice (Schwartz, 2000) 
or choice overload (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000) and refers to a decreased motivation to 
make a choice, weaker preference strength and decreased choice satisfaction, as well as 
stronger negative emotions, such as disappointment and regret. However, a recent meta-
analysis (Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, & Todd, 2010) has shown that the average ‘effect 
size’ of choice overload was around zero, with large variance between studies which 
was not explained by the number of product alternatives participants were presented 
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with. Put differently, consumers seem to be unaffected by the growing number of 
product alternatives in the supermarkets after all. 
In a different study, conducted by Wansink and Sobal (2007), it has been shown 
that consumers are often unaware of just how complex food choices really are, and this 
is reflected in their underestimating of the number of food and beverage related 
decisions made daily. More specifically, Wansink and Sobal found that when asked to 
estimate how many food and beverage related decisions they make daily, participants 
gave an estimation of an average of 14.4 decisions. However, when asked several 
specific questions regarding what they ate, when, where, how much and so on, the 
number increased to an average of 226.7 decisions. A great difference between these 
two numbers was attributed to the fact that participants did not label something as a 
food or beverage related decision unless it was an actual choice. Put differently, they 
did not classify merely thinking about buying a product as a food and beverage related 
decision because it did not result in an actual purchase of that product. Nevertheless, 
when focusing solely on the number of decisions which resulted in an actual purchase, 
Wansink and Sobal found that participants on average made 59 food and beverage 
related decisions, which is still four times higher than the initially estimated 14.4 
decisions.  
In sum, there are probably a few potential explanations why consumers may not 
be perplexed by the complexity of food choice as a process. Since time is a limited 
resource, and choice contexts are evidently becoming more complex, one reason could 
be attributed to the use of cognitive shortcuts to simplify the choice process. This 
assumption is discussed in more detail in the following section. 
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1.3 Simple heuristics behind food choices 
 The dominant assumption in research on food decision making is that consumers 
are rational decision makers. Specifically, they sample all available information, weight 
them considering their subjective preferences, and then combine these into an overall 
evaluation (e.g. Dennison & Shepherd, 1995; Rappoport, Peters, Downey, McCann, & 
Huff-Corzine, 1993). Yet, another stream of research shows that consumers often 
respond to complex tasks, such as food choice, using simplifying strategies called 
heuristics (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999; Payne, Bettman, & 
Johnson, 1993; Simon, 1957; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Heuristics are defined as 
cognitive shortcuts that enable people to make decisions based on only a few important 
pieces of information. Winter Falk, Bisogni and Sobal (1996) identified several such 
heuristics which can be used in the context of food choice, namely focusing on one 
attribute such as the healthiest food product; routinization such as eating the same 
breakfast every day; elimination such as cutting sweets out of diet; limitation such as 
limiting the intake of coffee per day; substitution such as eating dark bread instead of 
white bread; addition such as eating a salad with every lunch, and modification such as 
removing fat from meats.  
However, it has also been shown that relying on some heuristics, such as 
focusing on one attribute when making food choices, can sometimes lead to systematic 
biases and inferior choices (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In the context of food choice, 
this has been especially studied in the case of various food labels, such as low-fat, 
organic, fair trade and so on, which have been perceived as having better nutritional 
content and therefore lead to the increased intake of food products that bear these labels 
(Chandon & Wansink, 2007; Lee, Shimizu, Kniffin, & Wansink, 2013; Schuldt, Muller, 
& Schwarz, 2012; Wansink & Chandon, 2006). These effects have so far been 
explained with a cognitive bias called halo effect (Thorndike, 1920). The halo effect in 
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the food context refers to a belief that global evaluations of a food product may alter 
evaluations of specific food product attributes when there is sufficient information for 
an independent assessment. This happens, for instance, when an individual can assess 
the nutritional content of a food product by assessing the nutritional table on the back of 
the product, but instead, relies on a food label on the front of the package and makes an 
assessment based on this single piece of information.  
Even though the previously mentioned studies suggest that consumers may be 
misled by a halo effect, I speculate that there could be more to these beliefs than 
motivated reasoning. More specifically, if one considers the environment in which these 
beliefs about food products occur, these inferences could be justified if the environment 
is structured in such a way that encourages the formation of these beliefs. This notion 
has been termed as ecological rationality and refers to the match between the mind and 
the environment (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007; Todd, Gigerenzer, & the ABC Research 
Group, 2012). Accordingly, the first research question I aim to address in this doctoral 
dissertation is: can irrational beliefs sometimes lead to rational behaviours when 
making food choices? 
This research question is studied in the context of organic food products, i.e. 
products produced with a minimal use of pesticides, fertilizers, soil conditioners etc. 
(EUR-Lex, 2007). There are two reasons why I chose these specific products. First, the 
Research Institute of Organic Agriculture (FiBL) and International Federation of 
Organic Agricultural Movements’ (IFOAM) report shows a continuous growth in the 
global market for organic food products which should continue in the following years 
(Willer & Lernoud, 2017). This suggests there is a growing interest in organic food 
products. 
Second, there is an ongoing debate regarding the advantages of organic versus 
conventional food production which has ramifications for nature, agriculture, business, 
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and consumers alike. More specifically, research shows that organic food production is 
likely more environmentally sustainable (Bahlai, Xue, McCreary, Schaafsma, & Hallett, 
2010; Crowder, Northfield, Strand, & Snyder, 2010) but, as previously shown, many 
consumers also believe that organic food products are more healthful than their 
conventional counterparts (Lee et al., 2013). Superior health attributes would be an 
important argument for organic production, but, so far, evidence supporting this claim is 
mixed, at best (Barański et al., 2014; Dangour et al., 2009; Smith-Spangler et al., 2012). 
It is beyond the scope of this doctoral dissertation to determine whether there are 
nutritional composition differences between organic and conventional food products in 
favour of organic food products. However, the aim is to explore whether organic food 
products could be in some way more healthful than conventional food products, by 
being more prevalent in less processed food product categories. If this would be so, then 
this currently irrational belief, i.e. organic food products being more healthful, would no 
longer be irrational and therefore could result in rational behaviour, i.e. buying more 
organic food products. I explore these speculations in three studies, the findings of 
which are reported in Chapter 3. 
1.4 Information search processes behind food choices 
Traditional economic approach to decision making focuses on what decisions 
are made, rather than how they are made (Payne & Venkatraman, 2011). However, it 
has been repeatedly pointed out that human decision making cannot be understood by 
merely observing final outcomes (Berg & Gigerenzer, 2010; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; 
Payne & Venkatraman, 2011; Svenson, 1979). Payne and Venkatraman (2011) have 
nicely summarised the previous findings from decision research revealing why this is 
so, i.e. why it is advantageous to focus also on the processes and not just the outcomes. 
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First, decisions are extremely susceptible to apparently small changes to 
decision tasks and contexts. For instance, numerous studies have found that increasing 
task complexity induces the use of strategies that employ less information (Payne, 1976; 
Swait & Adamowicz, 2001); that the format of information presentation strongly 
influences how we search for information (Bettman & Kakkar, 1977); and that, in 
general, people use various decision strategies in different situations as an adaptive 
response to the demands of the task (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993).  
Second, it is clear by now that there are differences between individuals in how 
they make decisions when presented with the same decision task. There are therefore 
many measures used to study these differences. Appelt, Milch, Handgraaf and Weber 
(2011) have proposed the following classification of measures used to study individual 
differences in decision research: decision-making measures, risk attitude measures, 
cognitive ability measures, motivation measures, personality inventories, personality 
construct measures, and miscellaneous measures. However, Payne and Venkatraman 
(2011) argue that to better understand these differences between individuals, one should 
focus not only on the outcomes, but the processes as well. Including processes into the 
models has the potential to enhance the prediction of individual differences in decision 
making.  
Third, better understanding of how decisions are made is correlated with 
improving decisions. This suggests that focusing on studying the processes behind 
choices can, for instance, help with creating environments which could encourage better 
decisions (e.g. Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).  
In the previous section, I showed that consumers often rely on heuristics when 
making food choices. However, research exploring the actual decision processes behind 
food choices is still limited. Therefore, it is not clear whether these heuristics are the 
result of long or short decision processes. As heuristics are cognitive shortcuts, they 
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should simplify the decision process; however, food choices based on only one attribute 
could, in theory, also be the result of an extensive search process. For instance, a person 
choosing a food product with an organic label as the most healthful food product may 
have performed a quick, but to some extent extensive, search of the available products 
and concluded that the one bearing the organic label is the most healthful one. 
However, if we focus only on the outcomes, i.e. the choice of a product with an organic 
label as the most healthful food product, we may say that this person is biased. A 
fundamental issue is, if we do not explore the processes behind food choices, we cannot 
be sure that a choice is a result of heuristic thinking.  
One way to better understand decision processes, is to look at how consumers 
search for information. There have been several measures proposed to differentiate 
between different search patterns. The most commonly used one has been the Search 
Index (SI, Payne, 1976). This index differentiates between the two search patterns, 
namely, the information search that can be characterised as within attributes 
(alternative-wise) or across attributes (attribute-wise) search. An alternative-wise search 
is a search based on looking at a specific set of at least two attributes such as price and 
organic label across at least two different alternatives. An alternative-wise search is 
usually associated with compensatory strategies, i.e. decision strategies where a good 
value on one attribute can compensate for a poor value on another attribute. On the 
other hand, an attribute-wise search is a search based on looking at one attribute, e.g. 
organic label, across at least two different alternatives. An attribute-wise search is 
usually associated with non-compensatory strategies, i.e. decision strategies where a 
good value on one attribute cannot compensate for a poor value on another attribute 
(Payne et al., 1993). 
However, several important criticisms regarding the characteristics of the SI 
have been identified. First, the analysis of an information search is restricted to single-
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step transitions in the information search sequence and therefore not all available 
information is used. This criticism has been addressed by Ball (1997) who proposes 
focusing on multiple-step transitions.  
Second, there is a lack of chance correction, i.e. the mean SI is zero only when a 
decision task consists of the same number of alternatives and attributes. When this is 
not the case, the SI points either to an alternative-wise information search when the 
number of attributes is higher than the number of alternatives, or an attribute-wise 
information search when the number of alternatives is higher than the number of 
attributes. This criticism has been addressed by Böckenholt and Hynan (1994) who 
proposed using a different measure called Strategy Measure (SM).  
Third, it is unclear how to classify search strategies that include approximately 
the same number of both alternative and attribute-wise transitions and, therefore, cannot 
be associated with either compensatory or non-compensatory strategies (Ball, 1997). 
This criticism has not yet been addressed.  
There is therefore an additional research question which I aim to address in this 
doctoral dissertation: what measure can complement the Search Index (SI) to better 
describe information search? To answer this question, I propose a new measure, the 
Systematicity of Search Index (SSI), for exploring information search behaviour. The 
SSI explores information search in terms of systematicity or the proportion of non-
random search. I explore this in more detail in Chapter 4 where I introduce the proposed 
measure and test it in a specifically designed study.  
1.5 Tracking processes behind food choices 
It is clear by now that to better understand how food choices arise, it is very 
important to focus not only on the outcomes, that is, food choices, but also on the 
processes that precede the choices. The information processing approach, which stems 
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from human problem solving research (Newell & Simon, 1972), has been particularly 
useful for trying to understand which decision processes precede which responses. 
Therefore, to uncover these decision processes, more emphasis has been put on the 
process tracing methodology (Payne, Braunstein, & Carroll, 1978). The process tracing 
methodology consists of many different methods; however, to understand how 
consumers search for food related information, a group of methods for tracing 
information acquisition, i.e. information boards, eye tracking and active information 
search, has been of special importance.   
To address the research questions in this doctoral dissertation, I need to apply a 
nonobtrusive and effortless method for tracing information acquisition, such as eye 
tracking. Eye tracking is a process tracing method used for measuring eye movements. 
It has significantly developed over the last couple of decades. The equipment has 
become more accessible in terms of price, the reliability of the obtained data has 
improved and there are minimal restrictions imposed on the natural behaviour of 
decision makers (Glaholt & Reingold, 2011).  
The experimental design of the studies in this doctoral dissertation is such that 
using any other method for tracing information acquisition apart from eye tracking, 
would be both time consuming and could affect the experimental manipulation. More 
specifically, by posing these specific research questions, I try to shed light on the 
decision processes behind the outcomes. I expect participants to search for information 
in a natural way as they would search for information if they were in a natural setting 
such as at the supermarket. Put differently, the method used for tracking their search 
should not influence the way participants search for information. Previous literature 
suggests that eye tracking is a promising method for studying both automatic and 
deliberate decision processes, i.e. it does not hinder the application of one or the other 
type of processes such as mouse tracking (Franco-Watkins & Johnson, 2011; Glöckner 
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& Herbold, 2011; Horstmann, Ahlgrimm, & Glöckner, 2009; Norman & Schulte-
Mecklenbeck, 2009). Therefore, using eye tracking seems to be a logical choice of the 
methodology for answering the research questions. 
1.6 Outline of the dissertation 
This doctoral dissertation is organised as follows. The following chapter, 
Chapter 2, is a literature review consisting of three sections. In the first section, I look 
more closely into the cognitive approach to explore food choice behaviour. More 
specifically, I discuss the three distinct accounts: decision analysis, heuristics and biases 
and fast and frugal heuristics, and put them in the context of food choice. In the 
following section, I introduce methodological approaches to studying decision 
processes: I discuss the importance of a process tracing approach in decision making; a 
specific group of process tracing methods relevant for this doctoral dissertation; 
strengths and weaknesses of each of these methods, and finally, the metrics used within 
this group of methods. In the final section, I provide a literature review of the eye 
tracking studies exploring the decision processes behind food choices.  
Chapter 3 is the first empirical chapter, in which I answer the first research 
question by exploring how sometimes consumers’ irrational beliefs can lead to rational 
behaviours. To answer the question, I combine field, online, and laboratory studies to 
show that consumers learn structures in the environment, that is, in supermarkets, and 
use them to guide their decisions. This chapter consists of five sections. In the first 
section, I introduce the topic. In the following three sections, I report the methods and 
results from the three studies. In the final section, I combine the results from all three 
studies and discuss the findings. 
Chapter 4 is the second empirical chapter, in which I answer the second research 
question by developing a new measure, the Systematicity of Search Index (SSI), for 
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analysing consumer search processes. The SSI explores consumer search in terms of 
systematicity or the proportion of non-random search, and, addresses the questions 
overlooked by existing measures for analysing information acquisition. This chapter 
consists of four sections. In the first section, I introduce the topic. In the following 
section, I report the methods and results of the experiment. In the third section, I apply 
the SSI to the data from the Study 3 described in Chapter 3. In the final section, I 
discuss the findings. 
Chapter 5 is the final chapter of this doctoral dissertation and it consists of three 
sections. In the first section, I provide a general discussion of the findings from 
Chapters 3 and 4, including the limitations of the research and suggestions for further 
research. In the following section, I outline and discuss the theoretical, methodological 





 In this chapter, I review the literature which has motivated my research 
questions; the literature about the methodology used to answer those questions, and the 
studies which on a broader level explored similar research problems using the same 
methodology. This chapter consists of three sections. In the first section, I look more 
closely into the cognitive approach which I use to enhance understanding of how 
consumers make food choices. In the following section, I introduce methodological 
approaches for exploring decision processes, with a special emphasis on the process 
tracing approach. In the final section, I provide a review of the studies exploring 
decision processes behind food choices using eye tracking. 
2.1 A cognitive approach to exploring food choice behaviour 
Different disciplines offer a range of distinct approaches for exploring food 
choice behaviour. For instance, the biological approach focuses on how genetic 
predispositions influence food choices (e.g. Birch, 1992, 1999); the cultural approach 
focuses on what should be eaten in different cultures, how food should be prepared and 
so on (e.g. Schutz, 1994); the contextual approach focuses on how environment 
influences food choices (for a review see Meiselman, 2006); the economic approach 
focuses on the monetary aspects of food choice such as diet costs (e.g. Drewnowski & 
Darmon, 2005; Drewnowski & Specter, 2004); the sensory approach focuses on how 
liking and wanting food shape food preferences and consequently food choices (for a 
review see de Graaf, 2006); the sociological approach focuses on how underlying social 
relations influence food choices (e.g. Mennell, Murcott, & van Otterloo, 1993); the 
cognitive approach focuses on how human thought, reasoning, intelligence and memory 
influence food choices (for a review see Shepherd & Raats, 2006). 
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Each of these approaches focuses on specific aspects of food choice, and 
therefore each contributes to the better understanding of food choice in its own way. In 
this doctoral dissertation, I focus exclusively on the cognitive approach to food choice. 
More specifically, I explore consumer decision processes related to food choices. 
However, even within the cognitive approach, perspectives are not homogeneous, i.e. 
there are different theories which are grouped around different, but in some ways 
intertwined, accounts. There are three prominent accounts: decision analysis, heuristics 
and biases and fast and frugal heuristics. In the following sections, I introduce and 
discuss these three accounts and place them in the context of food choice. 
2.1.1 Decision analysis 
The first account of human decision making, decision analysis, comes from the 
fields of economics, statistics and mathematics. In its simplest form, decision analysis 
can be broken down into three steps: formulating a problem, listing the possible 
scenarios and systematically assessing each scenario (Fox, 2015). The prominent 
concept here is the term expected utility which was first introduced by Bernoulli in 1738 
(1954) and later developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and Savage 
(1954). Expected utility refers to calculating the utility of each scenario as the sum of 
the utility of every possible outcome, each multiplied by the probability of its 
occurrence. An optimal decision would then be the one that maximises the expected 
utility. This became the basis of the expected utility theory which suggests that the 
decision maker chooses between the two uncertain options, based on the comparison of 
their expected utility values. 
To determine optimal decisions and policies, the expected utility theory has 
been used as a normative theory, i.e. what people should do if they want to be rational 
decision makers, within a decision analysis account. However, to explain various 
phenomena, in some fields such as economics, the expected utility theory has also been 
 27 
used as a descriptive theory, i.e. what people actually do and how they do it (Tversky, 
1975). Classical economics therefore considers people as rational decision makers. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that people possess complete, or at least clear and extensive, 
knowledge of the relevant aspects of their environment; well-organised and stable 
system of preferences, and computation skills for maximising behaviour (Becker, 
1976). This implies that they sample all available information, weight them based on 
their subjective preferences, and then combine into an overall evaluation. 
From the perspective of today’s shopper, utility theory suggests sampling all 
available information about each food product in a supermarket such as sensory appeal, 
price, nutritional information and so on; weighting them based on the preferences, e.g. 
price most important, followed by sensory appeal and then nutritional information; 
assigning a score to each product, and then choosing the one with the highest score. In 
so doing, the shoppers maximise their utility, that is satisfaction. In a situation where a 
typical modern supermarket stocks thousands of food products (Rozin, 2006), this does 
not seem a feasible approach.  
Nonetheless, theories such as the expectancy-value theory (Fishbein, 1967), the 
theory of reasoned action (TRA, Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and 
the theory of planned behaviour (TPB, Ajzen, 1985, 1988, 1991), which assume that 
individual’s behaviour and choices are controlled by rational considerations, are 
perhaps some of the theories most frequently used to explain food choices (Conner & 
Armitage, 2006; Köster, 2009). The key factor in these theories is the individual’s 
intention to perform a given behaviour, and it is generally considered that the strength 
of the intention to engage in a behaviour specifies the probability of its performance. 
The TPB extends the framework by introducing the concept of perceived behavioural 
control, which refers to decision maker’s confidence in their ability to perform a given 
behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). 
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Even though some research has shown that TRA and TPB could be useful 
predictors of food choice intentions (Armitage & Conner, 1999; Sparks & Shepherd, 
1992), these theories in combination with the methodologies used have been 
extensively criticised. For instance, Bentler and Speckart (1979) argue that Fishbein and 
Ajzen's (1975) account is incomplete because they do not distinguish between, on the 
one hand, predicting future behaviour based on attitudes and past behaviour, and on the 
other hand, predicting future behaviour based on intentions. Put differently, TRA 
restricts itself to volitional behaviours due to a proposition that intentions alone control 
behaviour (Conner & Armitage, 1998). These limitations were recognized by Ajzen 
(1988, 1991) as well, which is why TPB was introduced in the first place, to attempt to 
predict non-volitional behaviours.  
On the other hand, Köster and Mojet (2007) criticise the methodology used, and 
argue that often there are no observations of actual food choice behaviour to validate 
the results. Instead, consumer attitudes, beliefs and intentions are measured using self-
reports, which often results in a weak connection between intentions and actual 
behaviour. Furthermore, these theories are completely based on correlational measures 
and the correlations are usually low, which affects the credibility of the findings 
(Köster, 2009). Finally, Sutton (1997) suggests that these theories seem to be best suited 
for studying occasional behaviours (e.g. Askelson et al., 2010) rather than often 
repeated behaviours (e.g. McDermott et al., 2015). Thus, these theories may not be the 
most appropriate tools for understanding how consumers make food choices.  
 In sum, decision analysis suggests that to be a rational decision maker, an 
individual should calculate the expected utility of different scenarios and use these 
values for maximising behaviour. However, some disciplines such as classical 
economics argue that this, in fact, is how people make decisions. This view has been 
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heavily criticised by scientists from other fields, particularly psychologists, and some of 
these criticisms are discussed in the following section. 
2.1.2 Heuristics and biases 
One of the most prominent critics of the economists’ view of a decision maker 
was Herbert A. Simon (1955, 1990, 1997) who argued that decision makers should be 
viewed as boundedly rational instead of utility maximisers. More specifically, Simon 
proposed that human behaviour is “shaped by a scissors whose two blades are the 
structure of task environments and the computational capabilities of the actor” (1990, 
p.7). Put differently, he introduced the term bounded rationality for rational choices that 
consider cognitive limitations of decision makers, in terms of knowledge and 
computational capacity. Simon argued it is unrealistic to expect that decision makers 
can always maximise their utility and therefore, to describe their behaviour, he 
introduced the term satisficing, a combination of satisfy and suffice, which is a form of 
bounded rationality that suggests satisfaction of all the needs at some specified level 
(1956). Put differently, satisficing suggests willingness to settle for a good enough 
alternative which does not necessarily have to be the best one. Simon’s intention was 
therefore to describe these cognitive shortcuts or rules of thumb, known as heuristics, as 
a useful tool for making decisions in the world, where time, knowledge and cognitive 
capacities are limited.  
Other prominent critics of the decision analysis account were Daniel Kahneman 
and Amos Tversky. They conducted a series of experiments showing the presence of 
fundamental differences between the economists’ view of human decision making and 
how decision makers actually assess probabilities and make decisions. In their seminal 
papers (1979, 1986, 1992) Kahneman and Tversky criticised the expected utility theory 
for its wide application as a normative and a descriptive model of human behaviour, by 
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presenting decision-making tasks in which preferences systematically violate the 
axioms of the expected utility theory.  
Instead, to describe how decision makers actually make decisions, they 
proposed prospect theory (1979) and later cumulative prospect theory (1992). Prospect 
theory describes how decision makers decide between two risky alternatives. The 
theory has two key elements. First, it suggests that decision makers base their decisions 
on the values of potential losses or gains rather than final outcomes. More specifically, 
decision makers’ value function is commonly concave for gains, which implies risk 
aversion; convex for losses which implies risk seeking; and is generally steeper for 
losses than for gains, which implies that decision makers are generally loss-averse. 
Second, decision makers commonly overweight small probabilities and underweight 
moderate to high probabilities.  
To explain why decision makers’ behaviours deviate from the ones described by 
the normative theory described above, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) used the concept 
of heuristics. They argued that heuristics in general can be quite useful, but sometimes 
lead to systematic errors called biases. This often happens when judgments and choices 
are made intuitively. Therefore, Kahneman and Tversky argued that human reasoning 
can be divided into two common forms; a natural, intuitive mode and a logical, rational 
mode, and that decision makers show great affinity for intuitive reasoning (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1983). 
To demonstrate, one such heuristic is the representativeness heuristic, where 
probabilities of two events are evaluated by the degree to which one event resembles 
the other. However, if decision makers evaluate probabilities based on the 
representativeness heuristic, they may neglect prior probabilities and therefore commit 
the base rate bias, i.e. overly focus on the specific information compared to the general 
information provided, when this is not justified. Tversky and Kahneman's (1974) 
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famous example of an individual whose description encourages decision makers to 
conclude that he is engaged in a less probable occupation, such as a librarian, rather 
than a farmer, demonstrates the use of the representativeness heuristic which results in 
the base rate bias. Put differently, using the representativeness heuristic, the description 
of an individual is matched with a mental image of a librarian. In so doing, decision 
makers ignore the prior probabilities that there are many more farmers than librarians in 
the population, which results in the base rate bias.  
In the context of food choice, relying on heuristic cues, such as a specific food 
product attribute or diverse symbols and signs on the food product packaging, can 
sometimes result in biases and inferior choices. For instance, Chandon and Wansink 
(2007) and Wansink and Chandon (2006) showed that specific nutrient claims, such as 
low-fat, can promote calorie underestimation and therefore increase food intake. 
Furthermore, Lee, Shimizu, Kniffin, and Wansink (2013), Schuldt and Schwarz (2010) 
and Sörqvist and colleagues (2015) all found that the organic label, i.e. an ethical claim 
related to the production of food products, distorts the overall image of a product. More 
specifically, products that bear the organic label are judged as being lower in calories, 
with better nutritional content, and they therefore elicit greater willingness to pay. Since 
there is currently no conclusive evidence to support these beliefs about organic food 
products (Barański et al., 2014; Dangour et al., 2009; Smith-Spangler et al., 2012), it is 
generally considered that decision makers are biased towards thinking that organic food 
products are more healthful than conventional food products. Therefore, in both 
examples, i.e. low-fat claim and organic label, decision makers’ behaviour is described 
as influenced by a specific heuristic, namely the health halo effect. Put differently, the 
health halo effect creates false beliefs regarding the healthfulness of food products 
based on a single claim such as low-fat, organic and so on.  
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Another example of the detrimental effect of heuristics comes from the literature 
exploring how the structure of the environment influences food choices. More 
specifically, it has been shown that in a restaurant setting, the design of menus, portion 
sizes, food variety, music, visual displays, waitress behaviour and health rating systems 
(e.g. hygiene) influence what consumers choose to eat and in which quantities (Cohen 
& Babey, 2012). Furthermore, in a supermarket setting, consumers’ food choices are 
influenced by the location and placement of food products, product packaging, product 
labelling, sales promotions, product sampling, product variety, in-store media and 
atmosphere (Cohen & Babey, 2012). Such choices, made by the retailer in such settings 
could potentially lead to growing obesity rates. For instance, bigger portion sizes 
increase the amount of energy consumed and therefore contribute to weight gain 
(Young & Nestle, 2002); similarly, food options positioned at the beginning or the end 
of a menu can be up to twice as popular compared to food options positioned in the 
centre of the menu (Dayan & Bar-Hillel, 2011). 
To help consumers make better decisions, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) proposed 
organising the context in which consumers make choices and, by doing so, guiding 
them to make better decisions, which they termed as libertarian paternalism. For 
instance, they proposed rearranging school cafeterias in such a way that more healthful 
food alternatives become more accessible, whereas less healthful food alternatives 
become less accessible. In this way, one could increase or decrease the consumption of 
many food alternatives. In their experiment, Rozin and colleagues (2011) supported this 
idea by showing that, indeed, one could reduce intake of specific food alternatives by 8 
– 16% by making a food alternative slightly more difficult to reach (by varying its 
proximity by about 10 inches) or just simply changing the serving utensil (spoon or 
tongs). In another experiment, Hanks, Just and Wansink (2013) tested whether low- and 
no-cost environmental changes in school cafeterias could lead children to take and eat 
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more healthful food alternatives, by making fruits and vegetables more attractive and 
convenient. This was done, for instance, by placing fresh fruit next to cash registers, 
keeping 100% fruit juice boxes next to ice cream in freezer or by displaying fresh fruit 
in nice bowls. They found that 13% of children were more likely to take fruits and 23% 
were more likely to take vegetables, whereas the actual consumption increased by 18% 
for fruits and by 25% for vegetables. These findings have important implications 
because they show how small structural changes in the environment could potentially 
lead to developing and adopting more healthful behaviours, and therefore help to reduce 
growing obesity rates.  
2.1.3 Fast and frugal heuristics 
The third account of human decision making builds on Simon’s idea of bounded 
rationality presented above, and represents heuristics as useful aids for making a 
decision. The main claim behind this account is that the heuristics consumers use to 
make decisions are not necessarily inferior to the utility maximisation account provided 
by decision analysis (Fox, 2015). More specifically, following Simon’s idea of bounded 
rationality, Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) have proposed a class of models: fast-and-
frugal algorithms, which are based on a simple psychological mechanism called one-
reason decision making. One-reason decision making refers to making choices based 
solely on a single cue (reason) which differs from decision to decision. 
To test the performance of these algorithms, Gigerenzer and Goldstein tested 
one such algorithm, the take-the-best algorithm, with “rational” algorithms such as 
multiple regression. The results showed that fast-and-frugal algorithms, in this case the 
take-the-best algorithm, do not have to trade accuracy for simplicity. That is to say, 
simple psychological mechanisms can yield about as many, or even more, correct 
inferences in less time than standard statistical linear models. Fast-and-frugal heuristics, 
i.e. algorithms, became a part of the so called adaptive toolbox which is a collection of 
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heuristics that are fast, frugal, computationally cheap and adapted to specific 
environments (Gigerenzer et al., 1999). 
The fast-and-frugal heuristics account has three goals: descriptive, normative 
and engineering (Gigerenzer, Hertwig, & Pachur, 2011). The descriptive goal is to 
analyse heuristics, their building blocks, i.e. search rules, stopping rules and decision 
rules, and the learned core capacities such as recognition memory, frequency 
monitoring, on which heuristics operate.  
The normative goal is to determine in which environmental structures a given 
heuristic will succeed or fail, which has been termed as ecological rationality, i.e. the 
match between mind end environment (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007; Todd et al., 2012). 
This goal heavily relies on Simon’s idea that human behaviour is shaped by the two 
blades of scissors, i.e. the structure of task environments and the computational 
capacities. Put differently, it is impossible to understand why a heuristic succeeds or 
fails by focusing solely on the heuristic. Instead, one should study heuristics in different 
environments to find out in which environments specific heuristic predicts faster, more 
accurately or by requiring less information.  
The engineering goal is to combine the results from the descriptive and 
normative goals, to design heuristics and environments which will encourage making 
better decisions. To accomplish these three goals, Gigerenzer and colleagues (2011) 
propose relying on process models instead of as-if models, i.e. models that “explain 
behaviour on an aggregate level by explicitly ignoring the underlying cognitive 
processes” (Volz & Gigerenzer, 2014, p.575). Put differently, they argue for 
understanding actual decision processes and not only the outcomes. In addition, they 
propose focusing on computational models such as recognition heuristic, rather than 
vague one-word labels such as availability, because these models enable studying the 
heuristics in specific environments which in turn leads to novel predictions.  
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Apart from Simon, the development of the fast-and-frugal heuristics program 
was also influenced by the work of some other eminent scholars such as John W. Payne, 
James R. Bettman and Eric J. Johnson. For instance, Payne, Bettman and Johnson 
(1993) introduced the concept of the adaptive decision maker to explain how an 
individual uses a repertoire of various strategies in making a decision, dependent upon 
different factors such as the display of information and the complexity of the problem. 
They have built on the work of Ebbesen and Konečni (1980) who explored the 
differences between real world and simulated decision tasks and found that various 
features of decision tasks impact the decisions individuals make, such as the context in 
which the decision problem is presented, the salience of alternatives, the number of 
cues, and so on.  
Furthermore, Einhorn and Hogarth (1981) have argued that judgment and choice 
are strongly dependent on minor changes in task. Payne and colleagues (1993) therefore 
suggested that decision makers continuously shift their strategies in accordance with the 
demands of the task, rather than being affected by various cognitive limitations and 
biases. More specifically, they made a summary of characteristics that describe choice 
behaviour, such as the level of compensatoriness, i.e. the degree to which the trade-off 
between attributes is made; selectivity in processing, i.e. the degree to which the 
amount of processing is consistent or selective across alternatives or attributes; 
alternative-based versus attribute-based processing, and so on. In addition, based on 
these characteristics, they provided an overview of some of the most common decision 
strategies, used such as the weighted additive (WADD) rule, which examines the values 
of all the relevant attributes for each alternative, as well as the importance of each 
attribute for a decision maker; the equal weight (EQW) heuristic which examines all the 
alternatives, as well as all the attribute values, but ignores the relative importance of 
each attribute; the satisficing (SAT) heuristic which examines the alternatives based on 
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all the attributes and chooses the first one that meets the previously set threshold for all 
the attributes; the lexicographic (LEX) heuristic which examines all the alternatives 
based on the value of the most important attribute and chooses the one with the best 
value; the elimination-by-aspects (EBA) heuristic which orders attributes based on their 
importance, assigns threshold levels to each and then eliminates all the alternatives 
below these threshold levels accordingly; the majority of confirming dimensions 
(MCD) heuristic which examines pairs of alternatives on all the attributes, keeps the 
one with the majority of better attributes and continues the process of pairwise 
comparison until there is only one alternative left; to name just a few.  
In the context of food choice, Scheibehenne, Miesler and Todd (2007) explored 
whether a simple heuristic, such as a non-compensatory lexicographic rule, is able to 
account for individual food choices compared to a compensatory weighted additive 
model. Therefore, they asked participants to choose a dish from each of 20 pairs of 
lunch dishes and to indicate their importance weights, together with evaluation ratings 
of each dish, on nine different factors. They found that the simple lexicographic 
heuristic is as good at predicting participants’ food choices (72%) as a weighted 
additive model (73%) and concluded that food choices may be based on simple 
heuristics. Similarly, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, Sohn, de Bellis, Martin and Hertwig (2013) 
investigated whether decision makers do indeed search for as much information they 
can, or if they simply rely on simple decision strategies when making food choices by 
employing a process-tracing technique called MouselabWEB, i.e. a process-tracing tool 
used to monitor the information acquisition process (explained in more detail in section 
2.2.1.1). They tested eight different decision strategies in an experiment where 
participants were asked to make a choice in a series of choices between two lunch 
dishes. They found that non-compensatory decision strategies described their 
participants’ choices much better than compensatory strategies did. Interestingly, no 
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choices were classified as being based on the weighted additive rule. On the contrary, 
20-30% of choices were classified as being based on the lexicographic strategy. 
In sum, the fast-and-frugal heuristics program shares some basic features with 
the heuristics and biases program, such as that both programs strive to provide more 
psychologically realistic theories of rational behaviour as opposed to the account 
provided by decision analysts. However, Gigerenzer and colleagues (2011) highlighted 
three important differences between these two programs. First, the heuristics in the 
heuristics and biases program have not been developed into computational models. 
Second, the definition of rationality is not based on Simon’s scissors, that is the mind-
environment interaction, and therefore it is logical instead of ecological. Third, the 
heuristics and biases program assumes that heuristics are less effortful and therefore can 
never be more accurate than more complex strategies.  
Nevertheless, the main difference could be summarised as follows: the fast-and-
frugal program does not perceive an individual as cognitively inferior because of 
cognitive limitations. Instead, cognitive limitations encourage decision makers to rely 
on heuristics, which are perceived as useful strategies for making reasonable decisions, 
so that focus is placed on ways and settings where heuristics lead to accurate inferences. 
On the contrary, heuristics and biases program looks at heuristics as unreliable aids, so 
it seeks out settings where they can be accused of poor reasoning (Gigerenzer et al., 
1999).  
2.2 Methodological approaches to studying decision processes 
The cognitive processes underlying individual decision making have been an 
important focus of research for several decades. Two methodologically distinct 
approaches have been used to study these processes: a structural approach and an 
information processing approach (Abelson & Levi, 1985; Ford, Schmitt, Schechtman, 
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Hults, & Doherty, 1989; Newell & Simon, 1972; Payne et al., 1978; Westenberg & 
Koele, 1994). The structural approach is based on statistical models that describe the 
relationship between information stimuli (input) and decision responses (outcomes) 
(Abelson & Levi, 1985). For instance, the parameters in multiple linear regression 
analysis are regarded as representing important aspects of decision makers’ decision 
strategies. More specifically, if a specific attribute receives a high weight, it is generally 
considered that this attribute is very important for the decision maker (Reisen, Hoffrage, 
& Mast, 2008). However, this approach has been extensively criticized for focusing 
solely on the final stage of decision behaviour and therefore neglecting the processes 
that lead to a decision (Payne et al., 1978; Svenson, 1979).  
The information processing approach, on the other hand, stems from human 
problem solving research (Newell & Simon, 1972) and tries to understand which 
cognitive processes precede a response (Payne et al., 1978). Since this approach 
investigates cognitive processes more directly, it often produces more detailed 
explanatory models of the decision-making behaviour that leads to a specific choice 
(Harte, Westenberg, & van Someren, 1994; Payne et al., 1978; Payne, 1976). However, 
this approach has been criticized for its theoretical background. For instance, the crude 
classification of decision-making behaviour as compensatory and non-compensatory is 
not deemed to be specific enough, and it is in direct contrast to the amount of detail 
provided by this approach. In addition, a criticism has also been directed at the frequent 
practice of trying to explain cognitive processes by aggregating the vast amount of 
gathered data into some simple statistics (Bröder, 2000).  
Overall, it has been argued that both the information processing and structural 
approach have contributed to explaining decision making behaviour by shedding light 
on different aspects of the behaviour, and that researchers should continue using them 
in a complementary way (Costa-Gomes, Crawford, & Broseta, 2001; Einhorn & 
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Hogarth, 1981; Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, & Kleinmuntz, 1979; Riedl, Brandstätter, & 
Roithmayr, 2008). However, it has also been argued that sometimes these two 
approaches lead to contrasting conclusions and therefore cannot always be used in a 
complementary way. Instead, one should choose the appropriate method based on the 
theory behind a research question (Bröder, 2000). Since both research questions, in a 
broader or narrower sense, explore how decision makers search for information, the 
information processing approach has been deemed as more appropriate. Therefore, in 
the following section, I will more closely reflect on the methodology associated with 
the information processing approach. 
2.2.1 Process tracing in decision making 
The methodology derived from the information processing approach, often 
referred to as process tracing, has been used to uncover the cognitive processes 
preceding the decision maker’s response (Payne et al., 1978). There are several process-
tracing methods that have been applied in decision-making research. According to 
Schulte-Mecklenbeck, Kühberger and Ranyard (2011), they can loosely be classified 
into three groups: a) methods for tracing information acquisition (e.g. information 
boards, eye tracking and active information search); b) methods for tracing information 
integration and evaluation (e.g. thinking aloud and structured response elicitation), and 
c) methods for tracing physiological, neurological, and other accompanying cognitive 
processes (e.g. measurement of reaction time, galvanic skin conductance, pupil dilation 
and neuronal techniques of location). As one of the aims of this doctoral dissertation is 
to explore information search behaviour that precedes a final choice, in the next section, 
I focus on explaining the methods for tracing information acquisition.  
2.2.1.1 Information boards  
This is a process-tracing technique where participants acquire information by 
opening envelopes from a matrix of envelopes attached to a sheet of cardboard. Each 
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envelope contains a card with some text on it. To acquire a specific piece of 
information, the participant has to take a card out of the appropriate envelope, turn it 
around, read it, and place it back into the envelope (Payne, 1976; Wilkins, 1967). 
This technique provides data regarding what information the decision maker 
seeks, the sequence of information acquired, and how much information is acquired 
(Kühberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, & Ranyard, 2011). In the late 1970s, information 
boards became more sophisticated due to the introduction of computer-based 
information acquisition systems. Information boards were therefore no longer the only 
type of presentation devices. Instead, computer monitors were introduced for the 
presentation purposes and keypresses were used to indicate which cells should be 
opened (Payne & Braunstein, 1978). Ten years later, the introduction of a computer 
mouse has led to the further development and introduction of the Mouselab system 
which is, as the name suggests, a system that uses a mouse to perform various decision 
experiments (Bettman, Johnson, & Payne, 1990; Johnson, Payne, Schkade, & Bettman, 
1989). More specifically, this system could have been used to present the experiment 
instructions as well as a decision problem using one of five possible types of screen 
layout (e.g. matrix, gamble, decision-tree). In addition, it could have automatically 
recorded the content of the acquired information, the duration of each acquisition and 
search order, and choice (Johnson et al., 1989), which was a significant improvement 
compared to its ancestor, simple information boards. Currently, there are various more 
advanced (and freely available) online or offline versions of Mouselab system such as 
MouselabWEB (Willemsen & Johnson, 2008) or MouseTracker (Freeman & Ambady, 
2010). 
2.2.1.2 Eye tracking 
Eye tracking refers to a process-tracing technique where participants’ 
information acquisition behaviour is traced by recording their eye movements. 
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Recording eye movements has been used for over a hundred years and has becoming 
increasingly popular over the last couple of decades (Kühberger et al., 2011). There are 
two main assumptions which closely connect eye movements to cognitive processes, 
namely the immediacy and the eye-mind assumption (Just & Carpenter, 1980). The 
immediacy assumption suggests that the mind follows the eye, i.e. information is 
interpreted as soon as it is encountered, at the expense of possible false initial 
interpretations. The eye-mind assumption suggests that the eye follows the mind, i.e. 
the eye remains fixated on an object as long as this object is being processed.  
In a way similar to Mouselab, computer screens are used to present information 
in experiments when recording eye movements. However, instead of using a computer 
mouse to choose pieces of information, decision makers simply look at the information 
presented on the screen. The information acquisition process therefore resembles a 
more natural situation (Reisen et al., 2008). The eye tracking equipment records 
saccadic, i.e. rapid, voluntary movements from one object to another, and non-saccadic 
eye movements, i.e. focusing on a single point or object of interest (Russo, 2011). 
Parameters of specific interest for decision researchers are saccadic movements and 
fixations. Therefore, to draw inferences about cognitive processes, one can explore the 
tempo, amplitude, duration or latency of saccadic movements and the duration, 
frequency and scanning path of fixations (Kühberger et al., 2011).  
Generally, eye tracking techniques can be divided into two groups: a group 
focusing on measuring the position of the eye relative to the head and a group focusing 
on measuring the orientation of the eye in space, or the so called point of regard (i.e. 
gaze point). There are four categories of eye movement measurement methodologies 
used to estimate the point of regard. These involve the measurement of: electro-
oculography, i.e. measuring the position of the eye by placing skin electrodes around 
the eye and recording potential differences; scleral contact lens/search coil, i.e. 
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attaching a mechanical or optical reference object mounted on a contact lens and then 
positioning it directly on the eye; photo-oculography or video-oculography, i.e. 
measuring the distinct characteristics of the eyes under rotation/translation, and video-
based combined pupil/corneal reflection, i.e. measuring the point of regard by either 
keeping the head position fixed or by measuring features such as corneal reflection and 
the pupil centre (Duchowski, 2007; Young & Sheena, 1975). The last category, video-
based combined pupil/corneal reflection, is the prevailing method for estimating the 
point of regard, and has made eye tracking more convenient to use and therefore 
applicable in a broad range of research topics. 
Further advancements in the field have led to the development of the two 
distinct groups of eye trackers: remote eye trackers (i.e. desktop eye trackers) and 
mobile eye trackers. The leading manufacturers in this field are SR Research with the 
EyeLink system, SensoMotoric Instruments (SMI) and Applied Systems Laboratory 
(ASL) with Tobii Technology (Holmqvist et al., 2011). Recently, eye tracking has been 
receiving growing interest from the field that develops virtual reality. Therefore, there 
are already several available solutions on the market. This combination of 
methodologies has great potential to make research in “natural” environments more 
accessible, and therefore enhance the external validity of experiments.  
2.2.1.3 Active information search 
Active information search (AIS) refers to a process-tracing technique where 
participants only receive a basic description of the decision task. Therefore, to receive 
additional information, a participant needs to ask questions (Kühberger et al., 2011). 
This method was first introduced by Engländer and Tyszka (1980) and later developed 
by Huber, Wider and Huber (1997) who wanted to develop a method which would 
require less reactive information presentation or, put differently, participants would not 
be required to use a specific, already predetermined, piece of information.  
 43 
As previously mentioned, the basic idea behind AIS is to first present the 
participant with only a necessary description of the decision task. To minimize the 
danger of influencing the participant, the description should be as short as possible. 
However, the description also needs to be rich enough to enable the participant to 
formulate questions. Next, to obtain more information about the task from the 
experimenter, the participant needs to ask questions. The participant can ask any type 
and as many questions as she wants, as well as repeat already asked questions. To avoid 
situations where the experimenter answers the questions and therefore potentially 
influences the participant, the questions are recorded, and answers are given on small 
cards from a list of already prepared answers. Therefore, for each decision task, pilot 
studies are used to optimize the short description of the task and to find as many 
questions as possible, which allows preparing the list of answers. However, if the 
participant asks a question which was not encountered during the pilot study, the 
experimenter needs to answer it during the experiment by improvising. The probability 
of new questions asked should therefore be small.  
This method was further developed by Huber, Beutter, Montoya and Huber 
(2001) who introduced a structured version of the AIS. More specifically, instead of 
leaving the formulation of questions completely to the participant, in this version, she 
can choose a question from a list of questions and ask them to the experimenter one at 
the time. Questions are structured based on different types of questions identified in 
Huber et al. (1997). Some of the examples are questions concerning the probability of 
an event, questions dealing with the participant’s control over the external event or 
negative consequences, questions requiring information regarding what can be done in 
case of a negative event, questions regarding certain or uncertain consequences of a 
specific alternative and so on. In the standard version of AIS method, the type, 
frequency and sequence of the collected information are recorded, whereas in the 
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computerized version (e.g. WebDiP system – Web Decision Processes), one can also 
record the reading time (Kühberger et al., 2011). 
2.2.2 Strengths and weaknesses of methods for tracing information acquisition 
 Each of the process-tracing methods for tracing information acquisition 
presented in the previous section has its strengths and weaknesses which may affect the 
choice of the method. A summary of these characteristics is presented in Table 2.1 
(based on Huber et al., 2001; Reisen et al., 2008).  
Table 2.1 Strengths and weaknesses of methods for tracing information acquisition 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Information boards (including computerized versions) 
Relatively easy to set up and use 
Time and effort required to acquire a 
piece of information 
Requires no calibration procedure and 
therefore it works with almost every 
participant 
Almost exclusively relies on written 
information 
Quite convenient for participants because 
they are presented with a relatively well-
structured decision task in which all the 
available information is clearly presented 
Requires some type of information 
restructuring 
Many participants can be run at the same 
time and even over the Internet (e.g. 
MouselabWEB) 
Too structured; participants may be 
influenced regarding what information to 
use or to consider important 
Easier interpretation of the data 
compared to eye tracking 
 
Eye tracking 
A large amount of data; data regarding 
which pieces of information are acquired, 
how many, the sequence and time spent 
on information acquisition 
Calibration procedure can sometimes be 
difficult to perform and therefore on 
some occasions no reliable calibration 
can be achieved 
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Table 2.1 Continued  
Strengths Weaknesses 
Very fast and effortless information 
acquisition 
Special equipment which can be 
expensive 
No constraints in the choice of the stimuli 
Noise in the information acquisition 
process (e.g. fixations we are not aware 
of) 
Reduces the reactivity concern (changing 
the behaviour due to being observed) 
Too structured; participants may be 
influenced regarding what information to 
use or to consider important 
 
Eye tracking 
Accurate and precise data 
One can track only one participant at a 
time 
Flexibility in terms of data collection 
location (e.g. mobile eye tracking in 
supermarkets) 
Possible constraints on participants (e.g. 
head position stabilized using a chin rest) 
Active information Search (AIS) 
One can gain, in a non-reactive approach, 
information about the decision task and 
the alternatives the participant is actually 
interested in 
Less exact monitoring of the information 
acquisition processes than with the other 
two techniques 
Avoids restructuring of the decision task 
by the experimenter 
Procedural issues (e.g. question related) 
that can emerge during the data 
collection process 
 
The final choice of the process-tracing method should, apart from pragmatic 
reasons, depend on the research goals (Lohse & Johnson, 1996). For instance, it has 
been shown that each process-tracing technique requires different levels of information 
acquisition effort. For instance, experiments applying the Mouselab method require 
significantly more time to complete the tasks compared to eye tracking, with the time 
needed being correlated to the complexity of the task (Card, Moran, & Newell, 1983; 
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Lohse & Johnson, 1996; Russo, 1978). In addition, Mouselab can yield more 
alternative-wise search patterns than eye tracking. This may be so because this 
technique promotes a serial mode of information acquisition and therefore restricts the 
possibility of making quick comparisons between multiple pieces of information, as 
well as detecting specific patterns (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008). Also, participants tend to 
re-examine more information using eye tracking compared to when using Mouselab, as 
well as exhibiting greater variability in the proportion of information acquisition. In 
sum, the complexity of the task, in terms of amount of information to process, is 
positively correlated to the difference between eye tracking and mouse tracking 
techniques (Lohse & Johnson, 1996). 
2.2.3 Metrics for exploring information acquisition behaviour 
 Increased interest regarding uncovering the decision processes behind decision 
makers’ choices has brought a lot of attention to the judgment and decision-making 
field. Therefore, different researchers have proposed several metrics to explore 
information acquisition behaviour and to draw conclusions about decision makers’ 
cognitive strategies in decision situations. Table 2.2 shows the summary of the 








Table 2.2 Metrics for exploring information acquisition behaviour 
Author Metric 
(Hogarth, 1975; Pollay, 1970) Decision time 
(Payne, 1976) 
Proportion of information searched; 
search index; variability in the amount of 
information searched per alternative 
(Jacoby, Chestnut, Weigl, & Fisher, 
1976) 
Reacquisition rate 
(Van Raaij, 1977) 
Comparing the number of times 
alternative- and attribute-wise transitions 
occur in the first versus the second part of 
the search process 
(Klayman, 1982) 
Variability in the amount of information 
searched per attribute; contingency 
measures 
(Payne et al., 1993) 
Total amount of processing; total amount 
of time spent on the information in the 
boxes; average time spent per item of 
information acquired 
(Böckenholt & Hynan, 1994) Strategy measure 
  
(Koele & Westenberg, 1995) 
Compensation index (i.e. combination of 
the variability of search with the depth of 
search) 
(Ball, 1997) Multiple-step transition types 
 
2.3 A review of eye tracking studies exploring decision processes behind food 
choices 
 This review includes peer-reviewed studies on decision processes and food 
choices using eye tracking. I searched the databases Web of Science and Google 
Scholar using the following key words: decision process AND food AND eye track*, 
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which generated four papers that matched the requirements. I used a review by Orquin 
and Mueller Loose (2013) on eye movements and decision making to identify two 
additional papers. Finally, I identified the last four papers using either backward or 
forward citation search of the previously identified papers, which generated a further 
nine papers which I included in the review. I classified the papers into three groups 
depending on their approach to studying decision processes. The first group explores 
different stages of the decision process (five papers), the second group explores 
different cognitive thinking styles (two papers) and the third group explores the use of 














Table 2.3 Summary of papers included in the review 
Study Approach Finding 
Clement (2007) 
Stages of the decision 
process 
In-store purchase decision processes explained by the five-stage model, which consists of: pre-
attention stage, succeeded attention stage, the tipping point, semantic information process stage 
and the post-purchase stage. 
Gidlöf, Wallin, Dewhurst, 
& Holmqvist (2013) 
Used the three-stage model proposed by Russo and Leclerc and supplemented this with the 
Natural Decision Segmentation Model (NDSM) to identify decision making in a real-world 
supermarket environment. 
Reutskaja, Nagel, 
Camerer, & Rangel 
(2011) 
Tested three models which assume two-stage decision process (screening and evaluation) to find 
out: what computational processes decision makers use during the search and decision processes 
and to what extent they correspond to standard economic search models; how the complexity of a 
choice affects these processes, and whether computational processes exhibit systematic biases. 
Russo & Leclerc (1994) Three-stage model of decision process: orientation, evaluation and verification. 
Schaffer, Kawashima, & 
Matsuyama (2016) 
Consumer decision process in multi-alternative choice situations described by the two-stage 









Study Approach Finding 
Ares, Mawad, Giménez, 
& Maiche (2014) 
Cognitive thinking 
styles 
Rational decision makers engage in deeper and longer information search for making their 
choices than intuitive decision makers as well as appreciating more complex information; 
rational decision makers also engage in more thoughtful analysis of the labels and nutritional 
information compared to intuitive decision makers. 
Mawad, Trías, Giménez, 
Maiche, & Ares (2015) 
Field dependent decision makers tend to engage in less thoughtful information processing than 
field independent decision makers, and they make fewer fixations on traditional nutritional 
information. 




A choice model based on Simon’s satisficing choice rule (1955) which consists of the two 
interrelated parts: search and evaluation; decision makers seem to follow the satisficing choice 
rule; it is possible to estimate choice models that adapt more closely to the actual decision 
process. 
Wästlund, Otterbring, 
Gustafsson, & Shams 
(2015) 
Decision makers who chose a low-cost product of their preference directed less of their visual 
attention towards the task-relevant stimulus compared with consumers who chose a specific, 
predetermined product within the same product category. The findings are explained by 
suggesting that decision makers in the task non-specific group were most likely affected by the 




2.3.1 Stages of the decision process 
 Studies have shown that decision processes in more complex (multi-
alternative) decision tasks can be segmented into two stages: a screening stage in 
which some of the alternatives are eliminated, and an evaluation stage in which a 
few remaining alternatives are more closely inspected (Lussier & Olshavsky, 1979; 
Payne, 1976; Wright & Barbour, 1977). Studies conducted in the context of food 
choice have reached a similar conclusion. For instance, Reutskaja, Nagel, Camerer 
and Rangel (2011, p.900) have tested three models, i.e. an optimal search model with 
zero search costs, a satisficing search model and a hybrid search model, to answer 
the three questions: a) What are the computational processes deployed by consumers 
during the search and decision processes, and to what extent are they compatible 
with standard economic search models? b) How do the processes, and their 
performance, change with the number of options? c) Do the computational processes 
exhibit systematic biases that can be exploited by sellers to manipulate their choices?  
All three tested models described above assume that the decision process has 
two stages, i.e. an initial search stage and a final decision stage. More specifically, 
these models assume that decision makers begin the decision process by searching 
through the set of alternatives using distinct fixation sequences. After the initial 
search stage ends at a certain time, the decision process enters the next and final 
stage. There are two main differences between these models: namely, how the initial 
search stage stops and how the final decision is made. The optimal search model 
with zero costs assumes that during the initial search stage decision makers look at as 
many alternatives as possible, depending on the time available. The satisficing search 
model assumes that during the initial search stage decision makers search until either 
the time runs out, or the decision maker finds an alternative that meets her threshold. 
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The hybrid search model includes elements of both models. Model differences 
regarding how the final decision is made are reflected in the use of a decision rule. 
Reutskaja and colleagues assume that when decision makers reach the final decision 
stage, they use the probabilistic decision rule, i.e. all alternatives are assigned a 
probability of choice proportionally to their utility values. However, this does not 
apply to the case of the satisficing search model where an alternative which meets 
the threshold is found during the initial search stage.  
 Reutskaja and colleagues found that the hybrid search model, in which 
decision makers search for a random amount of time depending on the number of 
alternatives available, and then choose the alternative that meets their threshold, best 
describes how decision makers might search and decide in complex situations such 
as making food choices. They also found that decision makers search and choice 
processes changed with the increased number of alternatives, which was reflected in 
their eye fixations. More specifically, decision makers were making shorter eye 
fixations and searching for longer in total; therefore, sampling more alternatives 
before making a choice. Finally, they found that decision makers show a bias 
towards looking first and more often at the alternatives that are placed in the centre 
of the display, which they also in the end choose more often. 
 Schaffer, Kawashima and Matsuyama (2016) tested the assumption that the 
consumer decision process in multi-alternative choice situations can be described by 
the two decision stages, namely, exploration and evaluation. They defined 
exploration as a decision stage where decision makers aim to gather broad 
information about alternatives by examining them. On the other hand, they defined 
evaluation as a decision stage where decision makers aim to gather detailed 
information about a set of specific alternatives. To understand search stages in a 
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multi-alternative choice situation, they proposed the probabilistic approach to 
modelling search behaviour, i.e. a probabilistic gaze model. This model is based on a 
few simple assumptions regarding how often the chosen alternative is looked at to 
identify search stages. For instance, they suggested that the probability of a dwell on 
the chosen alternative, where a dwell is a set of successive eye fixations on an 
alternative, should be higher in the evaluation stage compared to the exploration 
stage, and this was confirmed. They also observed that decision processes differed 
between different decision makers, where some decision makers frequently changed 
search stages, whilst others just shifted their stage from the exploration to the 
evaluation stage. The proposed model was successful at accounting for these 
differences in search behaviour. 
 Russo and Leclerc (1994) also explored the presence and characteristics of 
decision stages in consumer decision processes. However, they studied this in a more 
naturalistic decision task, where decision makers made choices between real food 
products presented on a shelf in the laboratory. They proposed that the decision 
process consists of three stages, namely, orientation, evaluation, and verification. 
Each stage was identified based on one pattern of eye fixations, i.e. a sequence of eye 
fixations without re-fixating a previously observed alternative.  
The orientation stage is defined as the stage that occurs before the first re-
fixation, and might represent one of two different processes: screening or orientation. 
Screening corresponds to the first stage of the standard two-stage theory and serves 
as an initial consideration of the available alternatives, which should not require 
more than one fixation per alternative. Similarly, orientation corresponds to 
acquiring information about available alternatives to restrict following processing to 
a set of alternatives. The difference between screening and orientation is reflected in 
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the number and length of fixations; specifically, screening requires more and longer 
fixations, whereas orientation requires fewer and shorter fixations. The evaluation 
stage occurs between the first and last re-fixation. In this stage, the alternatives that 
are considered more seriously are more thoroughly evaluated. The verification stage 
could be divided into two stages: the first verification stage occurs after the last re-
fixation and lasts until the announcement of a choice, whereas the second 
verification stage occurs after the announcement of a choice, and could be 
interpreted as an additional verification.  
These findings were explained by providing two possible explanations. First, 
the methodology used to trace processes might have been responsible for observing 
differing numbers of stages, i.e. eye tracking provides more detailed data compared 
to other process-tracing techniques. Second, decision tasks usually used were 
represented with alternative-attribute matrices, whereas in this case a laboratory 
simulation of supermarket shelving was used.  
More recently, Gidlöf, Wallin, Dewhurst and Holmqvist (2013) used the 
three stage model proposed by Russo and Leclerc to identify decision making in a 
real-world supermarket environment. However, due to difficulties in differentiating 
between the orientation and the evaluation stages, based solely on a first re-fixation, 
they introduced the Natural Decision Segmentation Model (NDSM). In the NDSM, 
these two stages differ, based on the time the chosen alternative is first re-fixated. 
More specifically, after the first re-fixation on the chosen alternative, the initial 
screening stage ends and the evaluation stage begins. Gidlöf and colleagues argued 
that the introduction of the NDSM would better capture the differences between 
these three stages and therefore this model would be better able to differentiate 
between the search and decision processes.  
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Gidlöf and colleagues found that the NDSM better captures the more 
extensive processing of the alternatives in the evaluation stage, which is reflected in 
dwell times which are significantly longer compared to Russo and Leclerc’s findings. 
Also, they argued that only with the NDSM model can one observe a difference 
between the search and the decision processes, which is reflected in the number of 
re-fixations in the evaluation and the verification stages. In addition, they 
emphasized the importance of re-fixations, not only in the evaluation stage but in 
other stages as well, because they can serve as a measure of search and task 
difficulty. Lastly, they concluded that supermarkets are very complex environments 
which require more difficult search for an alternative than laboratory settings, and 
therefore require more visual processing, which is confirmed by their findings. 
Finally, Clement (2007) proposed the use of the self-organising criticality 
system to explain in-store purchase decision processes. This model consists of five 
stages: a) the build-up stage, b) the critical stage, c) the re-organising stage, d) the 
focal activity stage and e) the dormancy stage. These stages could be compared to 
the purchase decision process, which starts with a pre-attention stage (corresponds to 
the build-up stage), where the decision makers’ attention is attracted by the 
packaging of various alternatives. The next stage is the succeeded attention stage 
(corresponds to the critical stage) where the visual influence from packaging design 
accumulates in the decision makers’ mind. Next comes the tipping point 
(corresponds to the re-organising stage) where decision makers reach out for an 
alternative and then enter the physical action stage, which, if it results in a purchase, 
shifts the decision process into the semantic information process stage (corresponds 
to the focal activity stage). The final stage is the post-purchase stage which 
corresponds to the dormancy stage in the self-organising criticality system.  
  
56 
In his experiment, Clement found that gaze times followed his speculations 
about stages of a decision process in an in-store purchase setting. More specifically, 
the gaze time was short in the first two stages. Afterwards, it significantly increased 
during the stage where an alternative was in the decision maker’s hand, and finally, it 
shortened again in the last, post-purchase stage. 
In sum, the previously presented studies have three things in common. First, 
the authors agree that studying the decision process in the context of a food choice is 
a complex task, especially if the experiments are conducted in a natural environment, 
such as a supermarket. Second, all studies employ eye tracking, which is considered 
as advantageous compared to other process-tracing techniques, in terms of the 
amount of data it generates. Finally, they all divide the decision process into several 
stages, with a clear difference between the studies conducted in the laboratory 
setting, which find two stages (Reutskaja et al., 2011; Schaffer et al., 2016) versus 
studies performed in a more natural environment, which find three (Gidlöf et al., 
2013; Russo & Leclerc, 1994) or even five stages (Clement, 2007).  
2.3.2 Cognitive thinking styles 
 Cognitive thinking style refers to the way decision makers think and process 
information. One of the most prominent theoretical accounts in the understanding of 
human decision making has certainly been the dual-process framework, i.e. the 
models that classify cognitive processes into two main categories: intuition and 
reason. This framework has initially been applied to understand biases in judgments 
under uncertainty (e.g. Chaiken, 1980; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974); however, later it has been extended to be applied in 
the food choice domain as well. Nonetheless, research applying the dual-process 
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framework for explaining consumer food choices using process-tracing methodology 
is still very limited. 
Some studies have shown that different thinking styles, i.e. rational versus 
intuitive, do indeed impact decision processes and food related decisions. For 
instance, Ares, Mawad, Giménez and Maiche (2014) tested consumer processes and 
choices when evaluating yogurt labels using eye tracking. They expected that 
rational decision makers would engage in deeper information search for making their 
choices than intuitive decision makers, and that the former would prefer more 
complex information, e.g. nutritional information, to the graphic designs of the 
labels. They also expected differences regarding the extent to which the nutritional 
information would be processed. To identify decision maker groups with similar 
thinking style, Ares and colleagues performed a latent class cluster analysis which 
resulted in two clusters. Decision makers in Cluster 1 were classified as rational, and 
the decision makers in Cluster 2 were classified as intuitive.  
Eye tracking analysis showed that decision makers in Cluster 2 overall made 
significantly fewer and shorter fixations on the choice sets than decision makers in 
Cluster 1, which points to more superficial information processing. Furthermore, 
decision makers in Cluster 2 made fewer and shorter visits to the individual labels in 
the choice set. Additionally, the percentage of decision makers who fixated their 
gaze on nutritional information was significantly lower for Cluster 2 compared to 
Cluster 1. Also, decision makers in Cluster 2 tended to fixate their gaze on nutritional 
information and traffic light system earlier than decision makers in Cluster 2. The 
findings also showed that decision makers in Cluster 2 extracted less information to 
complete the task than decision makers in Cluster 1 which was confirmed by fewer 
visits and fixations on the central image and nutritional information. To conclude, 
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even though the findings of Ares and colleagues (2014) are limited by a non-
representative sample, they provide preliminary evidence that thinking style could 
affect decision processes and choices when evaluating food product labels. 
In a similar study, Mawad, Trías, Giménez, Maiche and Ares (2015) explored 
whether different cognitive styles influenced consumer information processing and 
yoghurt choices. However, the cognitive styles explored were one of the earliest 
styles studied, namely field dependence and field independence (Witkin, Moore, 
Goodenough, & Cox, 1977). Decision makers using a field independent style tend to 
separate details from the surrounding context, whereas decision makers using a field 
dependent style are relatively unable to distinguish detail from the other information 
around it. To distinguish between the field independent and field dependent decision 
makers, the Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT; Witkin, Oltman, Raskin, & Karp, 
1971) was used. Two groups emerged: Group 1, which consisted of field dependent 
decision makers, and Group 2, which consisted of field independent decision makers.  
Eye tracking analysis showed that decision makers with different cognitive 
styles differed in how they visually processed the information in the task. Decision 
makers in Group 1 made significantly fewer and shorter fixations on the choice sets 
than decision makers in Group 2. Furthermore, field independent decision makers 
performed a more thorough analysis of the yogurt labels. More specifically, field 
independent decision makers fixated more often on the four areas of interest (i.e. 
central image, brand, nutritional information and traffic light system) than field 
dependent decision makers. Also, field independent decision makers made more 
fixations on traditional nutritional information than field dependent decision makers.  
In sum, different cognitive styles seem to provide a good explanation for 
some of the observed differences in the decision process. Mawad and colleagues 
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argue that the importance of studying the influence of different cognitive styles on 
food choice could potentially contribute to the development of successful 
communication strategies aiming at changing the eating patterns. 
2.3.3 Decision strategies 
 Decision strategies that decision makers may apply to make decisions have 
been classified into two groups of strategies: compensatory, i.e. a good value on one 
attribute can compensate for a poor value on another, and non-compensatory 
strategies, i.e. a good value on one attribute cannot compensate for a poor value on 
another (Payne et al., 1993). Each of these two groups of decision strategies includes 
quite different search processes (Pachur, Hertwig, Gigerenzer, & Brandstätter, 2013). 
For instance, the compensatory weighted additive (WADD) rule considers the values 
of each alternative on all the relevant attributes as well as the weight of each relevant 
attribute (Payne et al., 1993). In contrast, the non-compensatory LEX heuristic 
(Fishburn, 1974), instead of weighting and adding, orders attributes and relies on the 
first attribute that allows for a decision.  
However, research exploring the use of different decision strategies in the 
context of food choice using eye tracking is still very limited. Thus, I only managed 
to two identify two papers that matched these criteria. The first paper is the one by 
Stüttgen and colleagues (2012)  who proposed a choice model based on Simon’s 
satisficing heuristic (1955), i.e. choosing any option that meets the threshold level. 
They tested the model in an incentive compatible task which required making a 
choice of instant noodles. The proposed model consists of the two interrelated parts, 
namely search and evaluation. More specifically, during search, a decision maker 
constantly acquires more information, but also constantly updates her evaluations of 
the alternatives. These evaluations can end up in one of the three groups: satisfactory 
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products, unsatisfactory products and undetermined products, i.e. alternatives for 
which she still does not have enough information to form a judgment. What is 
essential about this model is that it allows for these evaluations to influence the 
continued search, as well as the final decision, once a decision maker proceeds to the 
termination stage.  
Stüttgen and colleagues found that, overall, the decision makers seem to 
follow the satisficing heuristic, because more than 70% of participants had on 
average less than two satisfactory options across choice sets before terminating their 
search. This suggests that most decision makers were satisfied with finding one good 
enough alternative which led to terminating their search very soon after. Stüttgen and 
colleagues also evaluated the predictive ability of the satisficing model compared to 
a standard multinomial logit model and found that that the proposed model out-
predicts the multinomial logit model. In sum, their findings show that it is possible to 
estimate choice models that adhere more closely to the actual decision process. 
The second paper is the one by Wästlund and colleagues (2015), who tested 
whether consumers more often rely on the previously mentioned satisficing heuristic 
rather than on the take-the-best heuristic, i.e. choosing an option based on the first 
cue that discriminates between them, where the cues are ordered from the highest to 
the lowest (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996), when asked to buy a relatively cheap 
product. They used a 2 (task specificity: specific versus non-specific) × 2 (choice 
task: first versus second) mixed design. The task-specificity was a between-subjects 
factor and the choice task was a within-subjects factor. The goal of the first task was 
to choose a package of coffee. The participants were instructed either to find a 
specific type of coffee (task specific group), or to choose a package of coffee they 
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preferred (task non-specific group). The goal of the second task was to go to the 
pastry department and choose any type of pastry they preferred. 
Wästlund and colleagues found that participants in the task non-specific 
group observed a significantly smaller number of AOIs than participants in the task 
specific group. This suggests that consumers who choose a low-cost product of their 
preference direct less of their visual attention towards the task-relevant stimulus 
compared with consumers who choose a specific, predetermined product within the 
same product category. The authors explained these findings by suggesting that 
consumers in the task non-specific group were most likely affected by the satisficing 
heuristic and therefore performed shorter search. 
In sum, research exploring decision processes in the context of food choice 
using eye tracking is still scarce. However, as emphasised in the introduction of this 
doctoral dissertation, understanding how consumers make food choices is becoming 
increasingly important for the three main societal reasons outlined already, i.e. 
growing obesity rates, food waste rates and concerns regarding food safety. 
Therefore, to enhance understanding of food choice, one needs to consider its 
complexity, and, as has been repeatedly pointed out, focus also on the processes that 
precede a choice, and not just the final choice. Eye tracking, as a process-tracing 
technique, has great potential to bring valuable insights into decision processes 
behind food choices.  
In the following chapters I contribute to the literature described above by 
exploring consumer decision processes behind food choices, using eye tracking. 
More specifically, I propose a different explanation as to why consumers may 
behave in a specific way, and this explanation sheds more light on decision processes 
which leads to a specific choice. I then focus more closely on how consumers 
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acquire information, which is the beginning stage of every decision process, by 
proposing methodological improvements to the existing measures for analysing 




Irrational beliefs can lead to rational behaviours 
In this chapter, I explore my first research question: can irrational beliefs 
sometimes lead to rational behaviours when making food choices? I explore this 
research question in the context of organic food products. It was motivated by the 
currently dominant belief that organic food products are more healthful than 
conventional food products, even though there is still no conclusive scientific 
evidence for this belief. In this chapter, I first consider a current explanation in the 
literature as to why this may be so, which is that consumers may be influenced by a 
halo effect. Then, I propose a different explanation, which explores the organic = 
healthful heuristic by placing it in the right context. This explanation consists of the 
three hypotheses which I test in the three studies and the findings of which I report 
separately. I finish this chapter with a general discussion of all the findings in the 
light of the research question asked.  
3.1 Introduction 
The halo effect was first coined by Thorndike (1920) who set out to explore 
how commanding officers evaluate their soldiers in terms of physical qualities, 
intelligence, leadership, personal qualities and general value to the service. He found 
unusually high and equal correlations between the tested traits. For instance, a soldier 
rated as intelligent also tended to get high marks on physical qualities such as 
physique, energy and endurance, and the other way around. Thorndike therefore 
concluded that a positive or negative halo of general merit influenced the ratings of 
the special abilities. Half a century later, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) experimentally 
reproduced the halo effect in a seminal paper. They divided their participants into 
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two groups and asked them to watch a video and rate a college instructor who spoke 
English with a Belgian accent on his likability, physical appearance, mannerism and 
accent. In both videos the instructor answered the same questions; however, in one 
video he was warm and friendly, and in the other he was cold and distant. 
Interestingly, the ‘warm’ version of the instructor influenced participants to rate his 
appearance, mannerism and accent as appealing, whereas the ‘cold’ version had the 
opposite effect. Nisbett and Wilson therefore concluded that global evaluations of a 
person can alter evaluations of the person’s attributes about which the individual has 
sufficient information for an independent assessment. Another 20 years later, Roe, 
Levy and Derby (1999) discovered the halo effect in the area of food choice. They 
found that consumers tend to overgeneralize specific health claims believing that a 
product is more healthful than it really is, which implies that the claim creates a halo 
effect. There has been a vast amount of research on the perception of health claims 
since then, but it remains an open question whether health claims actually lead to 
halo effects (Orquin & Scholderer, 2015).  
A similar line of research has found that organic food products seem to have 
a robust halo effect with regards to health perceptions. Specifically, it has been 
shown that organic food products are perceived as being more healthful (Hughner, 
McDonagh, Prothero, Shultz, & Stanton, 2007; Lee et al., 2013; Orquin & 
Scholderer, 2015; Schuldt & Hannahan, 2013; Schuldt & Schwarz, 2010; Sörqvist et 
al., 2015), safer (Michaelidou & Hassan, 2008) and of better quality (Lockie, Lyons, 
Lawrence, & Mummery, 2002). Since there is currently no conclusive evidence that 
organic food products are indeed more healthful than conventional alternatives 
(Barański et al., 2014; Dangour et al., 2009; Smith-Spangler et al., 2012), it is often 
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concluded that decision makers have an irrational bias in favour of organic food 
products (EUFIC review, 2013). 
Even though it seems that decision makers are in fact biased by the halo 
effect, there may be other explanations for the organic = healthful heuristic. One 
counterhypothesis is that the heuristic is not a bias at all, but rather a clever 
adaptation to a specific environment. This idea is often termed as ecological 
rationality (see section 2.1.3) (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Todd et al., 2012) and refers 
to the application of simple heuristics in appropriate environments. More 
specifically, when taken out of its environment a heuristic may seem irrational, but 
with the right application, it can sometimes lead to better outcomes than other 
procedurally more complicated processes (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996).  
Therefore, here I propose that the organic = healthful heuristic may be 
ecologically rational if the environment is structured such that organic food products 
are in some way more healthful than conventional food products. While currently 
there is no evidence for such a claim, I speculate that organic food products are more 
prevalent in less processed, as opposed to processed, food product categories due to 
various restrictions regarding organic production; that is to say that unprocessed or 
less processed food products, such as vegetables, fruit, milk, meat, eggs and so on, 
are more likely to be organic than more processed food products, such as frozen 
pizzas, candy, chips, prepackaged meals and so on. If this is true, then the organic = 
healthful heuristic would be ecologically rational; a person primarily buying organic 
food products would have a higher likelihood of buying from healthful (less 
processed) food product categories.  
If such a statistical structure exists in the environment, would consumers be 
able to learn it? Research shows that people are undoubtedly sensitive to statistical 
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regularities observed in the world. According to Reber (1989) this type of learning, 
sometimes referred to as statistical or implicit learning (Conway & Christiansen, 
2006; Perruchet & Pacton, 2006), evolves without conscious attempts to pick up the 
rule-governed complexities of the environment. Such unsupervised learning allows 
us to infer distributional properties, correlations, and transition probabilities in the 
environment (Thiessen, Kronstein, & Hufnagle, 2013) and the learning happens fast 
(Saffran, Newport, Aslin, Tunick, & Barrueco, 1997), across sensory modalities 
(Conway & Christiansen, 2005), and in different domains (Brady & Oliva, 2008; 
Kushnir, Xu, & Wellman, 2010; Xu & Garcia, 2008). While statistical learning is 
mainly concerned with language and visual learning, it could provide an opportunity 
to understand ecological rationality in decision making. When combining this line of 
thought with the finding that decision makers are typically very categorical in 
thinking about food healthfulness (Orquin, 2014; Rozin, Ashmore, & Markwith, 
1996), it seems plausible that consumers may observe a natural correlation between 
organic food products, and less processed food product categories, and form the 
sensible conclusion that organic food products are in fact more healthful than 
conventional food products. This suggests that in the case of the organic food 
products, the putative halo effect may not be a halo effect after all, but rather a 
heuristic based on statistical learning. 
Based on the previously introduced idea that the organic = healthful heuristic 
is a matter of statistical learning rather than a halo effect, I derive the following 
hypotheses. First, I hypothesise that there is a correlation between organic and more 
healthful food products in the natural environment, i.e. food product categories 
which are less processed have a higher prevalence of organic food products. Second, 
I hypothesise that consumers observe this statistical structure and, therefore, 
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perceive organic food products to be more prevalent across more healthful food 
product categories. Third, I hypothesise that it is also possible to experimentally 
reproduce statistical learning in the lab by manipulating the correlation between 
organic and health cues. As an objective health cue, I use the Nordic Keyhole label 
which indicates healthful alternatives within a product category (Ministry of Food, 
Agriculture and Fisheries, 2013). I expect that a positive correlation between organic 
and the Keyhole label will increase attention to, and use of, organic cues when 
estimating food healthfulness. Put simply, consumers will be more likely to look at 
and choose food products with organic cues when these cues are a valid predictor for 
food healthfulness. 
I tested these hypotheses in three studies. Study 1 is a field study from six 
Danish supermarkets in which I tested the first hypothesis by obtaining the true 
correlation between organic food prevalence and the healthfulness of food product 
categories. In Study 2, I tested the second hypothesis in an online consumer study 
where participants provided estimates of the healthfulness and prevalence of organic 
food products for the food product categories identified in Study 1. In Study 3, I 
tested the third hypothesis in an eye tracking experiment by manipulating the 
correlation between organic and health cues in a health judgment task.  
3.2 Study 1 
In Study 1, I investigated the assumption that there is a correlation between 
the likelihood of a product being organic, and the likelihood of that product being 
healthful. I obtained the true percentages of organic food products across food 
product categories in six Danish supermarkets as well as the estimates of food 
healthfulness from a panel of food and nutrition experts. I expected to find a positive 
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correlation between organic food prevalence and food healthfulness. 
3.2.1 Methods 
3.2.1.1 Design and procedure  
To obtain estimates of organic product prevalence, I manually counted the total 
number of products within various food categories as well as the number of organic 
food products within the same food categories. The counting took place in six 
supermarkets in Aarhus, Denmark; of these, three would be considered small, one 
medium, and two large. The coding scheme was developed over three rounds by 
adding new categories as new products were encountered. The inclusion criterion 
was whether a food product could be consumed independently of other products or 
ingredients. For that reason, I decided that raw ingredient sub-components, such as 
flour, salt, sugar and so on, would not be taken into consideration. Thus, 54 food 
product categories emerged and were used as a basis for developing a coding 
scheme. The initial coding scheme consisted of 17 super-ordinate categories and 54 
sub-ordinate categories. The coding scheme was revised two more times, in the 
second and the fourth supermarket respectively. The final coding scheme consisted 
of 17 super-ordinate and 59 sub-ordinate categories. Organic food products within 
those 59 food product categories were detected by inspecting the presence of a 
Danish organic label or the EU organic label (see Figure 3.1). To ensure that the 
counting performed was unbiased, an independent coder, blind to the study 
hypotheses, was used in one supermarket. The coders assessed 53 food product 
categories. I calculated the inter-coder reliability separately for total food product 
counts and organic food product counts obtained from each coder. To do that, I 
compared the frequencies of all food products per food category and frequencies of 
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organic food products per food category for two coders. The inter-coder reliability 
(Krippendorff's alpha; Krippendorff, 2011) was high for both total food product 
counts, a = .93, and organic food product counts, a = .88.  
a                                                        b 
  
 
Figure 3.1 An image of (a) Danish organic label and (b) EU organic label. 
To obtain objective estimates of the healthfulness of the 59 food product 
categories, 15 nutrition and food scientists were asked to complete a short survey, 
indicating the healthfulness of each category on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 
‘extremely unhealthful’ to ‘extremely healthful’. Ten participants completed the 
survey. One expert provided the same score for all 59 food product categories and 
was excluded from further analysis, resulting in a final sample of nine experts. A 
copy of the survey used can be found in Appendix A.  
3.2.2 Results  
The field data show that organic food products are more prevalent in food 
product categories that require less processing. For instance, food product categories 
such as whole-grain pasta, brown rice, milk, eggs etc. have a higher prevalence of 
organic food products compared to categories such as prepackaged meals, candy, 
chips and canned meat. An overview of the average number of food products, 
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percentage of organic food products, and corresponding expert estimates can be 
found in Table 3.1 (columns two to four). An overview of all counting scores from 
the six supermarkets can be found in Appendix B. 
Table 3.1 Average number of food products, percentage of organic food products, 
and expert and consumer estimates of healthfulness 
Category Totals % Organic Expert Consumer 
Whole-grain pasta 17.33 84.39 5.38 5.06 
Non-dairy milk 9.17 78.94 4.5 4.61 
Brown rice 3.83 64.58 5 5.27 
Milk 15.33 53.47 5.5 5.09 
Unprocessed breakfast cereals 28.17 50.89 5.88 5.21 
Eggs 9 36.82 6.38 5.22 
Oil 30.33 31.46 4.88 4.16 
Plain yoghurt products 19.5 30.67 6.13 4.99 
Syrups 32.17 29.67 1.88 2.94 
Crispbread and rice crackers 37 27.15 4.75 4.35 
Dried fruits, nuts and seeds 100.33 25.97 5.25 4.84 
Vegetables 136.33 25.45 6.63 6.16 
Butter 14.67 24.46 2.75 3.34 
White rice 15.83 22.92 3.5 3.57 
Fruit 39.50 20.61 6.13 5.80 
Honey 8.5 20.4 3.38 4.36 
Juices 57.83 19.39 3.63 4.02 
Processed meat 25.17 18.79 2.38 2.87 
Marmalade 51.17 16.37 2.88 3.15 
Chocolate spreads 14 16.26 2 2.74 
Crackers 11.17 15.48 2.5 3.09 
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Table 3.1 Continued     
Category Totals % Organic Expert Consumer 
Fruit yoghurts 42 14.86 3 4.07 
Frozen meat 13.33 14.35 4.5 4.49 
Fresh meat 62.17 13.08 5 4.96 
Whole-grain bread 25.33 12.37 6.25 5.52 
Canned vegetables 91.5 12.23 4.88 4.5 
Cream 12.33 11.42 2.63 3.04 
Frozen fruit 6.5 11.21 5.38 4.82 
Frozen bread 19.67 10.78 4.13 3.67 
Cheese 153.67 10.56 4.5 4.57 
Frozen vegetables 33.33 9.9 6.25 5.27 
Canned fruit 15.83 9.89 3.5 3.96 
Sauces (tomato, pesto) 42.83 9.58 4.63 4.05 
Cold cuts 123 9.29 3.5 4.02 
Refined wheat flour pasta 36 8.21 2.75 3.2 
Ice cream 39.5 7.49 2.25 2.68 
Dressings 76.5 6.38 3.38 2.86 
Cakes and cookies 80.67 5.49 2.13 2.24 
Muesli and protein bars 16 5.28 4 4.09 
Frozen prepackaged meals 64.67 5.11 2.5 3.22 
Processed breakfast cereals 25.33 4.71 1.75 2.66 
Refined wheat flour bread 42 4.19 2.88 2.77 
White wine 44.83 4.18 4 3.36 
Sodas 109.5 3.51 1.5 2.06 
Alcoholic beers and shakers 131.33 3.32 3 2.45 
Mayonnaise-based salads 36.83 3.03 3 3.09 
Chips 56.33 2.67 1.5 1.92 
Red wine 121.17 2.59 4.38 3.69 
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Table 3.1 Continued     
Category Totals % Organic Expert Consumer 
Candy 382.83 2.19 1.38 1.92 
Soups 12.83 1.31 4 3.97 
Frozen fish 15.17 1.04 6 5.21 
Dry prepackaged meals 17.33 0.83 2.88 3.16 
Processed fish (refrigerated) 49.17 0.76 5.25 4.99 
Prepackaged meals: sauces 38 0.29 2.13 2.95 
Take-out meals 4.67 0 3 3.18 
Canned fish 35.5 0 5.63 4.63 
Canned meat 5.83 0 3.25 3.56 
Fresh fish 5.17 0 6.63 5.99 
Refrigerated prepackaged meals 11.17 0 2.75 3.27 
 
The results show a medium-sized, positive correlation between the true 
percentages of organic food products and healthfulness estimates by experts, r = .35, 





Figure 3.2 Scatter plot of (a) the true percentages of organic food products and 
expert healthfulness estimates, (b) healthfulness estimates by experts and 
consumers, (c) the true and perceived percentages of organic food products and 
(d) the perceived percentages of organic food products and healthfulness 
estimates by consumers. The trend lines in all plots represent the best-fitting, 
linear regression line and its 95% confidence interval.  
 
Next, I calculated the expected healthfulness of organic and conventional 






where #$ denotes the probability of a product being in category i and %$ denotes the 
expert healthfulness rating for that category. I applied the calculation separately for 
organic and conventional food products. The results show that organic food products, 
M = 4.47, SD = 1.48, are, on average, 30% more healthful than conventional food 
products, M = 3.44, SD = 1.59, d = .67.  
3.3 Study 2 
The findings from Study 1 show a correlation in the environment between the 
likelihood of a product being organic and the likelihood of that product being 
healthful. According to my previous assumption, consumers have learned this 
statistical structure which should be reflected in their ability to accurately estimate 
the percentage of organic food products across food product categories. Therefore, in 
Study 2, I conducted an online survey to test this assumption. Given that consumers 
learn about the statistical nature of the environment, I expected to find a strong 
correlation between their perceptions and the true state of the environment.    
3.3.1 Methods 
3.3.1.1 Participants 
Seven hundred and seventy-three participants representative of the Danish 
population were recruited through a consumer panel provider. Six hundred and 
thirty-seven participants completed the study which gives a response rate of 82.4%. 
The participants ranged in age from 17 to 81 (M = 42.95, SD = 16.09) with an 
approximately even distribution of male and female participants (315 women). The 
sample captured a broad spectrum of the population with regards to age, gender, 
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education and shopping behaviour as well as psychographic dimensions. For a full 
description of the sample, see Figure D1-D3 in the Appendix D. Each participant 
received approximately €1 for completing the study. The sample size was determined 
by maximising within budget constraints. A post-hoc power analysis was conducted 
using the ‘pwr’ package in R (Champely, 2017) which revealed that the power to 
detect a small-sized effect (d = .2; see Cohen, 1988) with the sample size of 637 and 
the alpha level .05 is .99. The study received ethical approval from the University of 
Leeds. 
3.3.1.2 Materials and procedure  
Participants were recruited online and all gave informed consent before 
commencing the study. Participants were asked to estimate the percentage of organic 
food products for the 59 food product categories identified in Study 1. Subsequently, 
participants were asked to estimate the healthfulness of each food category on a 7-
point Likert scale ranging from ‘extremely unhealthful’ to ‘extremely healthful’. 
Besides the main variables, demographic and psychographic information about the 
sample was collected as well as information about organic purchasing behaviour. 
Organic purchasing behaviour was measured with two items. The first item measured 
the frequency of purchasing organic food products using a 7-point unipolar scale 
ranging from ‘never’ to ‘always’ (Magnusson, Arvola, Hursti, Åberg, & Sjödén, 
2001). The second item measured the percentage of organic food products purchased 
with a visual analogue scale ranging from 0 to 100. The organic purchasing attitudes 
were measured by asking participants to indicate how ‘good’, ‘important’ and ‘wise’ 
they think it is to purchase organic food products. To do that, 7-point bipolar scales 
from Magnusson and colleagues (2001) was used ranging from ‘very bad’ to ‘very 
good’, ‘very unimportant’ to ‘very important’, and ‘very foolish’ to ‘very wise’. 
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Beliefs about organic food products were measured by asking participants to rate on 
a 7-point Likert scale whether they think organic food products are ‘healthier’, 
‘tastier’, ‘have less calories’, ‘better quality’, ‘fresher’, and ‘safer’ than conventional 
food products. A copy of the survey used can be found in Appendix C. 
3.3.2 Results 
The results from Study 1 and Study 2 combined show a positive correlation 
between the true and perceived percentages of organic food products across food 
product categories, r = .65, CI95 = [.45, .77], suggesting that participants have 
accurately learned the prevalence of organic food products across food product 
categories. The results also show a strong, positive correlation between expert and 
consumer healthfulness estimates, r = .95, CI95 = [.91, .97], suggesting that 
participants make very accurate healthfulness estimates. Finally, the results show a 
strong positive correlation between consumer perceptions of organic food products 
prevalence and food healthfulness, r = .72, CI95 = [.55, .81]. An overview of the 
consumer estimates can be found in Table 1 (column five). Figure 3.2b, 3.2c and 
3.2d show scatterplots of the observed data.  
The results from Study 2 also show that participants in general hold positive 
attitudes towards organic food products, M = 4.82, CI95 = [4.81, 4.84]. However, the 
results indicate the absence of an overall spread of attitudes. Specifically, there is no 
relationship between attitudes and the calories attribute, r = .05, CI95 = [.04, .06]. On 
the other hand, there is a strong positive correlation between attitudes and the health 
attribute, r = .64, CI95 = [.63, .64]. What is more, the results also show a moderate to 
strong correlation for other tested attributes, namely the taste, quality, freshness, and 
safety attributes (see Table 3.2).  
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Table 3.2 Correlations with 95% confidence intervals between participants’ attitudes 
towards organic food products and specific attributes 
Attribute Correlation 95% Confidence Interval 
Health .64 [.63, .64] 
Taste .54 [.53, .55] 
Calories .05 [.04, .06] 
Quality .61 [.60, .61] 
Freshness .44 [.43, .45] 
Safety .61 [.60, .61] 
 
The mean responses from the attribute scales support previous results 
showing that responses for all attributes, besides the calories attribute, are above the 
middle value, indicating neither agreement nor disagreement. While interpreting 
scales’ mean in absolute terms can be unjustified, it can be noticed that the health 
attribute has the highest mean response, M = 4.78, CI95 = [4.77, 4.80], suggesting 
that participants on average agree that organic food products are more healthful than 
conventional food products. The calories attribute has the lowest mean response, M = 
2.98, CI95 = [2.96, 3], suggesting that participants on average disagree that organic 
food products have less calories than conventional food products. The remaining 
attributes indicate that participants on average find that organic food products taste 
better, are of a higher quality, fresher and safer than conventional food products. An 
overview of the mean attribute values, standard deviations and confidence intervals 
can be found in Table 3.3.   
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Table 3.3 Means, standard deviations and 95% confidence intervals of consumer 
beliefs about organic compared to conventional food product attributes 
Attribute Mean Standard Deviation 95% Confidence Interval 
Health 4.78 1.49 [4.77, 4.80] 
Taste 4.26 1.51 [4.24, 4.27] 
Calories 2.98 1.53 [2.96, 3.00] 
Quality 4.55 1.51 [4.53, 4.56] 
Freshness 4.04 1.48 [4.03, 4.06] 
Safety 4.56 1.55 [4.55, 4.58] 
 
3.4 Study 3 
While Study 1 and Study 2 have provided evidence in support of the 
statistical learning hypothesis, the studies are correlational in nature. The question of 
whether consumers can learn a statistical structure where organic food products are 
correlated with more healthful food product categories remains to be answered. 
Therefore, in Study 3, I conducted a lab-based, eye tracking study, manipulating the 
correlation between organic cues and cues about the healthfulness of food products. 
The task for participants was to choose, in their opinion, the most healthful of eight 
food product alternatives. As an objective health cue, I used the Nordic Keyhole 
label which indicates healthful food product alternatives within a food product 
category (Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, 2013). 
However, as the Keyhole is present only on some healthful products (Orquin, 
2014), it is useful to rely on other cues as well, when judging product healthfulness. 
More specifically, the Keyhole label is a 100% valid cue for a healthful product 
(Orquin, 2014), but the Keyhole is only available on 39% of healthful products. In 
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contrast, the organic label is available on 100% of organic food products (Orquin, 
2014). Consequently, when cue availability varies, it is an advantage to know many 
cues because it reduces the number of times we must choose at random (Berretty, 
Todd, & Martignon, 1999). I therefore expect that participants would be more likely 
to look at and choose organic food products when organic cues are positively 
correlated with health cues, compared to situations with zero or negative correlation 
between the two.    
3.4.1 Methods 
3.4.1.1 Participants 
Seventy-eight Danish participants were recruited through a consumer panel 
provider. Seven participants were excluded after the experiment due to insufficient 
data quality, resulting in a total sample of 71 participants. The participants ranged in 
age from 18 to 74 years (M = 45.73, SD = 15.12) with more male than female 
participants (19 women). The data was collected from participants with normal, or 
corrected-to-normal, and full colour vision only. Each participant received a gift card 
of approximately €34 for completing the study. All participants gave informed 
consent. The sample size was determined by maximising within budget constraints, 
which gave at least 20 participants per cell thereby exceeding the threshold suggested 
by Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn (2011). The study received ethical approval 
from the University of Leeds. 
3.4.1.2 Stimuli and apparatus 
The experimental stimuli consisted of 50 trials of processed food products, 
each with eight alternatives positioned in a 4x2 array with a separation of 5.1° 
horizontal and 10.3° of vertical visual angle. Each alternative contained several 
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features, i.e. product picture, name, brand, price, weight, and two manipulated 
features – a Keyhole label and an organic label. The degree of overlap between the 
Keyhole and organic labels varied across three conditions (25%, 50% and 75% 
overlap). More specifically, the number of Keyhole and organic labels was constant 
across conditions (four Keyhole and four organic labels). Therefore, 25% overlap 
between labels implies that only one product bore both labels, r = -0.5, 50% of 
overlap implies that two products bore both labels, r = 0, and 75% overlap implies 
that three products bore both labels, r = 0.5. An example of the experimental 
stimulus from each condition is shown in Figure 3.3. The labels were randomly 
distributed across alternatives in each trial, and the presentation order of the trials 







Figure 3.3 Example of a trial with 25% overlap (-0.5 condition) between the 
Keyhole and organic labels (top), 50% overlap (0 condition) between the 
Keyhole and organic labels (middle), 75% overlap (0.5 condition) between the 
Keyhole and organic labels (bottom).  
 
Eye movements were recorded using a Tobii T60 XL eye tracker with a 
  
82 
temporal resolution of 60 Hz and a screen resolution of 1920 × 1200 pixels. Average 
viewing distance was 60 cm from the screen and a chin rest was used to stabilize 
head position. I determined areas of interest (AOIs) by defining the pixel positions of 
the manipulated labels in each trial (16 possible positions). Fixations were identified 
using a velocity based algorithm (I-VT algorithm) with default settings (Salvucci & 
Goldberg, 2000). Specifically, the maximum length of the gap between fixations was 
set to 75 ms. A noise reduction function was not applied, and averaged data from 
both eyes were used. The velocity threshold was set to 30°/s. Fixations with a 
duration less than 60 ms were discarded. Margins of the AOIs were set to 
approximately 0.15° larger than the actual labels, to consider the inaccuracy in 
recording of fixation locations. There have been several attempts to define the most 
suitable AOI margins. More specifically, I tested the margins 0°, 0.15° and 0.5° of 
visual angle for a random sample of three participants and six trials per condition 
with a total number of 432 hand-coded AOIs. The hand-coded fixation count was 
used as criterion and compared with the fixation count for each AOI margin size, by 
counting the number of false negatives and false positives1. I found that different 
AOI margin sizes influenced the results with respect to the number of false negatives 
and false positives registered. The AOI margin size of 0.15° of visual angle had the 
most acceptable rates of false negatives and false positives. The results are presented 
in Table 3.4 and are in accordance with the findings of Orquin, Ashby and Clarke 
(2016) which indicate that using maximal AOI sizes may, as suggested by Holmqvist 
                                            
1 False negatives occur when margins of the AOIs are too narrow so they do not capture the eye 
fixations belonging to the specific AOI whereas false positives occur when margins of the AOIs 
are too wide so eye fixations belonging to the objects close by are captured as if they belong to 
the AOI we are interested in. 
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and colleagues (2011), not always be a good idea. Specifically, in a situation when 
fixation distributions overlap due to shorter object distances, smaller AOI sizes are 
expected to yield a better ratio of true to false positives which was confirmed in this 
situation. 
Table 3.4 The influence of AOI margin sizes on the number of false negatives and 
positives 
AOI Condition False Negatives (%) False Positives (%) 
0° -0.5 3.7 0 
0° 0 2.78 0 
0° 0.5 5.09 0 
0.15° -0.5 3.01 0 
0.15° 0 1.39 .46 
0.15° 0.5 3.01 0 
0.5° -0.5 .23 5.56 
0.5° 0 0 5.79 
0.5° 0.5 .93 6.25 
 
3.4.1.3 Procedure  
The study was conducted in a light-controlled, laboratory environment. Upon 
arrival, participants were greeted, and seated in front of the eye tracker. The height of 
the chin rest was adjusted for each participant and calibration was performed using 
the Tobii Studio 9-point calibration procedure. After calibration, each participant 
was randomly assigned to one of the three conditions. The experiment started with 
instructions to choose the most healthful alternative among eight food products and 
to indicate the choice with a mouse click. A fixation cross lasting 1000 ms appeared 





3.4.2.1 Eye movement analysis  
To test whether participants fixate more on the organic label when there is a 
high degree of overlap between the organic and Keyhole label, I analysed the eye 
tracking data by means of a generalized linear mixed model. The model was fitted 
using the ‘lme4’ package in R (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). I used 
fixation selection (AOI-fixated or not) as a dependent variable, and condition and 
label type as independent variables. The best-fitting model was identified using a 
step-up procedure and had a binomial response distribution, a logit link function, two 
random intercepts grouped by participant and trial and a random slope of label type 














Table 3.6 Summary statistics for the best fitting model 
Parameter Value Standard error 95% CI  
Intercept -2.39 0.20 [-2.79, 2.00]  
Condition 0 0.02 0.28 [-0.53, 0.56]  
Condition .5 -0.20 0.30 [-0.78, 0.39]  
Label type organic -.077 0.23 [-1.22, -0.32]  
Condition 0 ´ label type organic 0.47 0.31 [-0.14, 1.09]  
Condition .5 ´ label type organic 0.63 0.33 [-0.02, 1.28]  
AIC  16484.1    
BIC 16566.6    
Log Likelihood -8232.1    
Number of observations 28400    
Number of groups: Participant  71    
Number of groups: Trial 50    
Variance: Participant (Intercept) 0.90    




Variance: Trial (Intercept) 0.03    
 
To interpret the direction of the interaction effect, I plotted the fixation 
likelihood across condition and label type (see Fig. 3.3). Figure 3.4 shows that 
participants fixate on the organic label more frequently at the expense of the Keyhole 




Figure 3.4 Fixation likelihood for the Keyhole and organic labels across conditions. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
3.4.2.2 Follow up analysis 
One potential problem with the fixation likelihood analysis is that fixations to the 
organic label in the 0.5 condition could be an artefact. Specifically, the pattern in 
Figure 3.4 could occur if participants searched for the Keyhole label and then fixated 
on the remaining information on Keyhole labelled food products. If this was the case, 
I would expect the Keyhole to drive fixations to the food product, i.e. participants 
should be faster to fixate on the Keyhole label than the organic label. To exclude this 
possibility, I inspected the cases where participants fixated on both labels. As can be 
seen in Table 3.7 below, participants who fixated on both labels on a food product 
were equally likely to fixate on the Keyhole label or the organic label first. I take this 
to imply that the Keyhole label did not drive fixations and hence that the results of 
the fixation likelihood analysis are not artefactual. 
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Table 3.7 Number of cases where the Keyhole or the organic label was fixated first 
given that both labels were fixated on a product 
Condition Keyhole first Organic first 
-0.5 18 15 
0 29 31 
0.5 42 44 
 
3.4.2.3 Choice analysis 
To examine the effect of the condition on participants’ choice of organic food 
products, I fitted participants by means of multinomial logit models using the 
‘mlogit’ package in R (Croissant, 2013). Each participant was fitted with a null 
model, including only intercepts for the eight food product alternatives, and a full 
model including a term for product type, i.e. whether the alternative had a Keyhole 
label, organic label, both labels, or none of the labels. I calculated the AIC difference 
as AICfull – AICnull. Out of 71 participants, 42 participants were identified as label 
users (AICdiff > 0) and 29 as non-label users (AICdiff ≤ 0). I then calculated the 
standardized mean difference between the choice likelihood in the 0.5 and -0.5 
conditions for the food products with an organic label and food products with both 
labels correcting for chance level:  
&!' =	 (!*., −	!.*.,) − (!*.,	012304 −	!.*.,	012304)&'566748  
For label users, I found a medium increase in the likelihood of choosing food 
products with an organic label in the 0.5 condition, SMD = .42, and a large increase 
in the likelihood of choosing food products with both labels, SMD = .83, relative to 
the -0.5 condition. For non-label users, I found that choices are close to chance level 
for products with an organic label, SMD = -.08, and food products with both labels, 
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SMD = .06. Figure 3.5 shows the choice likelihood across conditions for food 
products carrying organic, Keyhole, both, or neither of the labels. 
 
Figure 3.5 Likelihood of choosing products per label type and statistical condition 
for label users and non-label users. The black line represents observed choice 
likelihood, the grey line represents chance level choice, and error bars represent 
95% confidence intervals. 
3.5 Discussion 
This chapter explored whether irrational beliefs can sometimes lead to 
rational behaviours when making food choices. I explored this in the context of 
organic food products. A motivating question was why consumers perceive organic 
food products as more healthful than conventional food products, when in fact there 
is no conclusive scientific evidence for this belief (Barański et al., 2014; Dangour et 
al., 2009; Smith-Spangler et al., 2012)? This belief can therefore be considered as 
irrational. So far the only explanation as to why this may be so, is the idea of a halo 
effect which implies that general positive attitudes towards an object spread to all 
Organic Keyhole Both Labels No Labels
Label Users
Non−label Users



























associated attributes (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Thorndike, 1920). In the context of 
organic food products, this implies that a general positive attitude towards organic 
food products spreads to specific attributes such as health perceptions (Lee et al., 
2013).  
Taken out of context, this organic = healthful heuristic may seem irrational, 
but what if the same heuristic is applied in an appropriate environment? More 
specifically, if one assumes that: a) the level of food processing is related to food 
healthfulness, b) organic food products are more prevalent in less processed food 
product categories, c) consumers observe this statistical structure in the environment 
and d) consumers can learn statistical structures from their environment and apply 
them correctly, then the organic = healthful heuristic would actually be meaningful 
and could lead to rational behaviour. Considering these assumptions, I hypothesised 
that organic food products are more prevalent in less processed food product 
categories. Furthermore, I hypothesised that consumers observe this statistical 
structure in the supermarkets. Finally, I hypothesised that consumers can learn the 
statistical structure of a natural environment and apply it correctly in a form of a 
decision heuristic. These hypotheses were tested in three studies, the findings of 
which are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
The findings from Study 1 support the hypothesis that less processed and 
therefore more healthful food product categories have a higher prevalence of organic 
food products. More specifically, the findings from a field study show that food 
product categories such as vegetables, fruit, milk, meat, eggs, and so on have a 
higher prevalence of organic food products. There are two possible explanations for 
this finding. First, it seems that it is more difficult to produce processed organic food 
products since each of the ingredients must be organic, meaning that highly 
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processed food products with many ingredients are rarely organic. These highly 
processed food product categories such as prepackaged meals, candy, and chips tend 
to be unhealthful food products. Second, it appears that organic producers target 
health-conscious consumers, which leads to an overrepresentation of organic food 
products in more healthful sub-categories. For example, whole-grain pasta is more 
likely to be organic than pasta made with refined wheat flour. 
The findings from Study 2 support the hypothesis that consumers observe the 
statistical structure of their environment regarding the distribution of organic food 
products across food product categories. More specifically, the findings from an 
online consumer survey show that consumers accurately estimate the prevalence of 
organic food products across food product categories. Furthermore, their estimates of 
healthfulness of food product categories are consistent with the ones made by food 
and nutrition experts. Interestingly, there is a stronger correlation between consumer 
perceptions of organic prevalence and their healthfulness estimates, r = .72, than 
between the true prevalence of organic food products and expert healthfulness 
estimates, r = .35. This could be due to the organic = healthful heuristic influencing 
either the consumer perception of organic food prevalence or the healthfulness of 
food product categories. 
Finally, the findings from Study 3 support the hypothesis that consumers can 
learn the statistical structure of a natural environment and apply it correctly in the 
form of a decision heuristic. More specifically, the findings from an eye tracking 
experiment show that participants respond to the statistical structure, that is the 
correlation between organic and health cues in a health judgment task, both in their 
eye movements and their choices. When there is a positive correlation between 
organic and health cues, participants are more likely to look at organic labels 
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compared to a negative or zero correlation between the cues. This gaze bias suggests 
that participants in this statistical condition consider the organic label as relevant to 
the health judgment task (Orquin & Mueller Loose, 2013). The findings also show 
that most participants include labels in their judgments, and these participants are 
more likely to choose food products with organic labels when there is a positive 
correlation. In addition, the findings show that participants choose food products 
with both labels more often than would be expected by chance in all three conditions 
(see Figure 3.5). This means that participants generally prefer food products with 
both labels to food products with either label or no label. The preference for having 
both labels increases under a positive correlation. Overall, these findings support the 
hypothesis that consumers are, without explicit instructions, capable of learning the 
statistical structure of the environment and are able to apply the learned correlation 
correctly in the form of a decision heuristic, such as the organic = healthful 
heuristic. 
In sum, the previously presented findings provide strong support for the idea 
that the organic = healthful belief is a consequence of statistical learning rather than 
the halo effect. However, I do not claim that the halo effect is hereby falsified. In 
fact, the halo effect and the statistical learning hypothesis are not mutually exclusive 
- both mechanisms could, in theory, contribute to explaining the organic = healthful 
belief. Whether statistical learning and halo effects co-exist remains an open 
question, but it should be clear that one should be careful before labelling something 
as a halo effect and, in general, before labelling beliefs as irrational. Beliefs and 
behaviours that seem irrational at first glance may, in fact, lead to ecologically 
rational behaviours when applied in the right environment. Hence, I propose that the 
organic = healthful belief is meaningful when applied in the right context. 
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Consumers who hold this belief and purchase organic food products for this reason 
will ultimately purchase food products that are, on average, 30% more healthful.  
In the next chapter, I focus more closely on the consumer decision processes. 
More specifically, I am most interested in the first stage of the decision process, i.e. 
information acquisition (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981). Common practice suggests 
analysing search strategies by looking at whether the search could be characterised as 
predominantly alternative or attribute-wise. However, when the search includes 
approximately equal amounts of both search patterns, it is not clear how to classify it. 
The existing measures do not provide an answer to this issue. Therefore, in the next 
chapter, I discuss the limitations of the existing measures and propose a new measure 
which addresses those limitations. I use the new measure to reanalyse the data from 




Systematicity of Search Index: A new measure for exploring information search 
patterns 
 In Chapter 3, I showed that consumer beliefs that at first seem irrational can, 
in fact, lead to rational behaviour. However, when looking more closely at consumer 
decision processes and how consumers search for information, I noticed that in some 
situations the existing measures for exploring the pattern of information search are 
not informative enough. Therefore, in this chapter, I explore my second research 
question: what measure can complement the Search Index (SI) to better describe 
information search? I begin this chapter with a discussion of the existing measures 
and their criticisms. Then, I present a new measure, the Systematicity of Search Index 
(SSI), to address these criticisms. Next, I test the SSI in an experiment and on the 
data of Study 3. I finish the chapter with a general discussion of the findings in the 
light of the research question asked. 
4.1 Introduction 
Cognitive processes behind judgment and decision making can be broken 
down into several sub-processes such as information acquisition, evaluation, action, 
and feedback/learning (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981). Information acquisition concerns 
the processes of information search and storage, and has received much attention 
over the last 40 years. Therefore, several measures have been developed to explore 
information acquisition processes such as the depth of search, the pattern of 
information search, the variability of search, the compensation index, the latency of 
search and the content of search, to name just a few (Harte & Koele, 2001; Riedl, 
Brandstätter, & Roithmayr, 2008). Of all the measures on information acquisition, 
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measures for exploring the pattern of information search have received the most 
attention so far, mainly due to Payne’s seminal paper (1976) where he proposed a 
simple measure for detecting the pattern of information search. Hence, in the sections 
to follow, I focus exclusively on the measures for exploring the pattern of 
information search.  
4.1.1 Pattern of information search 
Focusing on the pattern of information search when studying cognitive 
processes has also been labelled as “analysis of transitions” because it considers the 
change from one acquired piece of information to the next (Jacoby et al., 1976). Four 
types of transitions can be distinguished with respect to whether the sequence of 
information searched consists of transitions belonging to a different or the same 
alternative, and a different or the same attribute (see Fig. 4.1). Type II transitions, i.e. 
transitions occurring within the same alternative but different attributes, and type III 
transitions, i.e. transitions occurring within the same attribute but different 
alternatives, are most often analysed in decision-making studies (Norman & Schulte-
Mecklenbeck, 2009).  
 




Figure 4.1 Types of single-step transitions during information search (a) type I 
(reassessing the same attribute within the same alternative), (b) type II 
(assessing different attributes within the same alternative), (c) type III 
(assessing same attributes within different alternatives) and (d) type IV 
(assessing different attributes within different alternatives). 
 
Based on these four types of transitions, several measures have been 
proposed for analysing the pattern of information search in process-tracing studies. 
Since these four types of transitions include the analysis of single-step transitions, 





of citations suggests2 that the most commonly used measure is the Search Index (SI) 
proposed by Payne (1976) which shows the proportion of alternative-wise (type II) 
and attribute-wise (type III) search. The index is a ratio of the number of alternative-
wise transitions minus the number of attribute-wise transitions over the sum of those 
two numbers: 
SI = 9:;<=	>.	9:;<=	?9:;<=	>@	9:;<=	? 
It ranges from -1 to 1, -1 being a fully attribute-wise search and 1 being a 
fully alternative-wise search. In case there is an equal number of alternative- and 
attribute-wise transitions, the SI equals to zero. An alternative-wise search allows 
trade-offs between attributes, i.e. a high value on one attribute can compensate for a 
low value on another, so it often relates to the use of compensatory strategies, 
whereas an attribute-wise search does not allow such trade-offs so it relates to the use 
of non-compensatory strategies (Ford et al., 1989; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 
1993). The overall simplicity of the measure could potentially explain its wide 
application. 
However, there has been much criticism of the SI. For instance, Böckenholt 
and Hynan (1994) suggested that for an accurate categorization of information-
acquisition strategies, one needs to consider characteristics of the decision 
environment, such as the number of presented alternatives and attributes. 
Specifically, when the number of attributes is higher than the number of alternatives, 
the SI points to an alternative-wise information search and when the number of 
                                            
2 The number of citations of Payne’s paper Task complexity and contingent processing in decision 
making: An information search and protocol analysis was 2161 on 25 August 2017 (obtained 
using Google Scholar). 
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alternatives is higher than the number of attributes, the SI points to an attribute-wise 
information search. The SI may, therefore, lead to misleading classifications of 
information search behaviour because it ignores these characteristics of the decision 
environment. Moreover, the index mean varies not only as a function of the number 
of alternatives and attributes, but also the number of transitions. Therefore, the 
values of the SI observed in different sized matrices as well as different numbers of 
transitions could not be compared directly (Bettman & Jacoby, 1976; Böckenholt & 
Hynan, 1994). In addition, extreme SI values have a higher probability of occurrence 
than intermediate values (Böckenholt & Hynan, 1994). Böckenholt and Hynan, 
therefore, proposed a new index, the Strategy Measure (SM), which describes 
information search strategies as standardized deviations from random search 
patterns: 
SM = 9((AB 9) CD.	CE .(B.A))A> B.F @B>(A.F)	  
where N represents the total number of transitions, A represents the number of 
alternatives and D the number of attributes (dimensions) in an information matrix, G2 
represents the frequency of alternative-wise transitions and G8 the frequency of 
attribute-wise transitions. However, Payne and Bettman (1994) have argued that the 
limitation of the SM lies in its inability to provide consistent results when decision 
makers make only one type of transition (e.g. alternative- or attribute-wise). On the 
other hand, the SM delivers identical results when it should not, for instance, in a 
case of a search pattern consisting of only attribute-wise transitions versus a pattern 
consisting of a mixture of alternative- and attribute-wise transitions. Ball (1997) 
suggests that the distribution of SM values still varies with changes in the number of 
alternatives and attributes in a matrix as well as the total number of transitions made. 
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Furthermore, comparing the mean SM values for the same search strategy applied in 
different sized matrices yields mixed results, as the calculation of the mean is 
sensitive to extreme values.  
A different line of thought has led Van Raaij (1977) to propose a measure 
which is based on the same input as the SI but compares the number of times 
alternative- and attribute-wise transitions occur in the first versus the second part of 
the search process. More specifically, the information search patterns may change 
over time due to the application of different decision strategies during different 
stages of a decision process. The analysis is, therefore, sometimes divided into a few 
equal parts which are analysed separately (Svenson, 1979). The Van Raaij index can 
be calculated using: [I JK#L	M F − I JK#L	M N]! − 1  
where N represents the number of observations for a particular type of transition, j 
represents the type of transition (type II or type III), the subscripts 1 and 2 represent 
the first and second half of the decision process respectively and M represents the 
total number of information items searched for. This measure has been shown to be 
more sensitive in detecting strategies used in the first versus the second phase of the 
decision process than the SI (Stokmans, 1992). Furthermore, the index is 
independent of the number of alternative- and attribute-wise transitions and the 
expected value of it is zero.  
Overall, Ball (1997) nicely summarizes the three main limitations of 
measures that include the analysis of single-step transitions. First, since the analysis 
is restricted to single steps in the information search sequence, not all available 
information is used. Second, one does not actually learn about the search strategies 
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used because the measures often restrict comparisons of search strategies to strict 
compensatory (e.g. weighted additive strategy) and non-compensatory strategies (e.g. 
lexicographic strategy). Specifically, Ball argues that it is not clear how to classify 
strategies that include both types of transitions and, therefore, fall between these two 
extremes. This is a direct criticism of the SI and particularly noticeable in the 
example of strategies that include an equal amount of both types of transitions so the 
SI concentrates around zero. This issue has also been addressed by other scholars 
(e.g. Harte & Koele, 2001). Finally, the distributions of such measures seem to be 
dependent on the number of dimensions, i.e. alternatives and attributes, of a matrix.  
Ball, therefore, proposes the use of multiple-step transitions, which 
overcomes these limitations by focusing on a more complex and complete range of 
transitions. More specifically, he proposes pairwise comparison (type V) and multi-
attribute comparisons (type VI; type k, where k = number of attributes + 4). Pairwise 
comparison is described as a comparison of the same two alternatives on more than 
one attribute in succession whereas multi-attribute comparison refers to a comparison 
of two or more alternatives on two or more attributes that are examined in the same 
order for each alternative. The maximum number of multi-attribute comparison 
transitions is a function of the number of attributes representing the different 
alternatives. For instance, in a situation where each alternative consists of four 
attributes, a decision maker can assess alternatives by focusing on two attributes 
(type VI), three attributes (type VII) or all four attributes (type VIII).  Figure 4.2 
shows examples of type V to type VII transitions. In his paper, Ball also provided 
specific examples of how to detect different search strategies by focusing on 
multiple-step transitions. For instance, type V transitions can be indicative of a 
majority of confirming dimensions (MCD) strategy, whereas type VII transitions can 
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be indicative of weighted additive (WADD) and equal weight (EQW) strategies. 
Conversely, he pointed out how single-step measures can sometimes be misleading 
when the search process consists of type II (60%) and type III transitions (40%), 
which results in the SI being zero, and is indicative of a satisficing strategy which is 
usually considered to be a non-compensatory strategy. 
 
Figure 4.2 Types of multiple-step transitions during information search (a) type V 
(pairwise comparison), (b) type VI (two-attribute comparison) and (c) type VII 
(three-attribute comparison). 
 
Here I focus more closely on Ball’s previously introduced remarks. I am 





when the SI equals to zero. Put differently, when it equals to zero, all that the SI 
conveys is that a decision maker made approximately the same number of 
alternative- and attribute-wise transitions. However, does this mean that a decision 
maker’s information search should, therefore, be described as random, or is it 
possible that this similar number of both types of transitions did not happen by 
chance?  
To address this issue and answer my research question about what measure 
can complement the Search Index (SI) to better describe information search, I 
propose a new measure, the Systematicity of Search Index (SSI). The SSI explains the 
pattern of information search in terms of systematicity or the proportion of non-
random search, i.e. a search that is alternative- or attribute-wise, corrected for 
chance. In addition, the SSI is a measure based on multiple-step transitions. As I 
show later, this measure has the potential to complement existing measures for 
exploring the pattern of information search, most specifically the SI. In the next 
section, I briefly outline how the SSI was developed (a detailed account is presented 
in the results section). I then discuss the hypotheses and report an experiment in 
which I test the usefulness of the SSI. Finally, I test the SSI on the data of Study 3 
and discuss all the findings. 
4.1.2 Development of Systematicity of Search Index 
I developed the SSI by proposing the three alterations to the SI. First, rather 
than focusing on simple single-step transitions, I propose focusing on alternative- 
and attribute-wise patterns, i.e. sequences of either alternative- or attribute-wise 
transitions of specific length. The reasoning behind this alteration is an attempt to set 
the threshold higher in terms of what can be accepted as an indication of alternative- 
or attribute-wise processing. Second, I propose assessing whether the obtained 
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patterns occur by chance by estimating the probability of a pattern occurring using a 
Monte Carlo simulation. Third, to get the proportion of systematic search, I propose 
that the SSI should be a ratio of alternative- and attribute-wise patterns corrected for 
chance over all transitions made. The SSI ranges from zero to one, zero representing 
a random or unsystematic search and one representing a non-random or systematic 
search. The SSI can, therefore, be calculated using the following equation: 
SSI = 
li I$ 1 - #$3$QF
ltotal
 
where R$ is the length of a pattern i, I$ is the frequency of a pattern i, #$ is the 
probability of a pattern i occurring by chance and RS6S27 is the length of a total 
sequence of all transitions, i.e. string length.  
I hypothesise that the SSI is a more informative measure than the SI in 
situations where decision makers make approximately the same amount of 
alternative- and attribute-wise transitions (SI ≈ 0). More specifically, I expect that 
the SSI will show whether these alternative- and attribute-wise transitions did or did 
not occur by chance. I also hypothesise that the SSI is higher when information 
presentation is visually organised compared to when it is visually disorganised, 
because the visual organisation of information should encourage the level of 
systematic search. I test these hypotheses in an experiment reported below. 
4.2 Study 4 
I tested the previous hypotheses in a discrete choice experiment using eye 
tracking. I used four within-subjects conditions in which information was presented 
in an organised or disorganised way to encourage either systematic or unsystematic 
search, respectively. More specifically, as illustrated in the stimuli section below, in 
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the conditions encouraging systematic search, the pieces of information were 
presented by either grouping alternatives (alternative array condition), grouping 
similar attributes (attribute array condition) or by presenting alternatives vertically in 
a matrix (matrix condition). In contrast, in the condition which encourages 
unsystematic search, all pieces of information belonging to each alternative were 
presented randomly in a matrix. As explained in the introduction of this chapter, the 
expected SI score for a random information search is zero only in the case of a 
symmetrical matrix. Therefore, to answer my research question about what measure 
can complement the Search Index (SI) to better describe information search, I was 
particularly interested in the conditions with matrix visual grouping.  
4.2.1 Method 
4.2.1.1 Participants 
 Thirty-five Danish participants were recruited through a consumer panel 
provider. Three participants were excluded from further analyses due to insufficient 
data quality, resulting in a total sample of 32 participants. An a priori power analysis 
performed through a simulation in R indicated that to have 95.6% power for 
detecting a small-sized effect (d = .2; see Cohen, 1988) with an alpha level of .05 for 
a within-subjects design with four conditions and 100 trials per participant, a sample 
size of 28 participants is required. The participants ranged in age from 23 to 50 years 
(M = 29.59, SD = 6.36) with more female than male participants (18 women). The 
data was collected from participants with normal and full colour vision only. Each 
participant received approximately €10 for completing the study. All participants 





 In this discrete choice experiment, participants were instructed to choose the 
most healthful alternative out of four. Four within-subjects conditions were used, i.e. 
alternative array, attribute array, matrix and random matrix, in which information 
was presented differently. Each condition had 25 trials resulting in a total of 100 
trials per participant. Each trial had four alternatives named A, B, C and D. Each 
alternative had four attributes: brand, percentage of fat, grams of protein and grams 
of sugar. The attributes had four levels (see Table 4.1) all of which were presented in 
each trial. In every trial participants were, therefore, presented with 16 pieces of 
information. Each trial was generated by randomly combining attribute levels 
without replacement, meaning that when one attribute was sampled, this attribute 
could no longer be chosen again in that trial. The order of conditions was randomised 
across participants. 
Table 4.1 Attributes and attribute levels 
Attribute 
Brand Fat (%) Protein (g) Sugar (g) 
Alpro 0.2 3 4 
Cultura 1 6 8 
Thise 1.5 9 12 
Yoggi 3 12 16 
 
4.2.1.3 Stimuli 
 The sixteen pieces of information in each trial were presented with 32 Gabor 
patches (i.e. sinusoidal gratings typically with a Gaussian envelope) paired in the 
following way: each Gabor patch pair had a target Gabor and a distractor Gabor. 
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Distractor Gabors had a rectangular envelope (5 cycles/deg, 3˚ x 3˚) and target 
Gabors had a circular envelope (5 cycles/deg, diameter 1˚). The distractor Gabors 
were oriented horizontally. The target Gabors were tilted either 20˚, 70˚, 110˚ or 160˚ 
clockwise from vertical. Each orientation of the target Gabor represented a different 
alternative. The Gabors tilted 20˚, 70˚, 110˚ and 160˚ belonged to alternatives A, B, 
C and D respectively. A grey rectangle (2˚ x 0.7˚) was positioned in the centre of 
each target Gabor. An attribute level (text height = 0.5˚) was positioned within each 
rectangle.  
Each condition had its own unique visual presentation. In the alternative array 
condition, all attributes belonging to an alternative were presented together in a 
group (see Fig. 4.3a). The spacing between Gabor pairs within groups was 1˚ and 
between groups 3˚. The centres of the Gabor pair groups were located at the 
following coordinates: {(-5,5), (5,5), (-5,-5), (5,-5)}. The locations of target Gabors 
were randomised within groups across all trials. The attributes were randomly 
assigned to the four group locations. Additionally, the locations of attribute levels 
within groups were randomised. In the attribute array condition, similar attributes 
were presented together in groups, i.e. brand with brand, fat percentage with fat 
percentage and so on (see Fig. 4.3b). The spacing and the location of Gabor pairs 
were the same as in the alternative array condition. The locations of target Gabors 
were randomised between groups across all trials. The attributes were randomly 
assigned to the four group locations. Additionally, the locations of attribute levels 
within groups were randomised. In the matrix condition, alternatives and attributes 
were presented in a matrix, i.e. alternatives were presented vertically and attributes 
horizontally (see Fig. 4.3c). The spacing between Gabor pairs was 1˚. The locations 
of target Gabors and attribute levels were randomised column-wise and row-wise, 
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respectively, across all trials. In the random matrix condition, alternatives and 
attributes were presented in a matrix as in the matrix condition; however, all pieces 
of information were presented independently (see Fig. 4.3d). The locations of target 










Figure 4.3 Visual array of (a) alternative array condition: alternatives presented 
together (note the orientation of the lines in the circular Gabor Patch), (b) 
attribute array condition: attribute levels belonging to the same attribute 
presented together, (c) matrix condition: alternatives presented vertically and 
attributes horizontally and (d) random matrix condition: all pieces of 






 The stimuli were created and presented using PsychoPy 1.84.2 (Peirce, 2007, 
2009). Eye movements were recorded using a desk-mounted EyeLink 1000 eye 
tracker with a monocular sampling rate of 1000 Hz and a screen resolution of 
1920x1200 pixels. The screen subtended a visual angle of 46.5˚ horizontally and 
30.1˚ vertically. Average viewing distance was 60 cm from the screen. A chin rest 
was used to stabilize head position. Fixations were detected using a velocity, 
acceleration and motion-based algorithm with velocity, acceleration, and motion 
thresholds of 30˚/sec, 8,000 ˚/sec2, and 0.15˚, respectively (Holmqvist et al., 2011; 
SR Research, 2008). To consider the inaccuracy in recording of eye fixation 
locations, an area of interest (AOI) was drawn around every distractor Gabor (Orquin 
et al., 2016). 
4.2.1.5 Procedure 
 The study was conducted in a light-controlled laboratory environment. Upon 
their arrival to the laboratory, participants were greeted and asked to read the study 
information sheet and fill in the consent form. This was followed immediately by an 
explanation of the procedure, task and visual design of the experiment. Specifically, 
participants were presented with four possible Gabor pairs and informed that each 
Gabor orientation represented a specific alternative throughout the experiment. They 
were also shown a screenshot of each condition and asked to locate alternatives in 
each. After determining the dominant eye, participants were calibrated using a 9-
point calibration procedure followed by a 9-point drift validation test. A calibration 
offset < 1.0° was considered as acceptable. After the calibration, participants were 
introduced to the experiment layout and instructions on the screen. To test whether 
participants had memorized the target Gabors, they practiced recognizing in up to 48 
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practice trials. Each target Gabor was presented randomly 12 times. Feedback was 
given after each practice trial. Participants proceeded to the next practice trial only 
by providing the correct answer. In case of 10 correct answers in a row, suggesting 
mastery of recognition, participants immediately proceeded to the experiment. 
Participants were instructed to choose the most healthful among four alternatives by 
indicating their choice through a key press (A, B, C or D). They were given as much 
time as needed to make their choices. No feedback was given between trials. To 
control the location of the first fixation, a fixation cross lasting 1000 ms appeared in 
the centre of the screen preceding each trial. Participants completed 25 trials per 
condition, resulting in a total of 100 trials. The experiment lasted 45 minutes on 
average. 
4.2.2 Results 
4.2.2.1 Analysis of practice trials 
 The analysis of practice trials showed that participants on average completed 
20 practice trials (M = 20.09, SD = 13.01, C95 = [24.78, 15.4]) before they proceeded 
to the experiment. However, three out of the 32 participants completed the maximum 
of 48 trials before they proceeded to the experiment, which suggests they may have 
not mastered recognizing the alternatives. Without considering the results for these 
participants, the rest of the participants on average completed 17 practice trials 
before proceeding to the experiment (M = 17.21, SD = 9.76, C95 = [20.92, 13.49]). 
Bearing in mind that participants needed to have 10 correct answers in a row to be 
able to proceed to the experiment, this result suggests that, overall, they did not have 
issues with mastering recognizing which alternative is represented by each target 
Gabor. Table 4.2 shows an overview of how many practice trials participants 
completed before they proceeded to the experiment. 
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Table 4.2 The number of participants within four practice trial intervals 
Number of Practice Trials Number of Participants 
10 – 20 22 
20 – 30 5 
30 – 40 0 
40 – 50 5 
 
4.2.2.2 Calculating the Systematicity of Search Index 
 The analysis of participants’ information search behaviour was divided into 
seven steps (see Table 4.3). First, I determined which attributes participants fixated 
on and in which order. I therefore coded eye fixations considering 16 possible 
combinations of four alternatives and four attribute levels (see Table 4.4) which 
resulted in a string length of 154,355 elements for all participants. Table 4.5 shows 
an overview of the first ten rows of the data set after coding the AOIs. Since I was 
only interested in whether participants fixated on an attribute at least once, 
subsequent fixations, i.e. two or more fixations in a row to the same attribute within 
an alternative were deleted from the string which resulted in a total string length of 







Table 4.3 An overview of the seven-step procedure to calculate the SSI 
Step Number Step Name 
1 Data preparation 
2 Identifying alternative-wise patterns 
3 Identifying attribute-wise patterns 
4 
Assessing whether the obtained patterns occurred by 
chance (Monte Carlo simulation) 
5 Calculating probabilities of occurrence for each pattern 
6 Calculating probability complements 
7 Applying the SSI equation 
 
Table 4.4 Recoding of eye fixations depending on attribute-alternative combination 
 Alternative 
Attribute 
 (1) 20° (2) 70° (3) 110° (4) 160° 
Brand (b) 1b 2b 3b 4b 
Fat (f) 1f 2f 3f 4f 
Protein (p) 1p 2p 3p 4p 





Table 4.5 An overview of the first ten rows of the data set after coding the AOIs 
Participant Condition Trial Alternative Attribute 
1 Alternative array 1 3 b 
1 Alternative array 1 1 s 
1 Alternative array 1 1 s 
1 Alternative array 1 1 f 
1 Alternative array 1 1 f 
1 Alternative array 1 1 f 
1 Alternative array 1 1 f 
1 Alternative array 1 1 f 
1 Alternative array 1 1 b 
1 Alternative array 1 1 b 
 
Next, I determined alternative- and attribute-wise patterns in the string. The 
patterns were created for every participant on a trial level. I started by identifying 
alternative-wise patterns by searching for the substrings where at least two subsequent 
fixations belonged to different attributes within the same alternative. Then, I focused 
on the order and frequency of the elements within each substring. Specifically, in each 
substring, I ordered the elements alphabetically and deleted every repeating instance 
of an element. In other words, if a participant inspected three attributes within an 
alternative and then focused on the same three attributes, but in a different order in the 
next alternative, the attributes were coded as if they had been inspected in the same 
order. For example, a sequence sugar-protein-fat which is equal to fat-protein-sugar 
and protein-sugar-fat and so on, was then coded as fat-protein-sugar, i.e. ‘fps’. 
Additionally, if a participant fixated on an attribute within an alternative several times, 
the additional fixations were deleted. For example, if a participant made a sequence 
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sugar-protein-sugar-protein-sugar within an alternative, I coded it as protein-sugar, i.e. 
‘ps’.  
After identifying and recoding all substrings, I concatenated the identical 
subsequent substrings which belonged to different alternatives. For example, if a 
participant fixated on protein and sugar levels twice in a row across two different 
alternatives, a pattern named ‘psps’ was produced. To be classified as an alternative-
wise pattern, the same substring of a minimal length of two had to appear at least twice 
in a row. For this reason, a pattern length of ‘four’ was the shortest possible alternative-
wise pattern length. An example of the 10 alternative-wise patterns obtained can be 
found in Table 4.6 (column three). The maximum pattern length in this example is 12 
(trial three). 
I then proceeded to identify attribute-wise patterns by searching for the 
substrings where at least four subsequent fixations belonged to the same attribute, but 
different alternatives within a trial. For example, if a participant fixated on a sugar 
level four times in a row across four different alternatives, an attribute-wise pattern 
named ‘ssss’ was produced. Since the shortest possible alternative-wise pattern was of 
length ‘four’, I considered only the attribute-wise patterns of length ‘four’ or greater. 
An example of the 10 attribute-wise patterns obtained can be found in Table 4.7 
(column three). The maximum pattern length in this example is eight (trial 26). I then 
determined the frequency for every alternative- and attribute-wise pattern (see column 
four in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7).  
After identifying patterns and their frequencies, I assessed whether the 
obtained patterns occurred by chance. To do this, I, used a Monte Carlo simulation and 
simulated 10,000 random observations for each participant, with the string length 
being equal to the one in the original data set. An observation consisted of an 
  
114 
alternative number (1 to 4) and an attribute initial (b, f, p and s). I analysed the random 
data sets in the same way as I analysed the original data set in terms of identifying 
alternative- and attribute-wise patterns and calculating their frequencies. I then 
compared all the patterns and their frequencies from the original data set with the 
patterns and the associated frequencies (see column five in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7) 
in 10,000 random data sets. Specifically, I looked at how frequently a pattern from the 
original data set occurred in that amount or more in 10,000 random data sets. For 
example, if I observed that a pattern ‘ssss’ occurred four times in a trial in the attribute 
array condition, I looked at how many times this pattern occurred at least four times 
or more in a trial in the attribute array condition in 10,000 random data sets.  
I then calculated the probabilities by dividing these pattern frequencies by the 
total number of simulations (10,000) (see column six in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7). To 
preserve the data, instead of deleting the patterns that occurred below a specific 
threshold level (.05), i.e. by chance, I used the probability complements. Specifically, 
I multiplied each pattern from the original data set with its probability complement 







Table 4.6 First 10 alternative-wise patterns identified for one participant on a trial level  








Alternative array 1 fpsfps 1 33 .0033 . 9967 
Alternative array 2 bfsbfs 1 4 .0004 .9996 
Alternative array 3 bfpsbfpsbfps 1 0 0 1 
Alternative array 4 fpsfps 1 31 .0031 .9969 
Alternative array 5 bfpsbfps 2 0 0 1 
Alternative array 6 bfpsbfps 1 4 .0004 .9996 
Alternative array 6 bsbsbs 1 19 .0019 .9981 
Alternative array 6 fpsfps 1 38 .0038 .9962 
Alternative array 6 psps 1 621 .0621 .9379 
Alternative array 10 bfpsbfps 1 0 0 1 





Table 4.7 First 10 attribute-wise patterns identified for one participant on a trial level 








Alternative array 7 ssss 1 324 .0324 .9676 
Alternative array 8 sssssss 1 2 .0002 .9998 
Alternative array 9 ssss 1 925 .0925 .9075 
Alternative array 11 sssss 1 64 .0064 .9936 
Alternative array 12 ssss 1 214 .0214 .9786 
Alternative array 17 ssss 1 529 .0529 .9471 
Alternative array 18 sssss 1 66 .0066 .9934 
Alternative array 21 ssss 1 645 .0645 .9355 
Attribute array 26 bbbbbb 1 29 .0029 .9971 
Attribute array 26 ffffffff 1 3 .0003 .9997 
     Note. Attributes: b: brand, f: fat, p: protein and s: sugar. 
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 Finally, I applied the following, previously introduced equation, to calculate 
the systematicity of participants’ information search within each condition on a trial 
level:  
SSI = 
li !" 1 - #"$"%&
ltotal
 
where '" is the length of a pattern i, !" is the frequency of a pattern i, #" is the 
probability of a pattern i occurring by chance and '()(*+ is the length of a total 
sequence of all transitions (i.e. string length). I also calculated the direction of 
participants’ information search within each condition and for each trial by 
calculating the SI using: 
SI = ,-./0	23	,-./0	4,-./0	25	,-./0	4 
where type II are transitions occurring within the same alternative but different 
attributes, and type III are transitions occurring within the same attribute but 
different alternatives. I present these results in the following section. The full R code 
used to generate the previously described steps can be found in Appendix E.  
4.2.2.3 Eye movement analysis 
 To test whether participants are being more systematic in the three visually 
organised conditions compared to a disorganised one, i.e. alternative array, attribute 
array, matrix and random matrix condition, respectively, the data was analysed by 
means of linear mixed-effects model. The model was fitted using the ‘lme’ function 
from ‘nlme’ package in R (Pinheiro, Bates, DebRoy, Sarkar, & R Core Team, 2017). 
I used the SSI as a dependent variable, condition as an independent variable and 
participant variable as a random effect. The analysis revealed that adding the fixed 
effect of condition to the model significantly improved the fit compared to the 
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baseline model, χ2(3) = 113.13, p < .001. A Tukey post hoc test revealed that the SSI 
was significantly different in the alternative array compared to the random matrix 
condition (b = - .15, p < .001, d = -.96), the attribute array compared to the random 
matrix condition (b = - .30, p < .001, d = -1.56), the matrix compared to the random 
matrix condition (b = - .27, p < .001, d = -1.38), the alternative array compared to the 
attribute array condition (b = .15, p < .001, d = .63) and the alternative array 
compared to the matrix condition (b = .12, p < .001, d = .51). However, there was no 
significant difference between the attribute array compared to the matrix condition (b 
= - .03, p = .69, d = -.10). 
To test the direction of participants’ information search across four conditions, 
again I applied linear mixed-effects model using the ‘lme’ function from ‘nlme’ 
package in R. I used the SI as an outcome variable, condition as a predictor variable 
and participant variable as a random effect. Again, the analysis revealed that adding 
the fixed effect of condition to the model significantly improved the fit compared to 
the baseline model, χ2(3) = 193.31, p < .001. A Tukey post hoc test revealed that the 
direction of information search was significantly different between all conditions. 
Specifically, there was a significant difference between the alternative array 
compared to the attribute array condition (b = - 1.09, p < .001, d = -3.12), the 
alternative array compared to the matrix condition (b = - .62, p < .001, d = -1.52), the 
alternative array compared to the random matrix condition (b = - .40, p < .001, d = -
.99), the attribute array compared to the matrix condition (b =  .48, p < .001, d = 
1.18), the attribute array compared to the random matrix condition (b = .70, p < .001, 
d = 1.76) and the matrix compared to the random matrix condition (b = .22, p < .001, 
d = .49).  
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To better understand the relationship between the two indices, I plotted the SSI 
against SI across conditions (see Fig. 4.4). Figure 4.4 shows that participants scored 
higher on the SSI in the alternative array condition, attribute array condition, and 
matrix condition compared to the random matrix condition. The SI, on the other 
hand, shows that participants on average made more alternative-wise transitions in 
the alternative array condition and more attribute-wise transitions in the attribute 
array condition. In the matrix condition, participants on average made approximately 
an equal amount of alternative- and attribute-wise transitions, while in the random 
matrix condition they on average made slightly more alternative- than attribute-wise 
transitions. Table 4.8 shows an overview of means, standard deviations and 95% 
confidence intervals for the SSI and SI across conditions. 
 
Figure 4.4 Systematicity of Search Index (SSI) and Search Index (SI) across 
conditions on a trial level. 
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Table 4.8 Means, standard deviations and 95% confidence intervals for the 
Systematicity of Search Index (SSI) and Search Index (SI) across conditions 
 SSI SI 
Condition M SD 95%CI M SD 95%CI 
Alternative array .21 .22 [.19, .22] .55 .35 [.53, .58] 
Attribute array .35 .26 [.34, .37] -.54 .35 [-.57, -.52] 
Matrix .33 .27 [.31, .35] -.07 .45 [-.10, -.03] 
Random matrix .05 .09 [.05, .06] .16 .44 [.12, .19] 
 
4.2.2.4 Choice analysis 
 To examine the effect of the relative attribute importance on participants’ 
choices of the most healthful food product, I fitted participants by means of a 
multinomial logit model (MNL) using the ’mlogit’ package in R (Croissant, 2013). 
Each participant was fitted with a null model including intercepts for the four 
product alternatives and a full model including a term for each attribute, i.e. brand, 
fat, protein and sugar. I analysed the choices based on random utility theory 
(McFadden, 1974; Thurstone, 1927), which assumes that a) choice is a discrete 
event, b) utility towards an alternative varies across individuals as a random variable 
and c) individuals choose the alternative that maximises their subjective utility. 
Utility is defined as (Louviere, Hensher, & Swait, 2000): 
	6"7 = 	9"7 + ε"7 
where 6"7 is the utility of the ith alternative for the qth individual, 9"7 is a matrix 
component or ‘representative utility’ and ε"7 is a random component which reflects 
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all possible unobserved influences on decisions. The matrix component is further 
defined as: 
9"7 = <"=>"=7?=%&  
where >"=7	is the value of alternative i for individual q with attributes k (k = 1, ..., 4), 
and <"=	is a part-worth utility estimated for each attribute and each individual. If I 
assume that the random error terms ε"7 are independent across alternatives and are 
identically distributed, the probability of individual q choosing alternative i follows 
the closed-form expression of the MNL model: 	
@(BC) = exp(9"7)exp(9H7)IH%&  
Parameters of the MNL model are estimated with maximum likelihood where 
likelihood is defined as:  
J = 	 0L7%& @H7MNO
I
H%&  
where Q is a random sample of individuals, PH7 is a dummy variable such that PH7 =1 if alternative j is chosen and PH7 = 0 otherwise. The log likelihood function J∗ can 
be then written as: 
J∗ = 0L7%& PH7 ln @H7
I
H%&  
To investigate the explanatory power of each attribute for each participant, I 
calculated the relative attribute importance as the partial log-likelihood, i.e. how 
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much each attribute contributes to the overall log-likelihood of a choice model, 
assuming a linear integration of the four attributes (Crouch & Louviere, 2004; 
Lancsar, Louviere, & Flynn, 2007) using:  
ΔJ∗=Δ ∗=?=%&  
where ΔJ∗=, the delta log-likelihood for attribute k, is the log-likelihood difference 
between the full model and the full model excluding attribute k:  
ΔJ∗= =		J∗MV++ - J∗MV++(3=). 
After fitting the model and estimating the relative importance of each 
attribute, I evaluated the model by employing a Prediction Success Index (PSI, 
McFadden, 1977), which is one of the general goodness-of-fit measures for discrete 
choice models. To do that, I obtained the probabilities of choice for each individual 
on a trial level using the predict function from the ‘mlogit’ package in R. I then 
compared the choice probabilities generated by the model with the observed choices 
and calculated the PSI for each individual in each condition using the following 
equation:  
W" = 	!""!." − 	!."!..  
where !"" !." is the proportion of individuals expected to choose an alternative who 
indeed chose that alternative and !." !..is the proportion which would be 
successfully predicted if the choice probabilities for each individual were assumed to 
equal the observed aggregate shares. I then calculated an overall PSI for each 




W = !""!." 	− 	!."!.. ZI"%&  
The index is generally non-negative with a maximum value occurring when 
the model predicts perfectly. The index can also be normalized to have a maximum 
value of one with values closer to one showing greater predictive capability of the 
model. The results show that the overall PSI for alternative array, attribute array, 
matrix and random matrix condition was .43, .38, .42 and .33 respectively, 
suggesting that the systematicity of participants’ choices was the lowest in the 
random matrix condition. An overview of the full prediction success tables for each 
condition can be found in Appendix F. 
To inspect whether there is a relationship between the highest relative 
attribute importance and the PSI for each participant within each condition, I looked 
at the correlations between the two. I found medium to large positive correlations in 
all conditions (see Table 4.9) between attributes with the highest relative importance 
and the PSI.  
Table 4.9 Correlations with the 95% confidence intervals between attributes with the 
highest relative importance and Prediction Success Index (PSI) across 
conditions 
Condition Correlation 95% Confidence Interval 
Alternative array .74 [.54, .87] 
Attribute array .68 [.43, .83] 
Matrix .46 [.14, .70] 




Put differently, the more participants relied on one attribute when making 
choices, the higher their PSI. Figure 4.5 shows a scatterplot of the highest relative 
attribute importance and PSI across conditions. I also calculated the proportion of the 
sample predominantly relying on one attribute when making choices, and it appears 
that 80% of the sample had a relative attribute importance greater than 50% for one 
of the four attributes. This implies that participants predominantly relied on one 
attribute when making choices regardless of condition. Further analysis showed that 
participants who predominantly relied on one attribute when choosing the most 
healthful product, mostly relied on the sugar attribute (70% of the sample).   
 
Figure 4.5 Scatter plot of the highest relative attribute importance and Prediction 
Success Index (PSI). 
To test whether there is a relationship between the SSI and the PSI across 
conditions, I calculated the correlations between the two. I found a small positive 
correlation between the SSI and the PSI in the alternative array and attribute array 
conditions and a small to medium negative correlation in the matrix and random 





Table 4.10 Correlations with the 95% confidence intervals between the 








Figure 4.6 Scatter plot of the Systematicity of Search Index (SSI) and Prediction 
Success Index (PSI). 
4.3 Applying the SSI and SI measures to the eye movement data from Study 3 
 To explore how the SSI performs in a different eye tracking study, I tested how 
participants searched for information in Study 3. The methods for Study 3 are 
explained in more detail in section 3.4.1. To calculate the SSI and SI, I followed the 
steps from one to seven described in section 4.2.2.2. The results of the analysis are 
reported in Table 4.11. More specifically, Table 4.11 shows an overview of means, 
Condition Correlation 95% Confidence Interval 
Alternative array .25 [-.11, .55] 
Attribute array .11 [-.24, .45] 
Matrix -.21 [-.52, .14] 
Random Matrix -.30 [-.59, .06] 
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standard deviations and 95% confidence intervals for the SSI and SI across 
conditions.  
Table 4.11 Means, standard deviations and 95% confidence intervals for the 
Systematicity of Search Index (SSI) and Search Index (SI) across conditions 
 SSI SI 
Condition M SD 95%CI M SD 95%CI 
-0.5 .36 .26 [.34, .37] .03 .41 [0, .05] 
0 .32 .24 [.31, .33] .10 .39 [.08, .12] 
0.5 .31 .23 [.30, .32] .15 .36 [.13, .17] 
 
To better understand the relationship between the two indices, I plotted the SSI 
against SI across conditions (see Fig. 4.7). Figure 4.7 shows what the mean values of 
the indices indicate, i.e. that participants performed a relatively systematic search in 
all three conditions. The SI, on the other hand, shows that participants’ search was 
mostly grouped around zero, which suggests that participants in all three conditions 





Figure 4.7 Systematicity of Search Index (SSI) and Search Index (SI) across 
conditions on a trial level. 
4.4 Discussion 
To answer the research question posed in this chapter: what measure can 
complement the Search Index (SI) to better describe information search, I proposed a 
new measure, the Systematicity of Search Index (SSI), as an additional measure for 
exploring information search behaviour. More specifically, I developed a measure 
for exploring how systematic decision makers are when searching for information, 
by determining the proportion of non-random search, i.e. a search that is alternative- 
or attribute-wise, corrected for chance.  
I hypothesised that the SSI is a more informative measure than the SI in 
situations where decision makers make approximately the same amount of 
alternative- and attribute-wise transitions (SI ≈ 0). I also hypothesised that the SSI is 
higher when information presentation is visually organised compared to when it is 
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visually disorganised. I therefore tested the usefulness of this index in a discrete 
choice experiment with four within-subjects conditions (alternative array, attribute 
array, matrix and random matrix) using eye tracking. In each condition, I used 
different visual presentation to create either organised or disorganised information 
presentation format. 
The findings show there is a difference between the SSI in conditions with an 
organised (alternative array, attribute array and matrix) versus disorganised (random 
matrix) information presentation format, with the largest difference being between 
the attribute array compared to the random matrix condition, d = -1.56. I also 
observed a large difference between the alternative array and random matrix 
conditions, as well as the matrix and random matrix conditions, d = -.96 and d = -
1.38 respectively. Furthermore, the SSI was, on average, higher in the alternative 
array, the attribute array, and the matrix condition compared to the random matrix 
condition (see Table 4.8) which supports my hypothesis that the SSI will be higher in 
conditions where information was visually organised compared to the condition 
where it was disorganised. 
When comparing the SI in the conditions with an organised and disorganised 
information presentation format, I observed the largest difference between the 
attribute array and the random matrix condition, d = 1.76. I also observed a large 
difference between the alternative array compared to the random matrix condition, d 
= -.99, and a medium difference between the matrix compared to the random matrix 
conditions, d = .49. As expected, participants on average made more alternative-wise 
search transitions in the alternative array condition and more attribute-wise 
transitions in the attribute array condition. In the matrix condition, participants on 
average made approximately an equal amount of alternative- and attribute-wise 
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transitions, while in the random matrix condition they on average made slightly more 
alternative- than attribute-wise transitions (see Table 4.8).  
These findings, therefore, support my hypothesis that the SSI is a more 
informative measure than the SI, when the SI is close to zero. Specifically, the SI 
suggests that participants, on average, made an equal amount of alternative- and 
attribute-wise transitions in the matrix condition (SI = -.07), whereas the SSI 
suggests that although this may be the case, it did not happen by chance (SSI = .33). 
In addition, the SI in the random matrix condition suggests that participants, on 
average, produce slightly more alternative-wise transitions (SI = .16), whereas the 
SSI suggests that this most likely happened by chance (SSI = .05).  
Finally, a follow-up choice analysis showed a small positive correlation 
between the SSI and the PSI in the alternative array and attribute array conditions, 
and a small to medium negative correlation in the matrix and random matrix 
conditions. I take this to imply that the information presentation format may 
influence the relationship between the systematicity of the eye movements and 
choices. However, I do not want to draw any specific conclusions since the 
confidence intervals are wide. This finding supports previous research suggesting 
that presentation format strongly influences decision makers’ information processing 
(Bettman & Kakkar, 1977). Furthermore, the analysis of participants’ highest relative 
attribute importance and their PSI revealed a medium to strong correlation between 
the two in all conditions. This suggests that the more participants relied on one 
attribute when making choices, the higher was their PSI. Furthermore, the findings 
show that 80% of the sample had a relative attribute importance that was greater than 
50% for one of the four attributes. These findings, therefore, imply that participants 
who predominantly relied on one attribute made more systematic choices.  
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After applying the SSI to the eye movement data from Study 3, I found that 
the SSI proved to be useful as a complementary measure to the SI. More specifically, 
the mean SI values showed that in all three conditions participants made 
approximately the same number of alternative- and attribute-wise transitions, 
whereas the mean SSI values showed that this equal amount of transitions did not 
happen by chance (see Table 4.11).  
In sum, the previously presented findings contribute to the existing 
knowledge on information search by providing a new measure for exploring the 
pattern of search. Generally speaking, the SSI is useful as an additional measure for 
exploring the pattern of information search; however, it has been shown that it is 
particularly useful in situations when the SI is close to zero. The experiment 
confirmed the usefulness of the new measure by showing that decision makers’ 
systematicity of information search depends to a great extent on the visual format of 
an environment. Hence, the SSI can be used for calculating the systematicity of 
information search in process-tracing studies and, therefore, serve as a 






General discussion and conclusion 
The preceding chapters of this doctoral dissertation have dealt with exploring 
decision processes behind food choices. More specifically, in Chapter 3, I addressed 
the first research question: can irrational beliefs sometimes lead to rational 
behaviours when making food choices? In this chapter, I explored a novel hypothesis 
that consumers may not be biased when concluding that organic food products are, in 
general, more healthful than conventional food products. Instead, I proposed that 
consumers use this organic = healthful heuristic because in the environment, i.e. 
supermarkets, organic food products are more prevalent in more healthful food 
product categories which consumers have observed. This was tested in three studies, 
i.e. a combination of field, online and lab studies.  
In Chapter 4, I addressed the second research question: what measure can 
complement the Search Index (SI) to better describe information search? To answer 
this research question, I focused on analysing the measures for exploring the pattern 
of information search, which, of all the measures on information acquisition, have 
received the most attention so far. In particular, one of the measures for exploring the 
pattern of information search, i.e. the Search Index (SI), has received a lot of 
attention. Although applied in various contexts, this index also received several 
important criticisms. To address these criticisms, I proposed a new measure, the 
Systematicity of Search Index (SSI), which sheds light on processes not captured by 
the SI and therefore complements it. I tested the SSI in an experiment in the lab. 
Afterwards, I also used it to reanalyse the data from Study 3. 
This final chapter consists of three sections. In the first section, I discuss the 
findings from the empirical chapters in more detail. I also reflect on the possible 
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limitations and discuss potential future research ideas. Next, I outline and discuss 
theoretical, methodological and practical implications of the findings. In the final 
section, I provide some concluding remarks.  
5.1 General discussion  
The first research question I aimed to address in this doctoral dissertation was 
whether irrational beliefs can sometimes lead to rational behaviours when making 
food choices. This research question was driven by the previous findings that 
consumers perceive organic food products as more healthful than conventional food 
products (Lee et al., 2013; Schuldt & Schwarz, 2010; Sörqvist et al., 2015) when in 
fact there is currently no conclusive scientific evidence for this belief (Barański et 
al., 2014; Dangour et al., 2009; Smith-Spangler et al., 2012). It has been argued that 
consumers draw such conclusions because they are influenced by a halo effect. As 
discussed in more detail in section 3.1, the halo effect is a cognitive bias in which 
general positive attitudes towards an object spread to all associated attributes 
(Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Thorndike, 1920). In the context of organic food products, 
that would mean that a general positive attitude regarding organic food products is 
assumed to spread to all other more specific attributes such as health, quality or 
safety perceptions.  
I proposed a different explanation as to why this may be so. More 
specifically, taken out of context, this organic = healthful heuristic may seem 
irrational. However, if the same heuristic is applied in an appropriate context, it 
could actually lead to a meaningful conclusion, and therefore be considered as 
rational behaviour. This assumption is grounded in the literature that studies 
ecological rationality, i.e. the match between the mind and the environment (Todd & 
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Gigerenzer, 2007; Todd et al., 2012). In particular, it has been argued that the right 
application of a heuristic can sometimes lead to better outcomes than other 
procedurally more complicated processes (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). 
 However, there were several prerequisites for the previous assumption to 
hold. First, organic food products had to be, in some way, more healthful than 
conventional food products. As there is currently no conclusive scientific evidence to 
support this, I hypothesised that organic food products may be more prevalent in less 
processed, and therefore more healthful, food product categories, simply because it is 
easier to make a product with fewer organic ingredients. In that case, it would be 
meaningful to conclude that organic food products are in general more healthful than 
conventional food products. I tested this hypothesis in a field study (Study 1) by 
visiting six supermarkets and counting organic food products within 59 food product 
categories (see section 3.2). 
Second, considering that organic food products are indeed more prevalent in 
more healthful food product categories, I hypothesised that consumers have observed 
this in the environment, that is, in supermarkets, and learned it. I tested this 
hypothesis in an online consumer survey (Study 2) where consumers were asked to 
assess the healthfulness of the 59 food product categories identified in the field 
study, and to estimate the prevalence of organic food products within these 
categories (see section 3.3). 
Finally, I hypothesised that consumers can learn, in an unsupervised manner, 
that some cues are correlated, and use these cues in a heuristic way. More 
specifically, I hypothesised that consumers can learn a correlation between organic 
and health cues and use this correlation as a heuristic when choosing the most 
healthful food products. This hypothesis has a background in the literature that 
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studies statistical learning (Conway & Christiansen, 2006; Perruchet & Pacton, 2006) 
which is a type of learning that evolves without conscious attempts to learn 
distributional properties, correlations, and transition probabilities in the environment 
(Thiessen et al., 2013). I tested this hypothesis in an eye tracking experiment (Study 
3) with the three conditions (positive correlation, no correlation and negative 
correlation condition) which differed in the size of a correlation between organic and 
health cues (see section 3.4). 
The findings from Study 1 support the first hypothesis that organic food 
products are more prevalent in more healthful food product categories. More 
specifically, organic food products are more prevalent in less processed food product 
categories, such as fruit, vegetables, eggs and so on, possibly because fewer organic 
ingredients are required. This implies that highly processed food products such as 
prepackaged meals, candy, crisps and so on, are rarely organic, which is supported 
by the findings from Study 1. The findings also show that organic food products are 
also more prevalent in less processed variants of specific food products. For instance, 
whole-grain pasta is more likely to be organic compared to pasta made with refined 
wheat flour. In addition, a calculation of the expected healthfulness of organic and 
conventional food showed that organic food products are, on average, 30% more 
healthful than conventional food products. 
The findings from Study 2 support the second hypothesis that consumers 
have observed and learned the statistical structure of the environment where organic 
food products are more prevalent in more healthful food product categories. More 
specifically, consumers gave accurate estimates of the prevalence of organic food 
products across different food product categories. In addition, consumer estimates of 
food product categories’ healthfulness matched the ones provided by food and 
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nutrition experts, suggesting that consumers can distinguish more healthful from less 
healthful food products on a category level. This is in line with the previous findings 
arguing that consumers are typically very categorical in thinking about food 
healthfulness (Orquin, 2014; Rozin, Ashmore, & Markwith, 1996). 
The findings from Study 3 support the third hypothesis that consumers can 
learn the statistical structure of a natural environment and apply the learned cue in 
their decision making. The findings show that participants are more likely to look at 
organic labels when there is a positive correlation between organic and health cues. 
This gaze bias suggests that participants in this condition consider the organic label 
as relevant to the health judgment task (Orquin & Mueller Loose, 2013). The 
findings also show that participants who include labels in their judgments are more 
likely to choose food products with organic labels when there is a positive 
correlation between the two labels. However, they are even more likely to choose 
products with both labels when there is a positive correlation between the two. This 
suggests that participants generally preferred products with both labels, but also 
relied on organic labels if this cue was easier to retrieve.  
In sum, the findings from these three studies show that one ought to be 
careful before labelling something as a bias and, in general, before labelling beliefs 
as irrational. Beliefs and behaviours that seem irrational at a glance may, in fact, lead 
to rational outcomes in the right context. It is, therefore, important to focus not only 
on the outcomes, i.e. in this case irrational beliefs about organic food products, but 
also on the processes which lead to their emergence.  
Each decision process consists of several sub-processes and generally starts 
with information acquisition (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981). There are different 
measures proposed to explore information acquisition, the most applied of which, 
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based on the number of citations, is without a doubt the Search Index (SI, Payne, 
1976). However, there have been several criticisms raised so far regarding specific 
characteristics of the SI, such as a lack of chance correction or analysis of search 
behaviour restricted to single-step transitions and so on (Ball, 1997; Böckenholt & 
Hynan, 1994). One of the criticisms is directed towards the ambiguity of the SI in 
specific situations, i.e. when the SI is close to zero (Ball, 1997). This criticism has 
not been addressed yet and so it has motivated the second research question. 
Therefore, the second research question I aimed to answer in this doctoral 
dissertation was whether there is a measure which can complement the SI to better 
describe information search. 
To answer this question, I proposed a new measure, the Systematicity of 
Search Index (SSI), as an additional measure for exploring information search 
behaviour. I developed the SSI by addressing the criticisms directed towards the SI. 
The SSI therefore describes how systematic information search is, which is 
expressed as the proportion of non-random search, i.e. search that is alternative- or 
attribute-wise corrected for chance. I hypothesised that the SSI is a more informative 
measure than the SI in situations where decision makers make approximately the 
same amount of alternative- and attribute-wise transitions (SI ≈ 0). I also 
hypothesised that the SSI is higher when information presentation is visually 
organised compared to when it is visually disorganised.  
I tested these hypotheses in an experiment (Study 4) with four within-subjects 
conditions using eye tracking. In each condition, I used different visual presentation 
to create either organised or disorganised information presentation format, which 
resulted in three conditions with organised information presentation (alternative 
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array, attribute array and matrix) and one condition with disorganised information 
presentation (random matrix).  
Two of the conditions (matrix and random matrix) were especially important 
for testing the hypothesis that the SSI is a more informative measure than the SI 
when decision makers make approximately the same amount of alternative- and 
attribute-wise transitions (SI ≈ 0). More specifically, the mean SI is zero only in case 
of a matrix with the same number of alternatives and attributes. Otherwise, the SI 
points to an alternative-wise information search when the number of attributes is 
higher than the number of alternatives or to an attribute-wise information search, 
when the number of alternatives is higher than the number of attributes. Even though 
in this case the number of alternatives and attributes was equal in all conditions, 
alternative and attribute array conditions applied different visual groupings which 
were expected to nudge the SI to alternative- or attribute-wise search respectively. 
To test the hypothesis that the SSI is higher when information presentation is 
visually organised compared to environments when information presentation is 
visually disorganised, all four conditions were equally important (see section 4.2). 
The findings from Study 4 support the two hypotheses. More specifically, the 
findings show that the SSI is informative when the SI is close to zero. This is 
noticeable in both matrix conditions where the SI is relatively close to zero; however, 
the SSI shows that information search was systematic in the matrix condition and 
unsystematic in the random matrix condition, suggesting that in this condition it most 
likely happened by chance. In addition, the findings show that the SSI appears to be 
a useful measure for exploring information search, which is reflected in higher SSI 
scores in conditions with an organised information presentation format compared to 
the condition with a disorganised format. 
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Additionally, I tested the performance of the SSI on the data from Study 3. 
The findings support the earlier hypothesis, i.e. that the SSI is a more informative 
measure than the SI when the SI is close to zero. More specifically, in all three 
conditions the SI was close to zero, suggesting that participants made approximately 
equal amounts of alternative- and attribute-wise transitions. However, the SSI 
indicated that these search patterns did not happen by chance (see section 4.3).  
The findings from the choice analysis showed that participants who 
predominantly relied on one attribute when making choices ended up making more 
systematic choices. However, when inspecting the relationship between the 
systematicity of participants’ eye movements and their choices, the findings were not 
that clear. Systematicity of eye movements and choices were positively correlated in 
the alternative and attribute array conditions, whereas the two were negatively 
correlated in the matrix and random matrix conditions. This suggests that 
presentation format has a strong influence on information processing, which is 
supported by the previous findings in the literature (e.g. Bettman & Kakkar, 1977). 
However, I cannot draw more specific conclusions because these findings were 
accompanied by wide confidence intervals (see section 4.2.2.4). 
In sum, the SSI has the merit of calculating the systematicity of information 
search by taking into consideration the probability of a search sequence being due to 
chance. Furthermore, the SSI is a measure based on multiple-step transitions and, 
therefore, addresses the limitations of single-step transition measures summarized by 
Ball (1997). It can, therefore, shed light on processes not captured by the SI. More 
specifically, when the SI is close to zero, all we know is that information search 
consists of approximately equal amounts of alternative- and attribute-wise 
transitions. Therefore, extra information on whether information search did or did 
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not occur by chance in this situation, which is provided by the SSI, is beneficial. 
Considering the findings from Study 4, which suggest that the SSI is a useful 
measure, it can be concluded that the SSI can be used as a complementary measure 
to the SI to better understand information search behaviour. 
5.1.1 Limitations 
As with all studies, there are some potential limitations of the studies reported 
in this doctoral dissertation. In the following paragraphs, I therefore discuss potential 
limitations of the four studies. 
One limitation of Study 1 is that I only included the numbers of organic food 
products per each of 59 assessed food product categories in the supermarkets. In 
other words, I did not include the numbers of products that bear only the Keyhole 
label, nor the numbers of products that bear both labels, i.e. the Keyhole and organic 
label, per each food category. Therefore, it is not clear which of the conditions in 
Study 3 best represents the true state of the environment, because I could not 
calculate a correlation between the Keyhole and organic labels. However, this 
limitation should not affect the overall findings. Instead of the Keyhole label, to 
check whether there is a correlation between organic and more healthful food 
products in the environment, I used food healthfulness estimates provided by food 
and nutrition experts. 
One possible limitation of Study 2 is that I did not control for numeracy 
skills. More specifically, numeracy refers to mathematical proficiency and includes 
“basic logic and quantitative reasoning skills, knowing when and how to perform 
multistep operations, and an understanding of ratio concepts, notably fractions, 
proportions, percentages, and probabilities” (Reyna & Brainerd, 2008; Reyna, 
Nelson, Han, & Dieckmann, 2009, p.5). Since one of the questions for participants in 
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the survey was to estimate the percentages of organic food products in different food 
product categories in their local supermarket, testing numeracy would have made 
sense. However, it seems that this did not affect the findings from Study 2 because 
participants gave quite accurate estimates of organic food product prevalence in 
different food product categories. 
One limitation of Study 3 lies in the experimental stimuli. In this study, I used 
screenshots of the actual food products from an online supermarket to make the 
stimuli as realistic as possible. Therefore, the distances of the Keyhole and organic 
labels from other product features such as product image or name were sometimes 
too small. To address this limitation, I tested different AOI margins, i.e. 0°, 0.15° and 
0.5° of visual angle, to find the most suitable margin considering the numbers of 
false positives and false negatives (see section 3.4.1.2).  
Another limitation of the naturalistic stimuli used in Study 3 is the difference 
in sizes, positions and salience of food products. Since I did not control for these 
differences, it is possible that the findings are confounded by them. However, it has 
been argued that this would have been a problem, if the experiment consisted of one 
trial only. To address this issue, Orquin and Holmqvist (2017) recommend having at 
least 16 trials in the experiment. Since each condition in Study 3 had 50 trials, some 
of these differences should have been randomised away.  
One limitation of Study 4 is also related to the experimental stimuli. More 
specifically, experimental manipulation required that objects in the experimental 
stimuli should be positioned differently in each condition. Therefore, some of the 
objects had a higher likelihood to be looked at. However, I did not take this into 
consideration when creating random data sets used for comparing whether identified 
patterns occurred by chance. Instead, I created randomised data sets by sampling 
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equally from specific sets of numbers and letters suggesting that every object had an 
equal chance to be looked at. In addition, some of the elements varied in size such as 
attribute names. I addressed this limitation by creating more than one trial per 
condition, which were generated by randomly combining all object elements. I 
therefore argue that, as in Study 3, these differences have randomised away. 
One possible limitation of the SSI measure proposed in Study 4 could be that 
there the SSI is used to explore the information search by testing it for the strict 
compensatory and non-compensatory strategies only. Therefore, I neglected the 
entire repertoire of strategies that an individual could use dependent on the decision 
maker’s characteristics, decision task and decision environment (Payne et al., 1993). 
However, I deem this was an appropriate approach to start out with when developing 
a new measure for exploring information search, which serves as a complementary 
measure to the SI.  
Additionally, the SSI is a measure for exploring information search 
behaviour, which shows whether the search performed was systematic or it happened 
by chance. It has been shown previously that the SSI is specifically useful when the 
SI is close to zero. However, the SSI by itself is not very informative, i.e. it does not 
tell us anything about the search strategies used. Therefore, it should be used 
together with the SI, which could show the direction of systematic search, i.e. 
whether the information search was predominantly alternative or attribute-wise. 
Finally, another limitation of Study 4 is that in comparison to the SI measure, 
the SSI could be perceived as a slightly more complex measure, which may deter 
some decision researchers from using it. Hence, to simplify the use of the SSI, I plan 
to develop an R package. Consequently, there would be no further potential 
restrictions in implementing the SSI for analysing the pattern of information search. 
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In the meantime, one can use a script with the R code which can be found in 
Appendix E. Alternatively, the script can be accessed at the following link: 
https://github.com/sonjaPerkovic. 
5.1.2 Future research 
There are several suggestions for future research based on the findings, 
limitations or methods used in this doctoral dissertation. First, using the combination 
of methods employed to study the halo effect bias in the context of organic food 
products, i.e. a combination of field, online and lab studies, I could also study other 
heuristics and cognitive biases. For instance, social proof or bandwagon effect 
(Cialdini, 1993) could also be studied in the context of organic food products. Social 
proof is a phenomenon where people tend to adopt specific beliefs or ideas after 
observing other people doing so. Social proof becomes more effective if people who 
adopt specific beliefs are perceived as knowledgeable about a situation or if there is a 
greater number of people adopting this behaviour.  
This theory could also be tested in the context of organic food products. More 
specifically, the fact that consumers perceive organic food products as more healthful 
than conventional food products could be attributed to the social proof phenomenon. 
Put differently, consumers may observe other consumers, who are perceived as being 
on a healthful diet, buying organic food products and therefore conclude that these 
products must be healthful. At first, this seems to be irrational; however, it is 
possible that if studied in the right context, this heuristic could be ecologically 
rational.  
To test the meaningfulness of the social proof heuristic in the context of 
organic food products, I propose a combination of three studies, i.e. field, online and 
lab studies. The first study, a field study, would aim to assess whether consumers 
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who buy more healthful food products also buy more organic food products. To 
assess the healthfulness of consumer shopping baskets and the percentages of 
organic food products bought, I would require getting access to the purchase data 
from a supermarket. The healthfulness of a shopping basket could be calculated by 
assessing the ratio of processed vs unprocessed food products bought. Then, I could 
calculate the percentage of organic foods in all food products bought and assess the 
correlation between the two. This would ideally show that the more healthful a 
consumer shopping basket is, based on the ratio of processed vs unprocessed food 
products bought, the more organic food products consumers tend to buy. 
In the second study, an online consumer survey, I would explore whether 
consumers observe this phenomenon, that is that eating organic food products is a 
part of a healthful diet, by asking them to provide evaluations regarding behaviours 
of two different types of consumers. More specifically, I would provide participants 
with two scenarios. In the first scenario, they would assess on a scale from one 
(extremely unlikely) to five (extremely likely) how likely it is that an individual on a 
healthful diet consumes specific food products. The set of food products would 
consist of various food products including both organic and non-organic alternatives. 
In the second scenario, they would do the same but for an individual on an 
unhealthful diet. This would ideally show that consumers perceive that individuals 
on a healthful diet consume more organic food products.  
In the third study, a lab study, I would explore whether consumers can learn 
this connection between a healthful diet and organic food products by observing 
other individuals. I would ask participants to come to the lab where they would be 
presented with, for instance, four food product alternatives from one food product 
category which is not obviously healthful nor unhealthful such as breakfast cereals. 
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Their task would be to choose the most healthful food product alternative among 
these four food product samples. At the same time, there would be a confederate in 
the lab also sampling food products. The confederate would always choose a 
different, randomly assigned, food product. In one condition the confederate would 
be an individual who gives an impression of a person on a healthful diet whereas in 
the other condition that would be an individual who gives an impression of a person 
on an unhealthful diet. Afterwards, I would assess whether participants’ choices were 
influenced by the confederate’s choices. More precisely, I would assess whether 
participants were influenced by the confederate on a healthful diet by more often 
choosing the same food product as the most healthful food product. 
If the findings from all three studies confirmed the expectations, it would be 
meaningful to conclude that beliefs that at first seemed to be irrational could result in 
ecologically rational conclusions. More specifically, if the findings from the field 
study showed that consumers who generally consume healthful food products also 
consume more organic food products, this would suggest that organic food products 
are correlated with healthfulness. If the findings from the online survey and lab study 
showed that consumers observed this correlation and that they can learn it, then this 
would be yet another example of a belief that at first seems to be irrational but can 
lead to an ecologically rational conclusion when studied in the right context. 
The second idea for future research is related to tackling the limitation 
regarding the SSI being restricted to detecting strict compensatory and non-
compensatory strategies only. I therefore propose that the SSI could be adjusted so 
that it captures various search strategies, preferably in different decision 
environments with different decision tasks. For instance, the SSI could capture type 
V to type VII transitions proposed by Ball (1997) (see section 4.1.1). This could be 
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done by adjusting the existing code so that it analyses participants’ information 
search strings by searching for these specific types of transitions. In this way, the SSI 
would gain more power to discriminate between specific decision strategies such as 
weighted additive, equal weight or majority of confirming dimensions. 
The final idea for future research would be to test the SSI against the Strategy 
Measure (SM) proposed by Böckenholt and Hynan (1994) (see section 4.1.1). Since 
the SM is a measure for exploring information search behaviour that, as the SI, 
focuses on single-step transitions, it is also susceptible to the criticisms of this type 
of measure provided by Ball (1997). Testing the SSI against the SM would therefore 
show whether there are situations in which the SSI could complement the SM. I 
would approach this by re-analysing the existing data set used for assessing the 
performance of the SI to see how the SM performs in that setting. Based on the 
findings, I would design a new experiment which would be suited to studying the 
specific situations in which the SM perhaps gives ambiguous results. This would 
ideally result in providing specific recommendations for when the SM should be 
complemented with the SSI to obtain a more informative assessment of the 
information search process. 
5.2 Theoretical, methodological and practical implications 
 This doctoral dissertation has several very important implications for theory, 
methodology and practice. On a theoretical level, there are three important 
implications. First, this doctoral dissertation contributes to a better understanding of 
ecological rationality. More precisely, it has been shown that ecologically rational 
behaviour can be a result of statistical learning processes. This process can be broken 
down into two steps. First, statistical learning processes lead to a development of 
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specific beliefs about statistical properties of the environment. Second, these beliefs 
may then translate into decision rules that match the environment and therefore 
produce ecologically rational behaviours. Another theoretical implication is the 
finding that irrational beliefs can sometimes lead to rational behaviours. More 
specifically, a belief which at first appears to be irrational, could be rational if 
studied in an appropriate context. Finally, this doctoral dissertation also contributes 
to the theory by showing that systematic search for information is not always 
necessarily a result of using heuristics, but can also be a result of systematicity in the 
presentation format. Put differently, visual grouping of relevant pieces of information 
can enhance the systematicity of processing that information without an explicit need 
for simplifying the information and therefore use of heuristics. 
 On a methodological level, there are two important implications. The first 
methodological implication is the novel combination of different methods to study 
one phenomenon. This doctoral dissertation used a combination of three different 
approaches, i.e. a field study, an online survey and an eye tracking experiment to 
explore the first research question. To avoid limitations associated with any 
particular method and to obtain more robust results, tackling a research question 
using different methods has been endorsed many times, by different scholars (e.g. 
Davis, Golicic, & Boerstler, 2011; Stewart, 2009). Therefore, it has been argued that 
a multi-method approach to decision research should always be applied when 
possible (Payne et al., 1978). The second methodological implication is the new 
method proposed, that is the Systematicity of Search Index (SSI), for exploring 
information search behaviour. This measure addresses the questions overlooked by 
existing measures for exploring information search behaviour and therefore serves as 
a good complementary measure to those measures. Study 4 confirmed the usefulness 
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of the measure, which suggests that this measure can be used for exploring 
information search behaviour. 
 On a practical level, this doctoral dissertation contributes with the finding 
that, overall, organic food products are 30% more healthful than conventional food 
products. This finding can be used as a heuristic when trying to find more healthful 
food products. More specifically, since there is a correlation between organic food 
products and less processed food products in the supermarkets, consumers who want 
to buy more healthful food products could search for food product categories that 
have a higher prevalence of organic food products. Consuming food products from 
these food product categories would imply consuming less processed and therefore 
more healthful food products. This is especially useful for anybody who is struggling 
with obtaining a healthful diet and is unsure about the healthfulness of specific food 
product categories. Considering the continuous rise in obesity rates, and the fact that 
consumers are overwhelmed by conflicting information about what to eat or avoid 
(International Food Information Council Foundation, 2017; Nagler, 2014), it seems 
that this heuristic could be useful for many consumers. In addition, on a broader 
level, this heuristic could also be useful for food practitioners and public 
policymakers for enhancing policies, organising interventions, and guiding consumer 
behaviour towards more healthful food alternatives. 
As a heuristic for identifying more healthful food product categories, this 
practical implication could have a direct influence on tackling growing obesity rates, 
one of the three societal reasons for studying food choice discussed at the beginning 
of this doctoral dissertation (see section 1.1). On the indirect level, this practical 
implication could potentially address growing food waste rates and issues around 
food safety, the two other societal reasons for studying food choice. For instance, as 
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previously mentioned, the use of the organic = healthful heuristic provides 
consumers with a clear guideline towards more healthful food products, and 
therefore should have a positive impact on their diet. This would then reduce the 
need for purchase of various diet products and ultimately reduce the number of such 
products on the market, and consequently reduce food waste rates. Furthermore, the 
use of the organic = healthful heuristic could also be beneficial for dealing with the 
issues around food safety. For instance, the findings show that food categories with 
frozen food products (see Table 3.1) contain more organic food products compared 
to many other food product categories. Hence, following the organic = healthful 
heuristic, consumers should eventually acquire more positive attitudes towards 
frozen food products which could have positive impacts on both food safety and food 
waste (see section 1.1). 
Finally, marketers could also have an important role in helping consumers to 
apply the organic = healthful heuristic. This could be used in different areas of 
marketing, such as supermarket layout, product packaging and promotion strategies, 
to name just a few. For instance, one recommendation would be to make organic 
food products more salient both regarding their packaging and their positioning on 
the shelves, which would help consumers to more easily detect organic food 
products. Alternatively, organic food products could be positioned in a special 
supermarket section. This would correspond to the attribute-wise condition in 
Chapter 4 which would make it easier for consumers to apply non-compensatory 
decision strategies. By making it easier to apply the organic = healthful heuristic, 
supermarkets would ideally encourage consumers to follow this heuristic. Marketers 
could also use the organic = healthful heuristic to promote more healthful food 
product categories. This would greatly benefit consumers because the higher the 
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number of sources presenting this heuristic, the sooner consumers can start using it to 
improve their food choices. 
5.3 Concluding remarks 
 Food choice is a complex task which often occurs in multi-dimensional 
environments. The findings from this doctoral dissertation suggest that, even though 
environments are complex, consumers can learn the structures of these environments 
and use them to form simple heuristics. Furthermore, when the environments are 
visually extremely complex, consumers still seem to use heuristics by identifying the 
most relevant pieces of information which are then used for making choices. 
Therefore, one should be careful before labelling something as a bias, and in general, 
before labelling beliefs as irrational, because, in some situations, consumer food 
choice behaviour seems to be guided by sophisticated underlying mechanisms.  
 This doctoral dissertation shows that there is significant potential for a better 
understanding of food choice by studying the decision processes behind them. A 
process tracing approach has been shown to be particularly useful for this. However, 
there is still more work needed in developing appropriate measures for analysing 
these processes. Researchers should strive to constantly work on developing better 
measures based on the limitations of the existing ones. This doctoral dissertation has 
made an attempt in this direction.  
 Finally, the findings from this doctoral dissertation also provide clear 
implications about how to improve consumer food choices. Particularly, this refers to 
a simple heuristic, the organic = healthful heuristic, which can help consumers to 
detect more healthful food product categories. This heuristic is simple enough to be 
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used by consumers; however, it could also be used as a basis for organizing nutrition 
related interventions.  
 In sum, even though consumer food choices cannot generally be described as 
irrational, there are still many situations where their decision making could be 
improved. Tackling this problem from different theoretical viewpoints, and 
combining different methods to solve it, appears to be necessary for answering a 
seemingly simple, yet complex question about how food choice is made. In this way, 
we increase the chances of developing clear implications and guidelines for both 
theory and practice. The clearer the implications, the greater the chance that 
consumers will include them in their everyday decision making. Consequently, this 
would then lead to much needed behaviour change, and therefore address the main 
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Study 1 survey 
 
1. What is your gender: 
o Female 
o Male 
2. What is your age? 
3. What is your education? 


























Crispbread and rice crackers  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Whole-grain bread  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Refined wheat flour bread  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Frozen bread  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Vegetables  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Fruit  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Frozen vegetables  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Frozen fruit  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Canned vegetables  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Canned fruit  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Dried fruits, nuts, and seeds  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Butter  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 




Milk  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Plain yoghurt products  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Fruit yoghurt  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Cheese  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Non-dairy milk  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Eggs  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Fresh meat  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Cold cuts  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Processed meat  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Frozen meat  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Canned meat  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Canned fish  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Fresh fish  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Frozen fish  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Processed fish (fridge)  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Oil  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 




White rice  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Refined wheat flour pasta  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Whole-grain pasta  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Sauces (tomato, pesto)  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Prepackaged meals: sauces  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Dressings (salad dressings, mayo, 
ketchup, mustard) 
 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Juices  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Syrups  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Sodas  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
White wine  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Red wine  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Alcoholic beers and shakers  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Chips  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Savoury biscuits  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Muesli and protein bars  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 







Candy  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Ice cream  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Honey  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Processed breakfast cereals  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Unprocessed breakfast cereals  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Marmalade  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Chocolate spreads  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Mayonnaise-based  salads  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Soups  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Refrigerated prepackaged meals  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Frozen prepackaged meals  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Dry prepackaged meals  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 





Study 1 results 
  
Total count of all food products (T) and organic food products (O) per 
six supermarkets 
Total count of all and organic food 
products 
(additional coder) 












41 0 42 2 17 1 70 1 46 6 36 0 28 0 
Bread Frozen bread 17 4 25 4 9 1 23 1 31 3 13 0 14 0 
Fruit & veg Vegetables 94 20 140 41 76 16 187 53 228 59 93 25 89 32 
Fruit & veg Fruit 31 6 35 8 23 4 52 11 62 12 34 8 33 8 
Fruit & veg 
Frozen 
vegetables 




Fruit & veg Frozen fruit 5 0 3 0 5 0 10 2 11 3 5 1 5 1 
Fruit & veg 
Canned 
vegetables 
57 2 58 2 48 7 184 25 151 43 51 5 30 6 
Fruit & veg Canned fruit 14 0 14 0 3 0 34 6 24 10 6 0 6 0 
Fruit & veg 
Dried fruits, 
nuts, and seeds 
58 14 58 16 28 7 188 54 215 81 55 7 53 10 
Dairy Butter 13 2 14 2 12 3 18 3 19 8 12 4 11 3 
Dairy Cream 12 1 16 3 7 1 13 2 17 2 9 0 12 1 




25 4 17 3 14 5 21 7 26 10 14 6 18 7 
Dairy Fruit yoghurt 22 1 43 4 36 6 50 7 61 12 40 10 34 10 
Dairy Cheese 106 8 104 11 85 13 263 27 233 28 131 10 126 9 
Dairy Non-dairy milk 6 1 5 5 3 3 9 7 24 23 7 5 7 6 
Eggs Eggs 7 2 8 2 6 2 13 6 11 6 9 3 10 3 
Meat Fresh meat 49 5 65 12 29 3 97 14 80 14 53 4 59 3 




Meat Processed meat 28 0 19 0 15 0 51 2 4 4 34 3 56 2 
Meat Frozen meat 8 0 5 3 4 0 27 3 20 3 16 0 18 0 
Meat Canned meat 7 0 4 0 2 0 16 0 4 0 2 0 1 0 
Fish Canned fish 24 0 21 0 16 0 86 0 50 0 16 0 17 0 
Fish Fresh fish 2 0 10 0 3 0 6 0 3 0 7 0 4 0 




25 0 32 0 21 0 103 1 66 1 48 1 63 1 
Oil Oil 16 3 11 2 13 4 53 20 80 40 9 3 8 3 
Rice Brown rice 2 1 2 1 1 1 8 6 8 5 2 1 2 1 




























39 2 45 1 46 3 149 19 154 12 26 1 28 1 
Soft drinks Juices 26 2 38 5 19 3 109 22 102 53 53 4 23 2 
Soft drinks Syrups 32 7 13 6 11 4 75 13 44 15 18 4 10 2 
Soft drinks Sodas 64 0 95 0 51 3 233 15 160 14 54 0 36 0 
Alcoholic 
drinks 
White wine 53 0 53 1 31 1 25 4 67 1 40 1 48 1 
Alcoholic 
drinks 






34 0 84 3 66 1 299 15 248 20 57 1 62 1 















65 0 59 1 46 1 174 8 94 23 46 0 - - 
Sweets Candy 342 0 253 6 214 3 854 6 487 29 147 4 - - 
Sweets Ice cream 24 3 23 1 37 2 59 5 65 7 29 1 29 1 










13 8 13 6 17 8 54 29 50 28 22 9 21 9 




10 2 15 1 8 0 25 4 19 5 7 2 - - 
Spreads 
Mayonnaise-
based  salads 





































Study 2 survey 
 
6. What is your gender: 
o Female 
o Male 
7. What is your age? 
8. What is your education? (Your longest completed education) 
o Primary school 
o Secondary school 
o Store clerk 
o Craftsman 
o Short higher education (up to 2 years) 
o Medium higher education (up to 3 years) 




o Other education 



















o Another supermarket 
10. In your opinion, what percentage of food products in your local supermarket are organic? 
                                         0% = no products are organic                      100% = all products are organic 
Crispbread and rice crackers 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Whole-grain bread 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Refined wheat flour bread 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Frozen bread 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Vegetables 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Fruit 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Frozen vegetables 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Frozen fruit 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Canned vegetables 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Canned fruit 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 




Butter 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Cream 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Milk 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Plain yoghurt products 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Fruit yoghurt 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Cheese 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Non-dairy milk 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Eggs 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Fresh meat 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Cold cuts 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Processed meat 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Frozen meat 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Canned meat 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Canned fish 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Fresh fish 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Frozen fish 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 




Oil 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Brown rice 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
White rice 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Refined wheat flour pasta 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Whole-grain pasta 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Sauces (tomato, pesto) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Prepackaged meals: sauces 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Dressings  0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Juices 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Syrups 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Sodas 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
White wine 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Red wine 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Alcoholic beers/shakers 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Chips 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Savoury biscuits 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 




Cakes and cookies 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Candy 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Ice cream 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Honey 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Processed breakfast cereals 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Unprocessed breakfast cereals 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Marmalade 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Chocolate spreads 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Mayonnaise-based  salads 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Soups 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Refrigerated prepackaged 
meals 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Frozen prepackaged meals 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Dry prepackaged meals 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 























Crispbread and rice crackers  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Whole-grain bread  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Refined wheat flour bread  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Frozen bread  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Vegetables  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Fruit  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Frozen vegetables  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Frozen fruit  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Canned vegetables  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Canned fruit  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Dried fruits, nuts, and seeds  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Butter  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 




Milk  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Plain yoghurt products  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Fruit yoghurt  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Cheese  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Non-dairy milk  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Eggs  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Fresh meat  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Cold cuts  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Processed meat  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Frozen meat  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Canned meat  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Canned fish  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Fresh fish  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Frozen fish  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Processed fish (fridge)  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Oil  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 




White rice  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Refined wheat flour pasta  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Whole-grain pasta  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Sauces (tomato, pesto)  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Prepackaged meals: sauces  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Dressings   [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Juices  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Syrups  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Sodas  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
White wine  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Red wine  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Alcoholic beers and shakers  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Chips  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Savoury biscuits  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Muesli and protein bars  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Cakes and cookies  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 








Ice cream  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Honey  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Processed breakfast cereals  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Unprocessed breakfast cereals  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Marmalade  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Chocolate spreads  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Mayonnaise-based  salads  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Soups  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Refrigerated prepackaged 
meals 
 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Frozen prepackaged meals  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Dry prepackaged meals  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 




12. How often do you purchase organic food products? 
o Never 




o Very often 
o Always 
13. On average, what percentage of your shopping basket belongs to organic food products? 
 
% Organic food 
products purchased 








14. How good/bad do you think it is to buy organic food products? 
 
Very bad (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Very good (7) 
 
15. How important/unimportant do you think it is to buy organic food products? 
 
Very unimportant (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Very important (7) 
 
16. How wise/foolish do you think it is to buy organic food products? 
 




























Organic foods are healthier 
than conventional foods. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 [ ] 
Organic foods are tastier 
than conventional foods. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 [ ] 
Organic foods contain 
fewer calories than 
conventional foods. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 [ ] 
Organic foods are of 
higher quality than 
conventional foods. 
 




Organic foods are fresher 
than conventional foods. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 [ ] 
Organic foods are safer 
than conventional foods. 
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Appendix D 
Demographic and psychographic information about Study 2 sample  
 
Figure D1 Histogram representing (a) frequency of purchasing organic food 
products and (b) quantity of organic food products purchased when performing 
grocery shopping. 
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Figure D2 Histogram representing attitudes towards purchasing organic food 
products (a) good, (b) important and (c) wise. 
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Figure D3 Histogram representing perceptions of organic food (a) healthfulness, (b) 
tastefulness, (c) calories, (d) quality, (e) freshness and (f) safety. 
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Appendix E 







#set working directory 
setwd("/Users/userName/folderName") 
 
#read in the file 
infoSearch <- as.data.table(read.csv("fileName.csv", header = T, sep = ";")) #the   
original file consists of five columns: participant, environment, trial, alternative and 
attribute column 
 
#preparing the data #### 
 
#identify subsequent eye fixations to an attribute within the same alternative 
infoSearch$attributeClean <- ifelse(infoSearch$attribute == shift(infoSearch$attribu
te, 1L) & infoSearch$alternative == shift(infoSearch$alternative, 1L), 1, 0)  
 
#delete subsequent eye fixations to an attribute, i.e. keep only the  first eye fixation 
infoSearch <- infoSearch[infoSearch$attributeClean != 1 | is.na(infoSearch$attribute
Clean)] 
 
#delete unnecessary column 
infoSearch[, "attributeClean" := NULL] 
 
#create and count alternative-wise transitions (needed for calculating Search Index) 
infoSearch$transAlt <- ifelse(infoSearch$attribute != lag(infoSearch$attribute, n = 1
L) & infoSearch$alternative == lag(infoSearch$alternative, n = 1L) & infoSearch$tr
ial == lag(infoSearch$trial, n = 1L) & infoSearch$participant == lag(infoSearch$par
ticipant, n = 1L), 1, 0) 
 
infoSearch[is.na(infoSearch)] <- 0 
 
#new file with alternative-wise transitions for each participant within each               
environment and for each trial 
altTrans <- ddply(infoSearch,.(participant, environment, trial), summarize, transAlt 
= sum(transAlt))  
 
#create and count attribute-wise transitions (needed for calculating  Search Index) 
infoSearch$transAtt <- ifelse(infoSearch$attribute == lag(infoSearch$attribute, n = 
1L) & infoSearch$alternative != lag(infoSearch$alternative, n = 1L) & infoSearch$t
rial == lag(infoSearch$trial, n = 1L) & infoSearch$participant == lag(infoSearch$pa
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rticipant, n = 1L), 1, 0) 
 
infoSearch[is.na(infoSearch)] <- 0 
 
#new file with attribute-wise transitions for each participant within each                  
environment and for each trial 
attTrans <- ddply(infoSearch,.(participant, environment, trial), summarize, transAtt 
= sum(transAtt))  
 
#combine two data sets by columns and calculate Search Index 
searchIndex <- as.data.table(cbind(attTrans, altTrans))  
 
searchIndex$searchIndex <- (searchIndex$transAlt - searchIndex$transAtt) / (search
Index$transAlt + searchIndex$transAtt)  
 
#delete unnecessary columns 
searchIndex[, c("participant", "environment", "trial") := NULL]  
 
#set order of columns 
setcolorder(searchIndex, c("participant", "environment", "trial", "transAlt", "transAt
t", "searchIndex"))  
 
#calculate the length of total string of eye fixations per participant per trial (needed 
for calculating the denominator of Systematicity of Search Index) 




setnames(stringLength, "V1", "N")  
 
#create counter variable for alternative-wise search (focusing on a set of attributes 
when inspecting different alternatives) 
infoSearch <- setDT(infoSearch)[, counterAltwise:= rleid(environment, trial, altern
ative)] #assigning the same number to the eye  fixations  to the attributes within the  
same alternatives (e.g. if a participant   first fixated on sugar and fat levels within on
e   alternative and then  sugar and protein levels within another alternative, values  
1,1,2,2 would have been assigned to the counter variable)  
 
#create counter variable for attribute-wise search (focusing on the same attribute   
when inspecting different alternatives) 
infoSearch <- setDT(infoSearch)[, counterAttwise:= rleid(environment, trial, attribu
te)] #since additional eye fixations have been deleted, when there is a fixation on the 
same attribute, it must belong to a different alternative 
 
#identify alternative-wise patterns #### 
 
#create alternative-wise strings (i.e. sequences of letters) based on counter variable 
altwiseStrings <- infoSearch[,list(string <- paste(attribute, collapse = ""), participant 
= unique(participant), environment = unique(environment), trial = unique(trial)), b
y = counterAltwise] #collapsing all attributes within the same alternative into a       
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string of letters; in the above example we would and up with two strings of  length    
two: 'fs’ and 'ps' (i.e. 'fat and sugar' and 'protein and   sugar') 
 
#delete counter variable  
altwiseStrings[, "counterAltwise" := NULL] 
 
#rename column 
setnames(altwiseStrings, "V1", "string") 
 
#define a function that keeps the unique elements in a string and  sorts them             
alphabetically 
relaxedFreqOrder <- function(i){ 
  paste0(unique(sort(unlist(strsplit(i, "")))), collapse = "") 
} 
 
#apply the function to the column with previously created alternative-wise strings 
altwiseStrings$formattedString <- lapply(altwiseStrings$string, relaxedFreqOrder) 
 
#delete string variable  
altwiseStrings[, "string" := NULL] 
 
#rename column 
setnames(altwiseStrings, "formattedString", "string") 
 
#change the class of a variable into character 
altwiseStrings$string <- as.character(altwiseStrings$string) 
 
#create a counter variable based on string variable within each trial (i.e. assign a   
new number for every unique string within each trial) 
altwiseStrings <- setDT(altwiseStrings)[, counter:= rleid(string, trial)] 
 
#create a variable that assigns 1 to equal subsequent counter variable values 
altwiseStrings$equalCounter <- ifelse(altwiseStrings$counter == lag(altwiseStrings
$counter, n = 1L) | altwiseStrings$counter == lead(altwiseStrings$counter, n = 1L), 
1, 0) 
 
#extract equal subsequent counters (equalCounter = 1) 
altwiseStrings <- altwiseStrings[altwiseStrings$equalCounter != 0] 
 
#delete strings of length one 
altwiseStrings <- subset(altwiseStrings, nchar(as.character(string)) >= 2) 
 
#combine strings into alternative-wise patterns using the counter variable (i.e. all    
the strings with the same count should be collapsed into a pattern) 
altwisePatterns <- altwiseStrings[,list(string <- paste(string, collapse = ""), participa
nt = unique(participant), environment = unique(environment), trial = unique(trial)), 
by = counter] 
 
#delete counter variable   
altwisePatterns[, "counter" := NULL] 




setnames(altwisePatterns, "V1", "pattern") 
 
#calculate the frequency of occurrence for each pattern within each trial,                 
environment and for every participant  
altwisePatternsCount <- as.data.table(with(altwisePatterns, table(pattern, trial, envi
ronment, participant))) 
altwisePatternsCount <- altwisePatternsCount[altwisePatternsCount$N != 0]  
 
#rename column 
setnames(altwisePatternsCount, "N", "pattFreq")  
 
#assess whether obtained patterns occurred by chance by making a random data set 
to which we will compare the patterns from the original data set #### 
 
altwiseSim <- function() { #create a function which will contain the random version 
of the data set 
   
#read in the data file (the original file) 
infoSearch <- as.data.table(read.csv("fileName.csv", header = T, sep    = ";")) 
 
#delete unnecessary columns 
infoSearch[, c("alternative", "attribute") := NULL] 
   
#randomize data 
sim <- 154355 #the number of rows corresponding to the number of eye fixations    
made in the original data set 
 
infoSearch$alternative <- sample(1:4, sim, T) #sample the numbers  from 1 to 4      
154355 times 
 
infoSearch$attribute <- sample(c("b", "f", "p", "s"), sim, T) #sample the letters b, f, 
p and s 154355 times 
 
#identify subsequent eye fixations to an attribute within the same alternative 
infoSearch$attributeClean <- ifelse(infoSearch$attribute == shift(infoSearch$attribu
te, 1L) & infoSearch$alternative == shift(infoSearch$alternative, 1L), 1, 0) 
   
#delete subsequent eye fixations to an attribute i.e. keep only the  first eye fixation 
infoSearch <- infoSearch[infoSearch$attributeClean != 1 | is.na(infoSearch$attribute
Clean)] 
   
#delete unnecessary column 
infoSearch[, "attributeClean" := NULL] 
   
#create counter variable for alternative-wise search (focusing on a set of attributes 
when inspecting different alternatives) 
infoSearch <- setDT(infoSearch)[, counter:= rleid(environment, trial, alternative)] 
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#create alternative-wise strings (i.e. sequences of letters) based on counter variable 
altwiseStrings <- infoSearch[,list(string <- paste(attribute, collapse = ""), participant 
= unique(participant), environment = unique(environment), trial = unique(trial)), b
y = counter] 
   
#delete counter variable  
altwiseStrings[, "counter" := NULL] 
   
#rename column 
setnames(altwiseStrings, "V1", "string") 
   
#apply the 'relaxedFreqOrder' function to the column with previously created          
alternative-wise strings 
altwiseStrings$formattedString <- lapply(altwiseStrings$string, relaxedFreqOrder) 
   
#delete string variable   
altwiseStrings[, "string" := NULL] 
   
#rename column 
setnames(altwiseStrings, "formattedString", "string") 
   
#change the class of a variable into character 
altwiseStrings$string <- as.character(altwiseStrings$string) 
   
#create a counter variable based on string variable within each trial (i.e. assign a    
new number for every unique string within each trial) 
altwiseStrings <- setDT(altwiseStrings)[, counter:= rleid(string, trial)] 
 
#create a variable that assigns 1 to equal subsequent counter variable values 
altwiseStrings$equalCounter <- ifelse(altwiseStrings$counter == lag(altwiseStrings
$counter, n = 1L) | altwiseStrings$counter == lead(altwiseStrings$counter, n = 1L), 
1, 0) 
   
#extract equal subsequent counters (equalCounter = 1) 
altwiseStrings <- altwiseStrings[altwiseStrings$equalCounter != 0] 
   
#delete strings of length one 
altwiseStrings <- subset(altwiseStrings, nchar(as.character(string)) >= 2) 
   
#combine strings into alternative-wise patterns using the counter variable (i.e. all    
the strings with the same count should be collapsed into a pattern) 
altwisePatterns <- altwiseStrings[,list(string <- paste(string, collapse = ""), participa
nt = unique(participant), environment = unique(environment), trial = unique(trial)), 
by = counter] 
   
#delete counter variable   
altwisePatterns[, "counter" := NULL] 
   
#rename column 
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setnames(altwisePatterns, "V1", "pattern") 
   
#calculate the frequency of occurrence for each pattern within each trial,                 
environment and for every participant  
altwisePatternsCountRan <- as.data.table(with(altwisePatterns, table(pattern, trial, 
environment, participant))) 
altwisePatternsCountRan <- altwisePatternsCountRan[altwisePatternsCountRan$N !
= 0]  




#replicate the 'altwiseSim' function 10000 times #### 
altwiseSimRep <- do.call(rbind, replicate(10000, altwiseSim(), simplify=FALSE))  
 
#calculate the probabilities and probability complements #### 
 
#write a function which compares the pattern frequencies in original and simulated 
data sets for each participant, environment and trial 
altwiseProb <- function(i){  
sum(altwiseSimRep$pattern == altwisePatternsCount$pattern[i] & altwiseSimRep$
participant == altwisePatternsCount$participant[i] & altwiseSimRep$environment =
= altwisePatternsCount$environment[i] & altwiseSimRep$trial == altwisePatternsC
ount$trial[i] & altwiseSimRep$N >= altwisePatternsCount$pattFreq[i]) 
} 
 
#apply the 'altwiseProb' function 
altwisePatternsCount$pattFreqSim <- sapply(1:nrow(altwisePatternsCount), altwise
Prob)  
 
#calculate the probabilities 
altwisePatternsCount$probability <- altwisePatternsCount$pattFreqSim / 10000 
 
#calculate the probability complements (1 - probability) 
altwisePatternsCount$prob_complement <- 1 - altwisePatternsCount$probability 
 
#calculate the pattern length 
altwisePatternsCount$pattLength <- nchar(altwisePatternsCount$pattern) 
 
#save the table 
write.csv(file="fileName.csv", x=altwisePatternsCount) #in case we want to            
perform some data analysis without doing the simulation again 
 
#identify attribute-wise patterns #### 
 
#create attribute-wise strings (i.e. sequences of letters) based on counter variable 
attwiseStrings <- infoSearch[,list(string <- paste(attribute, collapse = ""), participant 
= unique(participant), environment = unique(environment), trial = unique(trial)), b
y = counterAttwise] #collapsing all   attributes between different alternative into a   
string of letters; for instance, if a participant inspected sugar attribute between four 
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different alternatives, we would end up with a string 'ssss' 
 
#delete strings of length three or less 
attwiseStrings <- subset(attwiseStrings, nchar(as.character(V1)) >= 4) 
 
#delete counter variable   
attwiseStrings[, "counterAttwise" := NULL] 
 
#rename column 
setnames(attwiseStrings, "V1", "pattern") 
 
#calculate the frequency of occurrence for each pattern within each trial,                 
environment and for every participant  
attwisePatternsCount <- as.data.table(with(attwiseStrings, table(pattern, trial, envir
onment, participant))) 
attwisePatternsCount <- attwisePatternsCount[attwisePatternsCount$N != 0] 
 
#rename the frequency column 
setnames(attwisePatternsCount, "N", "pattFreq")  
 
#assess whether obtained patterns occurred by chance by making a random data set 
to which we will compare the patterns from the original data set #### 
 
attwiseSim <- function() { #creating a function which will contain the random         
version of the data set 
   
#reading in the data file (the original file) 
infoSearch <- as.data.table(read.csv("fileName.csv", header = T, sep = ";")) 
   
#delete unnecessary columns 
infoSearch[, c("alternative", "attribute") := NULL] 
   
#randomizing data 
sim <- 154355 #the number of rows corresponding to the number of eye fixations    
made in the original data set 
infoSearch$alternative <- sample(1:4, sim, T) #sample the numbers  from 1 to 4      
154355 times 
 
infoSearch$attribute <- sample(c("b", "f", "p", "s"), sim, T) #sample the letters b, f, 
p and s 154355 times 
   
#identify subsequent eye fixations to an attribute within the same alternative 
infoSearch$attributeClean <- ifelse(infoSearch$attribute == shift(infoSearch$attribu
te, 1L) & infoSearch$alternative == shift(infoSearch$alternative, 1L), 1, 0) 
   
#delete subsequent eye fixations to an attribute i.e. keep only the  first eye fixation 
infoSearch <- infoSearch[infoSearch$attributeClean != 1 | is.na(infoSearch$attribute
Clean)] 
   
#delete unnecessary column 
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infoSearch[, "attributeClean" := NULL] 
   
#create counter variable for attribute-wise search (focusing on the same attribute   
when inspecting different alternatives) 
infoSearch <- setDT(infoSearch)[, counter:= rleid(environment, trial, attribute)] #si
nce additional eye fixations have been deleted, when there is an eye fixation on the  
same attribute, it must belong to a different alternative 
   
#create attribute-wise patterns (i.e. sequences of letters) based  on counter variable 
attwiseStrings <- infoSearch[,list(string <- paste(attribute, collapse = ""), participant 
= unique(participant), environment = unique(environment), trial = unique(trial)), b
y = counter] 
   
#delete patterns of length three or less 
attwiseStrings <- subset(attwiseStrings, nchar(as.character(V1)) >= 4) 
   
#delete counter variable   
attwiseStrings[, "counter" := NULL] 
   
#rename column 
setnames(attwiseStrings, "V1", "pattern") 
   
#calculate the frequency of occurrence for each pattern within each trial,                 
environment and for every participant  
attwisePatternsCountRan <- as.data.table(with(attwiseStrings, table(pattern, trial, e
nvironment, participant))) 
 
attwisePatternsCountRan <- attwisePatternsCountRan[attwisePatternsCountRan$N !
= 0] 




#replicate the 'attwiseSim' function 10000 times #### 
 
attwiseSimRep <- do.call("rbind", replicate(10000, attwiseSim(), simplify=FALSE 
))  
 
#calculate the probabilities and probability complements #### 
 
#write a function which compares the pattern frequencies in original and simulated 
data sets for each participant, environment and trial 
attwiseProb <- function(i){ 
sum(attwiseSimRep$pattern == attwisePatternsCount$pattern[i] & attwiseSimRep$
participant == attwisePatternsCount$participant[i] & attwiseSimRep$environment =
= attwisePatternsCount$environment[i] & attwiseSimRep$trial == attwisePatternsC
ount$trial[i] & attwiseSimRep$N >= attwisePatternsCount$pattFreq[i]) 
} 
 
#apply the 'attwiseProb' function 
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attwisePatternsCount$pattFreqSim <- sapply(1:nrow(attwisePatternsCount), attwise
Prob)  
 
attwisePatternsCount$probability <- attwisePatternsCount$pattFreqSim / 10000 
 
#calculate the probability complement 
attwisePatternsCount$prob_complement <- 1 - attwisePatternsCount$probability 
 
#calculate the pattern length 
attwisePatternsCount$pattLength <- nchar(attwisePatternsCount$pattern) 
 
#save the table 
write.csv(file="fileName.csv", x=attwisePatternsCount) #in case we want to            
perform some data analysis without doing the simulation again 
 
#calculate numerator for Systematicity of Search Index for alternative-wise patterns 
(numerator = length of each unique pattern *  frequency of each unique pattern *    
probability complement) 
altwisePatternsCount$numerator <- altwisePatternsCount$pattFreq * altwisePatterns
Count$pattLength * altwisePatternsCount$prob_complement 
sysAltwise <- ddply(altwisePatternsCount,.(participant, environment, trial), summar
ize, altwiseSum = sum(numerator)) 
 
#format the data 
sysAltwise <- as.data.table(sysAltwise) 
sysAltwise$participant <- as.numeric(sysAltwise$participant) 
sysAltwise$trial <- as.numeric(sysAltwise$trial) 
sysAltwise <- sysAltwise[order(participant, environment, trial),]   
 
#merge in the string length (eye fixations of the entire sample)  
sysAltwise <- merge(sysAltwise, stringLength, by = c("participant", "environment", 
"trial"), all = T) 
sysAltwise[is.na(sysAltwise)] <- 0 
 
#calculate numerator for Systematicity of Search Index for attribute-wise patterns    
(numerator = length of each unique pattern * frequency of each unique pattern *        
probability complement) 
attwisePatternsCount$numerator <- attwisePatternsCount$pattFreq * attwisePatterns
Count$pattLength * attwisePatternsCount$prob_complement 
sysAttwise <- ddply(attwisePatternsCount,.(participant, environment, trial), summar
ize, attwiseSum = sum(numerator)) 
 
#format the data 
sysAttwise <- as.data.table(sysAttwise) 
sysAttwise$participant <- as.numeric(sysAttwise$participant) 
sysAttwise$trial <- as.numeric(sysAttwise$trial) 
sysAttwise <- sysAttwise[order(participant, environment, trial),]   
 
#merge in the string length (eye fixations of the entire sample)  
sysAttwise <- merge(sysAttwise, stringLength, by = c("participant", "environment", 
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"trial"), all = T) 
sysAttwise[is.na(sysAttwise)] <- 0 
 
#calculate Systematicity of Search Index #### 
sysIndex <- merge(sysAltwise, sysAttwise, by = c("participant", "environment", "tri
al"), all = T) 
sysIndex$N.x <- NULL #delete unnecessary column 
setnames(sysIndex, "N.y", "stringLength") #rename column 
sysIndex$sysIndex <- (sysIndex$altwiseSum + sysIndex$attwiseSum) / sysIndex$st
ringLength 
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Appendix F 
Overview of prediction success tables per conditions 
Table F1 Prediction success table for alternative array condition 







Actual Alternatives (1) (2) (3) (4)   
(1) A 64 7 4 10 85 24.15 
(2) B 15 58 12 11 96 27.27 
(3) C 8 7 64 8 87 24.72 
(4) D 6 20 5 53 84 23.86 
Column Total (N.i) 93 92 85 82 352 100 
Predicted Share (%) 
(N.i/N..)*100 
26.42 26.14 24.15 23.3 100  
Proportion successfully 
predicted (%) (Nii/N.i)*100 
68.82 63.04 75.29 64.63   
Success index 42.40 36.91 51.15 41.34   
Percent error in predicted 
share 100*(Ni. – Ni.)/N.. 
-2.27 1.14 0.57 0.57   
Overall PSI (predicted share 
* success index) 
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Table F2 Prediction success table for attribute array condition 







Actual Alternatives (1) (2) (3) (4)   
(1) A 53 13 10 17 93 26.42 
(2) B 9 67 12 11 99 28.13 
(3) C 5 7 46 11 69 19.60 
(4) D 9 10 15 57 91 25.85 
Column Total (N.i) 76 97 83 96 352 100 
Predicted Share (%) 
(N.i/N..)*100 
21.59 27.56 23.60 27.27 100  
Proportion successfully 
predicted (%) (Nii/N.i)*100 
69.74 69.07 55.42 59.38   
Success index 48.15 41.52 31.84 32.10   
Percent error in predicted 
share 100*(Ni. – Ni.)/N.. 
4.83 0.57 -3.98 -1.42   
Overall PSI (predicted share 
* success index) 
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Table F3 Prediction success table for matrix condition 







Actual Alternatives (1) (2) (3) (4)   
(1) A 49 10 2 15 76 21.59 
(2) B 8 69 9 8 94 26.70 
(3) C 6 15 47 9 77 21.88 
(4) D 14 8 8 75 105 29.83 
Column Total (N.i) 77 102 66 107 352 100 
Predicted Share (%) 
(N.i/N..)*100 
21.88 28.98 18.75 30.40 100  
Proportion successfully 
predicted (%) (Nii/N.i)*100 
63.64 67.68 71.21 70.09   
Success index 41.76 38.67 52.46 39.70   
Percent error in predicted 
share 100*(Ni. – Ni.)/N.. 
-0.28 -2.27 3.13 -0.57   
Overall PSI (predicted share 
* success index) 
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Table F4 Prediction success table for random matrix condition 







Actual Alternatives (1) (2) (3) (4)   
(1) A 48 11 13 16 88 25 
(2) B 15 52 14 12 93 26.42 
(3) C 12 9 46 12 79 22.44 
(4) D 11 14 9 58 92 26.14 
Column Total (N.i) 86 86 82 98 352 100 
Predicted Share (%) 
(N.i/N..)*100 
24.43 24.43 23.3 27.84 100  
Proportion successfully 
predicted (%) (Nii/N.i)*100 
55.81 60.47 56.10 59.18   
Success index 31.38 36.03 32.80 31.34   
Percent error in predicted 
share 100*(Ni. – Ni.)/N.. 
0.57 1.99 -0.85 -1.7   
Overall PSI (predicted share 
* success index) 
0.33   
 
 
 
